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ABSTRACT
THE SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GADAMER*S HERMENEUTICS
by
Thomas G. McGowan 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1988
This study is a social-theoretical analysis of Hans- 
Georg Gadamer*s philosophical hermeneutics. Special 
attention is paid to Gadamer*s analysis of the nature of 
interpretation, which is based in part on Martin Heidegger's 
concept of the fore-structure of understanding. This 
Heideggerian concept, which implies that interpretation 
cannot proceed without a prior understanding of its object, 
reappears in Gadamer*s work in his notion of the prejudiced 
condition of interpretation. According to Gadamer, 
interpretation is prejudiced because it involves the 
application of preconscious linguistical concepts the truth 
status of which is assumed during their moment of 
application. Gadamer rejects a strictly pejorative view of 
prejudices, however, viewing them as necessary preliminary 
judgments of meaning that may be true or false. For 
Gadamer, the task we face is to experience prejudices 
consciously by bringing into discourse their tacit 
semantical content. This process is defined by Gadamer as 
the experience of hermeneutical reflection. Hermeneutical
reflection yields an "effective-historical consciousness,” 
consciousness that is aware of the anterior and meaning- 
constitutive effect of one's existence within a linguistic 
tradition. The interpretive-sociological contributions of 
Max Weber, Alfred Schutz and G. H. Mead are also discussed 
and contrasted with Gadamer's analysis of the prejudiced 
nature of interpretation. The social-theoretical reception 
of Gadamer is also discussed. It is argued that Anthony 
Giddens and Jurgen Habermas misunderstand Gadamer1s claim 
regarding the universality of hermeneutics and consequently 
fail to grasp the full significance of his hermeneutics for 
sociology. In the case of Giddens, the implications of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics are limited to the theoretical realm 
in Habermas, the implications are taken to be strictly 
methodological. It is argued that the sociological 
significance of Gadamer is topical, as well as theoretical 
and methodological. By "topical" we mean that Gadamer's 
hermeneutics may be used to introduce new topics and 
questions for research within sociology. It is proposed 
that sociologists begin studying the distribution of 
prejudices across groups and the stratification and 




NATURE, SCOPE AND PURPOSE
It may be noted, to paraphrase Whitehead, 
that sociological theory has for some time 
been living off the intellectual capital 
of previous centuries.
So began Walter Buckley's Sociology and Modern Systems 
Theory. The main thrust of the work was its critique of 
"functional" or "consensus" social theories rooted in 
"organismic system models laid down during previous 
centuries."1 This critique was based on the argument that 
such approaches are incapable of accounting for the 
inherently processual nature of human behavior and social 
organization. Central to the thesis was the notion that the 
socio-cultural system should be conceptualized as a complex 
adaptive system based on the organization of information and 
meaning.2 While the project at hand differs substantially 
from Buckley's of twenty years ago, the two share some 
striking structural similarities the illumination of which
1 Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 1.
2 Drawing from a diverse body of literature from this 
century, Buckley argued for a fundamental shift in the 
conceptualization of social systems. Instead of 
conceptualizing social systems in terms of reified analogies 
between biological organisms and social structure, Buckley 
conceptualized social systems in terms of the relationship 
between the organization of information and social action, 
both at the micro and macro levels.
1
will serve to put the present discussion in context.
Buckley faced the task of articulating the potential 
sociological importance of theoretical concepts that were 
alien to sociology. While the general systems approach of 
such thinkers as von Bertalanffy and Rapoport had already 
touched numerous fields, their works had yet to be explored 
by sociologists. Despite “recent signs of such stirrings," 
wrote Buckley, "hardly any of the intellectual ferment it 
(general- systems research) has occasioned has penetrated 
sociology."3 Buckley's goal, therefore, was to introduce 
sociologists to the key principles and insights of general 
systems theory and research. Similarly, the present work 
faces the task of demonstrating the potential sociological 
importance of a body of literature unfamiliar to most 
sociologists. The hermeneutical4 insights of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, while enjoying relatively wide currency in such 
fields as philosophy and literary criticism, have yet to be 
mined for their full sociological importance.0
The task of articulating the potential sociological 
importance of theoretical insights alien to sociology is a
3 Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. 1967, 
p. vii.
4 Hermeneutics is defined in this study as the study of 
interpretation.
0 Anthony Giddens and Jurgen Habermas are the only 
social theorists that X know of to have discussed Gadamer's 
work in relation to sociology. Their respective analyses of 
Gadamer are discussed in detail in chapter five.
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difficult one. First, one must contend with what might be 
termed "paradigmatic territorialism," the tendency for 
established authorities in a disciplinary matrix to ignore 
or discredit fresh insights that might threaten the 
comfortable status they have come to attain. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, one must be sensitive to the 
language differences which often separate the alien 
literature from the sociological. In the case of Buckley's 
project, it was quite clear that the vocabulary of systems 
theory constituted a very different "language game" than 
that with which most sociologists were accustomed.6
6 It should be noted that the difficulties faced by 
Buckley went beyond paradigmatic territorialism and 
misinterpretation. By attacking the theoretical center of 
American sociology, Parsonian functionalism, Buckley was at 
the same time attacking the conservative political nature of 
mainstream American sociology. Sociology and Modern Systems 
Theory therefore attacked traditional American sociology on 
two fronts: the theoretical and the political. The extent 
to which the latter factor contributed to what George Ritzer 
describes as systems theory's "meteoric rise and fall" 
within sociology is an open question (see George Ritzer 
Sociological Theory (New York: Knopf, 1983), pp. 397-401. 
However, Ritzer does not offer any explanation as to why the 
initial excitement surrounding Sociology and Modern Systems 
Theory gave way to indifference in a relatively short period 
of time. One thing is clear, however: some critics 
mistakenly interpreted Buckley's project as being 
"conservative" in nature. As a result, Buckley came under 
fire from the "left” as well as from the "right.” As Ritzer 
points out, the dialectical nature of Buckley's systems 
theory is similar to Marxist theories of social change and 
conflict theory in general. That some commentators mistook 
Buckley's project for being conservative in nature most 
probably resulted from systems theory's resemblence to 
cybernetics or control theory. Although Buckley did 
distinguish social systems theory from cybernetics it is 
arguable that he did not emphasize strongly enough the open- 
endedness of human interpretation and social action vis-a- 
vis technological control systems.
3
An American sociologist exploring the significance of 
hermeneutics faces similar problems. First, there is the 
paradigmatic barrier, and the opposition which is to be 
expected simply because one is exploring unfamiliar 
theoretical landscapes. But here the plot thickens.
Compared to the interpretive problems experienced by 
Buckley, those anticipated with regard to this project are 
much more deeply rooted. Hermeneutics, first of all, is a 
philosophical tradition. While some sociologists recognize 
the importance of philosophy for the practice of sociology, 
many do not. Generally speaking, then, it is not surprising 
that hermeneutics is unfamiliar to most sociologists. What 
is perhaps more important, however, is that hermeneutics is 
grounded in European, primarily German, philosophy. This 
means that hermeneutics is both paradigmatically and 
culturally foreign to American sociology.
As Thompson points out, there is a "longstanding 
insularity with regard to Continental traditions of thought 
in the English-speaking world."7 This "insularity" has 
undoubtedly contributed to the general failure of American 
sociologists to take into account that which is of value in 
the hermeneutic literature. It would be incorrect, however, 
to explain the ambiguity and misunderstanding regarding
7 John P. Thompson, "Introduction," in his translation 
of Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1981), p. 1.
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hermeneutics exclusively in terms of American 
provincialism.8 As Giddens argues, American and Anglo-Saxon 
sociology has been dominated by views which draw their 
inspiration from "positivistic or naturalistic philosophies 
of natural science."8 Such views of science, which reduce 
meaning to observable "facts," are antithetical to 
hermeneutics, which takes the interpretation of meaning to 
be its primary goal. It is clear, then, that there are at 
least two reasons why the hermeneutic tradition has 
generally been either ignored or misunderstood within 
American sociology: 1) American sociology's general 
detachment from European philosophy, and 2) the dominance of 
positivism within American sociology.10
8 The provincialism of which I speak is perhaps most 
evident in the general failure of the American education 
system to successfully teach students foreign languages.
While it is mandatory for many students to study foreign 
languages, it is not mandatory that they actually Isarn a 
foreign language, in any practical sense of the term.
9 Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social 
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p.
1. Giddens defines positivism broadly in terms of logic and 
method. According to Giddens, social scientists following 
the logic of Carnap, Hempel and Nagel; and the methodology of 
Comte and Durkheim, would be considered "positivists.”
10 It is fairly clear that one of the factors 
contributing to American sociology's detachment from 
European philosophy is the language barrier mentioned above.
It should be noted that a non-German-speaking American would 
not have been able to study the sociological significance of 
hermeneutics until very recently. (For example, Heidegger's 
Being and Time was only made available in English in 1962; 
Gadamer's Truth and Method, in 1975.) Fortunately, there 
now exists a considerable body of translated materials, and 
this has made possible an exclusively American study of 
hermeneutics.
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Where it has been ignored, the meaning of hermeneutics 
simply appears ambiguous within sociology. Where it has 
been misunderstood, however, hermeneutics has come to carry 
with it strictly negative connotations. The closest 
sociology has come to direct contact with hermeneutics is 
found in the work of Hax Weber, in particular, in his 
conception of Verstehen as an interpretive-sociological 
method. As we shall see in chapter six, however, two of the 
most influential English translations of Weber's work 
seem to have misconstrued several of his key concepts, 
including his conception of Verstehen. These translations 
are largely responsible for the fact that in the minds of 
many American sociologists Verstehen. and by association 
hermeneutics, is likely to represent a pre-scientific method 
based on empathetic introspection. When combined with the 
positivist bias in American sociology against humanistic or 
"soft" social science, the result has been a view of 
hermeneutics which is largely pejorative. To put it mildly, 
such misunderstanding regarding the nature and scope of 
hermeneutics has served to deter its sociological study.11
Another structural similarity between this work and
11 In addition to my review of the literature, these 
observations regarding the ambiguity and misunderstanding 
regarding the nature and scope of hermeneutics within 
sociology has been further supported by personal experience, 
such as conversations which I have had with graduate 
students and professors over the past two years, both at the 
UNH and at the annual meetings of the American Sociological 
Association and the Society for the Study of Social Problems 
in Chicago, New York, and Washington.
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Buckley's concerns the scope of its discussion. Buckley's 
project was not "an attempt at a definitive review of 
current systems theory in all its sprawling ramifications, 
but rather a selective emphasis on contributions of 
potential significance to the sociological perspective.a>12 
Similarly, this study is not an attempt at a definitive 
review of hermeneutics. It is, instead, a very selective 
analysis of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. This study is selective in another sense. It will 
not involve philosophical commentary on the larger issues 
and questions related to the concepts under consideration, 
nor will it attempt to consider developments in the field of 
cognitive psychology which might be relevant to Gadamer's 
analysis of the nature of interpretation. Such concerns, 
while relevant, simply lie beyond the scope of this study.
He will, however 1) discuss the critical social-theoretical 
reception of Gadamer (chapter five) and 2) compare his 
hermeneutics to various theories within interpretive 
sociology (chapter six).
These introductory remarks are intended to make explicit 
the problems which must be taken into account before 
proceeding with our discussion. Specifically, the 
discussion must be sensitive to the fact that its reception 
will be conditioned by the structural factors mentioned
12 Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. 1967,
p. 2.
7
above. Perhaps the most important of these factors is the 
language difference which separates hermeneutics from 
sociology. We are not referring here to the difference 
between English and German, although this difference of 
course complicates and limits the study of hermeneutics 
within American sociology. We are, instead, referring to 
the terminological differences between sociology and 
hermeneutics. Heidegger's writing, for example, would no 
doubt appear obscure and impenetrable to most sociologists 
if presented in its original (albeit translated) form, for 
many of his concepts are philosophical in nature and draw 
from intellectual traditions foreign to sociology. In 
light of this, an effort will be made to demystify and 
clarify the more philosophical and abstract concepts by re­
expressing them in terms familiar to sociologists whenever 
possible.
The purpose of this study is to establish the 
significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics for sociology. Our 
discussion of Gadamer's hermeneutics focuses primarily on 
his analysis of the nature of understanding and 
interpretation.13 As we shall see, his work is significant
13 It should be noted at this point that both Heidegger 
and Gadamer define understanding ontologically as our way of 
being: we understand simply by virtue of the fact that we 
are human beings existing in a meaningful world. 
Interpretation is what understanding becomes at any 
particular moment; it is the way understanding happens. We 
may say that understanding is our ability to relate to the 
world in a meaningful way, while interpretation is the 
manifestation of this ability in particular situations.
8
for sociology on three levels, the 1) theoretical,
2) methodological, and 3) topical.
On a theoretical level, Gadamer*s hermeneutics provides 
us with an opportunity to inform and refine existent social 
theory by specifying the experience of interpretation and 
its relationship to the social construction of reality. As 
we shall see, Gadamer*s insights into the nature of 
interpretation are particularly important for the question 
of the relationship between individual and social structure. 
In addition, Gadamer's hermeneutics clears the way for the 
development of a theory of interpretive violence. Such a 
theory, the basic points of which are outlined in chapter 
seven, attempts to locate the roots of social and economic 
domination at the interpretive level, a level arguably more 
primary than that studied by Marxist and critical theory.
On the methodological level, Gadamer*s hermeneutics 
shows us what interpretation always involves. It also shows 
us that methodologically guided or "thematized" 
interpretation errs if it assumes that it is possible to 
separate the researcher from his or her linguistic 
tradition. While this contention of Gadamer*s is 
responsible for much of the attention which he has received 
in philosophical circles, it is not the aspect of his work 
with which we are primarily concerned.
It is the view of this study that the central 
significance of Gadamer*s hermeneutics lies at the topical
9
level. We mean by this that Gadamer's work enables us to 
bring into sociological discourse research topics and 
questions that are both interesting and important. Xn the 
course of our discussion we will identify two such topics 
and demonstrate why they are deserving of sociological 
study. In chapter seven we will specify how sociologists 
might begin to study these topics empirically. The fourfold 
purpose of this work, therefore, is to 1) introduce 
sociologists to the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 2) discuss 
two research topics which he has identified, 3) demonstrate 
why these topics should be studied sociologically, and 
4) specify how we might begin to study these topics 
empirically.1 4
14 The two research topics alluded to are 1) the study 
of the prejudiced nature of interpretation and 2) the 
experience of hermeneutical reflection whereby we 
consciously experience the meaning of linguistical concepts 
which are typically assumed or taken for granted.
1 0
What Is Hermeneutics?
The term "hermeneutics" is derived from the Greek verb 
hermeneuein. which essentially means, to interpret.10 Those 
versed in Greek mythology may remember that Hermes was the 
messenger of the gods. It is often said, however, that 
while delivering a message may be straightforward enough, 
interpreting its meaning is something quite different. 
Hermeneutics has traditionally concerned itself with the 
problems which hinder interpretation. Bleicher defines 
hermeneutics generally as "the theory of the interpretation 
of meaning."16 For our purposes, we will define 
hermeneutics generally as the study of Interpretation.
The first hermeneuticists, or hermeneuticians, as they 
are also called,17 were concerned with questions regarding 
the authenticity of sacred texts. Thus early on 
hermeneutics, as a sub-field of theology, took the form of a 
methodology. It is important to note that traditional 
hermeneutics, initially serving theology and eventually
10 Hendrik Birus, "Hermeneutics today: Some skeptical 
remarks." New German Critique, No. 42, 1981, p. 73. This 
short paper provides a brief discussion of the etymology of 
the term.
16 Josef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics (London: 
Routledge, 1980), p. 268.
17 Robert Perinbanayagm uses the term "hermeneutician" 
in his work Signifying Acts (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1985), p. 1. Hendrik Birus, on the other 
hand, uses the term "hermeneuticist," in his paper 
"Hermeneutics today," 1981.
1 1
jurisprudence and philology, viewed interpretation in a 
strictly methodological sense.18 During the nineteenth 
century, largely due to the influence of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, hermeneutics came to be applied to problems 
regarding the interpretation of history in general and was 
thereby expanded into a general discipline. In the late 
nineteenth century Wilhelm Dilthey attempted to use 
hermeneutics to lay the ground for a methodology of the 
human sciences, thus bringing traditional hermeneutics into 
contact with psychology and sociology. In the twentieth 
century, as a result of the philosophical application of 
hermeneutics by Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, the 
scope of hermeneutics has been widened even further. It is 
Gadamer's claim that the scope of hermeneutics is universal. 
that is, relevant to all fields of study as well as to the 
study of interpretation itself. While this claim is 
disputed by certain thinkers, such as Jtirgen Habermas, and 
must be closely examined, it is beyond dispute that the 
study of interpretation is no longer bound to the 
disciplines within which it has traditionally been applied.
Philosophical hermeneutics refers specifically to the 
hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, and by association, to
18 For descriptions of the historical development of 
hermeneutics see Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social 
Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Brice 
R. Wachterhauser, ed., Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1986) ; Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, The 
Hermeneutics Reader (New York: Continuum, 1988).
1 2
Martin Heidegger. Their work marks a radical departure from 
traditional hermeneutics and its methodological view of 
interpretation. Within philosophical hermeneutics 
interpretation is viewed as something we all do naturally 
simply as a result of our existence within a linguistic and 
historical world: we are interpretive beings. According to 
philosophical hermeneutics, while we may thematize or 
methodologize interpretation it is a mistake to believe that 
interpretation itself is a method. Philosophical 
hermeneutics concerns itself primarily with the study of the 
nature of understanding and interpretation, and relates its 
findings to matters philosophical.
Following Heidegger, Gadamer takes the scope of 
hermeneutics to include all aspects of human experience. To 
Gadamer, human experience is. hermeneutical. Grasping this, 
the notion that experience itself is interpretive or 
hermeneutical, is the key to understanding Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. We will discuss the interpretive or 
hermeneutical nature of experience in chapter four.
Gadamer's hermeneutics focuses on the nature of 
interpretation and seeks to apply his findings to classical 
problems within philosophy, such as the question of truth 
and the nature of method. He is concerned with the 
relationship between hermeneutics and the human sciences and 
philosophy, and it is to members of these disciplines that 
his discussion is aimed. This is important and must be kept
13
in mind, for Gadamer's audience was not intended to include 
sociologists. It is understandable, therefore, why Gadamer 
does not explore the significance of his hermeneutics for 
sociology. With the exception of Anthony Giddens and Jfirgen 
Habermas I am unaware of any efforts to explore the 
importance of Gadamer's hermeneutics for sociology. As we 
shall see, however, the respective analyses of Gadamer by 
Giddens and Habermas are both extremely limited, and provide 
little toward establishing the significance of his work for 
sociology.
14
Plan of the Chapters 
This work is not an exercise in abstract theorizing or 
armchair social-philosophizing. Our interest in 
hermeneutics stems from questions raised by qualitative 
social research. It is therefore a practical interest which 
guides this study, and it is the practical, as well as 
theoretical, importance of Gadamer's hermeneutics which we 
aim to establish for sociology. The research that gave rise 
to this study was performed within the disciplinary matrix 
known as environmental sociology, a sub-discipline which has 
so far in its brief existence slighted the interpretive 
dimensions of social action. We will begin our discussion 
in chapter two, then, with a general overview of 
environmental sociology, before turning our attention to a 
case study of the town of Milford, New Hampshire, where five 
years ago toxic wastes were found to have contaminated 
public water supplies. As a research assistant to Professor 
Lawrence Hamilton, I performed a secondary analysis of 
survey data from Milford which focused on the citizens' 
interpretations of the importance of the contamination 
incident. While we were able to use the statements provided 
by the townspeople to explain the interpretive change 
experienced by some of them regarding the importance of 
water-protection issues, our analysis actually raised more 
questions than it answered. These questions pointed to the
15
need for a comprehensive analysis of the nature of 
interpretation. It was for this reason, after having looked 
unsuccessfully for such a theory within interpretive 
sociology, that I came to study the philosophical 
hermeneutics of Gadamer. Our discussion in chapter two is 
thus a means to an end, the end being the central research 
question of this work: what is the nature of interpretation?
In chapter three we discuss in detail the philosophical 
hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, focusing for the most 
part on his analysis of interpretation as presented in Truth 
and Method. Because of the importance of Martin Heidegger’s 
work for Gadamer, we will discuss in an extremely selective 
way several aspects of Heidegger's Being and Time. Through 
our discussion of Gadamer we will be able to conceptualize 
an answer to our central research question.
In chapter four we discuss Gadamer's response to his 
findings regarding the nature of interpretation. As we 
shall see, his analysis establishes, at least on a 
theoretical level, that interpretation is prejudiced. By 
prejudiced Gadamer means that interpretation always includes 
a prior understanding of its object.19 In Gadamer's view, 
the prejudices constitutive of interpretation are in some 
cases true and in other cases false. What is problematic 
about the prejudiced nature of interpretation is not its
19 This insight is actually Heidegger's. Gadamer takes 
this insight and develops it into an elaborate analysis of 
the linguisticality of understanding and interpretation.
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prejudiced nature per Be, but the fact that false prejudices 
are free to constitute false interpretations without our 
even knowing it. This is because, being preconscious,20 the 
truth status of prejudices is taken-for-granted during their 
moment of application. Gadamer thus calls for the 
cultivation of an "effective-historical consciousness," a 
consciousness which admits its prejudiced nature and seeks 
to become aware of the false prejudices it has typically 
left unquestioned. After exploring Gadamer's concern over 
the tyrannical effect of false prejudices we will discuss 
his notion of hermeneutical reflection, the experience 
through which one develops an effective-historical 
consciousness. Before concluding chapter four the nature of 
hermeneutical reflection is specified in terms of Gadamer's 
notion of "linguisticality" and discussed in relation to his 
controversial theory of truth.
Following our exposition of Gadamer's hermeneutics we 
will discuss in chapter five its critical reception within 
social theory by examining the writings of Anthony Giddens 
and Jdrgen Habermas. As we shall see, neither of these 
preeminent social theorists has succeeded in drawing out the
20 The term "preconscious" is used in this study to 
denote assumptions and linguistical concepts which may be 
experienced consciously through hermeneutical reflection 
(reflection on the prejudices which constitute interpretive 
experience). The term preconscious is thus distinct from 
subconscious, which typically refers to psychological 
processes.
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sociological significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics in its 
fullest sense. In Giddens' case, his concern over Gadamer 
is limited to the theoretical level. While it is true that 
he demonstrates a general grasp of one of Gadamer's central 
notions (the notion that understanding is ontological) by 
successfully applying it in his theory of structuration, it 
is also true that he misinterprets a number of key 
Gadamerian points. More importantly, Giddens simply fails 
to see beyond the general theoretical importance of Gadamer. 
In the case of Habermas, the sociological significance of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics is viewed in exclusively 
methodological terms. Habermas' debate with Gadamer over 
the nature and scope of hermeneutics, does, however, 
represent an important contribution on Habermas' behalf to 
the social-theoretical discourse on Gadamer, and we will 
discuss the debate in detail. However, aside from Habermas' 
criticisms of Gadamer, and his methodological interpretation 
of the importance of his hermeneutics, Habermas offers us 
little in the way of establishing the full significance of 
Gadamer's work for sociology. Both Habermas and Giddens 
overlook the topical significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics. 
That is, they fail to see how Gadamer's work provides us 
with interesting and important research topics deserving of 
sociological analysis.
In chapter six we discuss the contributions of 
interpretive sociology and relate them to Gadamer's analysis
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of the nature of interpretation. We begin our discussion 
with an analysis of Max Weber's conception of interpretive 
sociology. Our discussion focuses on the fact that Weber 
has been misinterpreted and misrepresented by his early 
translators and expounders and consequently has been subject 
to unwarranted criticism in American sociology. After 
examining the revisionist Weberian literature we discuss the 
work of Alfred Schutz, and conclude by analyzing several of 
G. H. Mead's key concepts.
In chapter seven, the concluding chapter of this study, 
the theoretical and practical significance of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics is discussed. On the theoretical level we 
1} discuss how Gadamer's hermeneutics helps us better to 
understand the relationship between individual and social 
structure, and 2) outline the basic principles of a theory 
of interpretive violence. The latter is accomplished by 
distinguishing the concepts of "violence" from "power," and 
then elaborating this distinction in terms of Gadamer's 
analysis of the nature of interpretation. On the practical 
level we identify two research topics deserving of 
sociological research. The first is the topic of the 
prejudiced nature of interpretation. Following Gadamer, 
prejudices are operationally defined as preconscious 
linguistical concepts which are implicitly associated with 
particular words. It is proposed that through interviewing 
people and asking them to define the meanings they
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implicitly associate with certain words we will be able to 
study the extent to which prejudices are in fact 
constitutive of particular interpretations of social reality 
and social action. The second topic which we propose to 
study is hermeneutical reflection, the experience through 
which people come to experience consciously the prejudiced 
nature of interpretation. Hermeneutical reflection is 
operationally defined as an experience in which we 
consciously experience the meaning of linguistical concepts 
that are typically assumed or taken for granted. It is 
proposed that through an experimental research design 
sociologists may study the mediating and transformational 
effect of hermeneutical reflection on prejudices. In light 
of Gadamer's methodological critique, this proposition 
raises interesting methodological questions which are 
discussed in the final pages of our study.
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CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF RESEARCH PROBLEM
Our interest in Gadamer's hermeneutics grows out of an 
interest in the relationship between interpretation and 
environmental concern. It is this original interest, and 
the problems which we encountered while pursuing it, which 
constitutes the focus of this chapter. Following a brief 
overview of the field of environmental sociology our 
attention turns to a discussion of a case study of immediate 
environmental concern. This study aims to explain 
interpretive differences observed in Milford, New Hampshire 
where five years ago close to half of the town's water 
supply was lost to toxic contamination. The data set from 
Milford, collected by Professor Lawrence C. Hamilton, 
provides a unique opportunity for studying interpretation 
within the context of environmental sociology. The focus of 
our analysis falls on examining why some townspeople came to 
interpret water-protection as an important political issue, 
while others did not. As we shall see, however, rather than 
providing answers to the more important questions regarding 
interpretation and environmental concern, our analysis 
simply demonstrates the need for a rigorous and thorough 
analysis of the nature of interpretation itself.
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Interpretation and Environmental Sociology 
Since 1970 the relationship between society and the 
environment has attracted an increasing amount of 
sociological attention.1 As more sociologists grew 
concerned with environmental issues and problems, it became 
clear that a new sociological specialization was emerging- 
"environmental sociology".2 Toward the end of the 1970's, 
some sociologists were claiming that environmental sociology 
had become a paradigm in its own right.3
The principal feature distinguishing environmental 
sociology from other areas of specialization is its
1 K. D. Van Liere and R. E. Dunlap, "Environmental 
concern: Does it make a difference how it's measured?" 
Environment and Behavior, Vol. 13 No. 6, 1981, p. 651.
2 R. E. Dunlap and W. R. Catton, Jr., "Environmental 
sociology." Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 5, 1979,
p. 243.
3 This claim was first made by W. R. Catton, Jr. and R. 
E. Dunlap in their paper "Environmental sociology: a new 
paradigm." American Sociologist 1978, Vol. 13, pp. 41-49. 
This claim, is problematic. Generally speaking, while 
Catton and Dunlap have successfully identified how several 
of the assumptions held by environmental sociologists 
diverge from the anthropocentric assumptions of traditional 
sociology, they have failed to demonstrate how the switch 
from an anthropocentric world-view to an ecological 
world-view would qualify, in itself, as a paradigmatic 
shift. For example, one of Thomas Kuhn's descriptions views 
paradigms as exemplars which define model problems and 
methodological approaches for scientists. It is problematic 
to claim that the overcoming of anthropo- centrism by 
sociologists would also be accompanied by a fundamental 
shift in the types of problems and methodological approaches 
chosen by them. See F. H. Buttel, "Environmental sociology: 
A new paradigm?" American Sociologist 1978, Vol. 13, pp. 
237-256 for an extended discussion of the problems with such 
a claim.
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assumption that society may be affected by "physical" 
factors which are "non-social" in nature. This assumption 
diverges from Durkheim's classical definition which views 
sociology as the process by which "social facts" are 
explained exclusively in terms of other "social facts."4
The "core" of environmental sociology is described as 
the "study of interactions between environment and 
society.”0 Its "basic task" involves seeking answers to two 
types of questions:
(a) How do interdependent variations in population, 
technology, culture, social systems, and 
personality systems influence the physical 
environment?
<b) How do resultant changes (and other variations) in 
the physical environment modify population, 
technology, culture, social systems, and 
personality systems, or any of the interrelations 
among them?6
These descriptions of environmental sociology's core and 
basic task explicitly emphasize the importance of society's 
interaction with the environment. However, a review of the 
literature suggests that the interpretive dimensions of this 
core process of interaction have generally been ignored by
4 W. R. Catton and R. E. Dunlap, "Environmental 
sociology: a new paradigm," 1978, p. 44.
0 Ibid., p. 44.
6 R. E. Dunlap and W. R. Catton, Jr., "Environmental 
sociology," 1979, p. 252.
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environmental sociologists.7 If one accepts the premise 
that interaction is an interpretive as well as biological 
process, then it becomes clear that environmental sociology 
must begin to study the interpretive dimensions of social 
action.
There are a number of reasons why the interpretive 
dimensions of social action have generally been ignored by 
environmental sociologists. Perhaps the most important of 
these reasons stems from environmental sociology's emphasis 
on "physical" or non-social variables, an emphasis which 
runs counter to interpretive sociology's emphasis on social 
meaning and symbolic interaction. The latter viewpoint, for 
example, is represented by Catton and Dunlap, who argue 
that "physical" factors become relevant "only if they are 
perceived and defined as such by the actors."6 Another 
reason might be that a fairly extensive literature has 
emerged from research conducted by environmental
7 Among the more notable exceptions is Levine's Love 
Canal. which evidences the importance of developing an 
interpretive tradition within environmental sociology.
Levine discovered that "the social actors at Love Canal were 
affected and behaved according to their perceptions and 
interpretations of the situation." A. G. Levine, Love 
Canal: Science. Politics and People. (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington, 1982), p. 1.
6 W. R. Catton, Jr. and R. E. Dunlap, "A new ecological 
paradigm for post-exuberant sociology." American Behavioral 
Scientist, Vol. 24 No.l, 1980, p. 21.
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psychologists, who have paid a “fair amount of attention"9 
to the cognitive levels of interaction.10 However, from an 
interpretive-sociological perspective, the approach of 
environmental psychologists appears deficient in several 
respects. When the cognitive and behavioral levels of 
societal-environmental interaction are approached from an 
exclusively psychological perspective, numerous 
societal-level factors are excluded from the analysis, and 
what is, in reality, a social process becomes reduced to a 
psychological one. Two of the more typical psychological 
reductions involve 1) treating the process of stimulus and 
response in a behaviorist fashion, that is, explaining 
output (response) exclusively in terms of input (stimulus); 
and 2) treating the individual, or "self," as a separate 
unit of analysis detached from larger societal influences.
From an interpretive standpoint, stimulus and response 
are viewed as a process which includes an interpretive 
individual. who mediates the meaning of the situation; and 
the individual or "self" is viewed as a social being whose 
personality and interpretive abilities are constituted via 
language and symbolic interaction with other social beings 
and institutions. When the differences between interpretive 
sociology and psychology are considered in terms of the core
9 R. E. Dunlap, and W. R. Catton, Jr., "Environmental 
sociology," 1979, p. 253.
10 See D. Stokols, "Environmental psychology." Annual 
Review of Psychology, 1978, Vol. 29, pp. 253-295.
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and basic task of environmental sociology, the benefits of 
applying interpretive-sociological theory within 
environmental sociology are clear. Unfortunately, as we 
shall see, interpretive sociology has yet to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the nature of interpretation. 
Hence, the assistance which interpretive sociology can 
provide regarding the process of interpretation as it 
relates to environmental concern is itself quite limited.
It is this realization that leads us to the study of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics.
There have been numerous empirical studies of
environmental concern11 and they have enabled sociologists
to gain a general understanding of its social bases.12 The
bulk of these studies, however, emphasize the relationship
between environmental concern and demographic variables, and
typically underemphasize or ignore cognitive variables. Van
Liere and Dunlap recognize the importance of cognitive
variables and argue that
in order to achieve a better understanding of the 
social bases of environmental concern researchers 
.... (should) pay at least as much attention to the 
cognitive as to the demographic determinants of
11 See R. E. Dunlap and K. D. Van Liere, "Environmental 
concern: a bibliography of environmental studies and brief 
appraisal of the literature," in Public Administration 
Series Bibliography 44. (Monticello, Illinois: Vance 
Bibliographies, 1978).
12 K. D. Van Liere and R. E. Dunlap, "The social bases 
of environmental concern: A review of hypotheses, 
explanations and empirical evidence." Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. 44, 1980, pp. 181-197.
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support for environmental protection.13 
The importance of considering cognitive variables in 
addition to demographic variables has been emphasized by 
other environmental sociologists.14
It is encouraging that environmental sociology is 
beginning to recognize the need to account for the mediating 
capability of social actors. It is unfortunate, however, 
that this capability is referred to as a "cognitive" 
variable. The problem with viewing the mediating capability 
of social actors, or "knowledgeability," as a cognitive 
variable is that it suggests that our interpretive faculty 
is exclusively psychological in nature.18 On the contrary, 
interpretation is viewed within interpretive sociology as an 
intersubiective process involving the mediation of shared 
meaning. As we shall see in chapter six, Max Weber states 
explicitly that interpretive sociology is not a part of 
psychology. It should be clear, then, that the effort to 
account for the knowledgeability of social actors within 
environmental sociology (and sociology in general) should 
focus on the social process of interpretation, rather than
13 Ibid., p. 194.
14 For example, L. C. Hamilton, "Concern about toxic 
wastes: Three demographic predictors." Sociological 
Perspectives, 1985, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 463-486.
18 In Anthony Giddens’ Profiles and Critiques in Social 
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), the 
term "knowledgeability" is used to signify the mediating 
capability of social actors.
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on psychological or cognitive processes.16
Our analysis of interpretation within the context of 
environmental sociology concerns differences in expressions 
of environmental concern. Implicit in the literature on 
environmental concern is a distinction between two types of 
environmental concern. These types may be termed 
"immediate" and "non-immediate." Before proceeding with our 
discussion of the Milford case study it will prove 
worthwhile to discuss the distinction between these distinct 
types of environmental concern.
As Schnaiberg points out, the "environmental movement" 
is "suffienctly diverse that a question arises as to whether 
it is really proper to label such diversity with a single 
name."17 This diversity stems from the different concerns 
held by various environmental groups, and also from 
differences in their "prescriptions for appropriate social 
changes." While the type and intensity of their 
environmental concern vary widely, all environmentalists are
16 This is not to say that there are no successful 
attempts to examine cognitive processes from a sociological 
perspective. For example, Aaron Cicourel has developed an 
area of research which he terms "cognitive sociology," which 
carefully takes into consideration the intersubjective or 
social nature of cognitive processes. See Aaron Cicourel, 
Cognitive Sociology (London: MacMillan, 1973). Nevertheless 
I believe the term "interpretive" is better suited to denote 
the process whereby people experience meaning in everyday 
life, for it explicitly acknowledges the constitutive 
importance of the other and society in general for the 
experience of meaning.
17 A. Schnaiberg, The Environment (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), p. 366.
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committed to the same broad goal of protecting the 
environment.18 Environmentalists tend to be younger, 
well-educated, and politically liberal.19
The broad concern over "protecting the environment," 
typical of professional environmentalists and members of 
national pro-environmental organizations such as the Sierra 
Club, the National Wildlife Federation, Friends of the 
Earth, and Environmental Action is very different than the 
type of concern found among the many local grassroots 
citizens' groups that have emerged to protest local 
environmental problems.20 For example, Hamilton has found 
that in the absence of immediate problems with community 
water supplies, water protection is typically viewed as an
18 N. Freudenberg, Not In Our Backyards (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1984), p. 252.
19 The description of environmentalists as "politically 
liberal" must be treated with caution, as there appears to 
be considerable diversity among contemporary 
environmentalists when it comes to liberalism and 
conservatism (see Kirkpatrick Sale, "The forest for the 
trees: Can today's environmentalists tell the difference?" 
Mother Jones, November, 1986, pp. 25-58.
2 ° According to Will Collette of the Citizens 
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, Inc., there are no less 
than 1700 citizens' groups in existence in North America (50 
in Canada) fighting problems related to toxic wastes.
Between 1982, when figures were first collected, and 1985, 
these groups were emerging at an approximate rate of 200 per 
year. Between 1985 and April of 1987, more than a thousand 
of these groups emerged either to protest the discovery of 
local toxic contamination or to fight the proposal of toxic 
waste dump sites or other threatening facilities. See N. 
Freudenberg's Not In Our Backyards
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984) for a comprehensive 
descriptive analysis of the history and development of such 
groups.
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"environmental" issue, with concern strongest among the more 
educated and environmentally active citizens.21 However, 
when a crisis appears, such as the discovery that local 
water supplies have been contaminated with toxic chemicals, 
water protection becomes viewed as a "health and safety" 
issue, and concern does not correlate with education. 
"Younger adults, parents of young children, and women are 
the groups most concerned after contamination has been 
discovered".22 The principal distinction, then, between 
local or "immediate" environmental concern and general or 
"non-immediate" concern is the fact that the former is 
prompted by an immediate threat to the health and safety of 
one's family and one's self, while the latter is not.
This distinction between "immediate" and "non-immediate" 
environmental concern can be likened to Deitz's distinction 
between "acute" and "chronic" risks.23 "Immediate"
21 L. C. Hamilton, Public Response to the Discovery of 
Water Contamination. (Durham, H. H.: Water Resource Research 
Center, University of New Hampshire, 1985).
22 Ibid., p. 1.
23 T. Dietz, "Comments on Perrow's 'Normal' 
Accidents..." Environmental Sociology: Newsletter of the 
American Sociological Association's Section on Environmental 
Sociology, Winter 1987. I am using the term "acute" in a 
broad sense here for it often takes years for the 
physiological effects of contamination exposure and 
ingestion to emerge. The interpretive and behavioral 
effects are more "acute" than the physiological effects 
since the discovery of contamination may directly affect 
one's routine, habits, and worldview. Dietz uses the 
distinction in the context of natural and man-made 
"disasters," while I am using it in the context of 
environmental concern.
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environmental concern is typically a response to acute 
health and safety risks posed by an environmental anomaly. 
"Non-immediate" or general environmental concern is 
typically a response to the chronic risks posed by our 
anthropocentric, techno-industrial, socio-economic system.
"Immediate" and "non-immediate" environmental concern 
can be further distinguished in terms of attitude, 
motivation and intention. Attitudinally, immediate 
environmental concern may be thought of as a "not in our 
backyard" attitude, compared to the "not anywhere" attitude 
of the non-immediately concerned.24 The intentions of these 
groups is also different. The "immediately" concerned 
generally aim to recover what might be considered to be a a 
normal relation to their environment by forcing government 
officials to eliminate the problem which is threatening
24 According to Will Collette (see note #20), while the 
concern of the citizens' groups stems from a "not in our 
backyard" attitude at first, it often broadens into a "not 
anywhere" attitude once the immediate problem is solved.
Many of these groups have expanded their interests and have 
grown into state, regional and even national organizations 
(for example, The Williamstown Health and Safety Committee 
grew into a state level organization called Vermonters 
Organized for Cleanup, and now consists of more than 20 
community groups; the Love Canal Homeowners Association, 
organized by Lois Gibbs, grew into the National 
Clearinghouse for Toxic Waste, Inc.). While a figure is not 
available on how many of the citizens' groups actually act 
more broadly once their immediate problem is solved, it is 
clear that many groups have had considerable impact beyond 
their immediate community.
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them.25 By contrast, environmentalists are primarily 
concerned with protecting the environment from present and 
future abuses.
Grassroots citizens' groups are motivated by health and 
safety risks posed by their close proximity to an 
environmental problem.26 By contrast, environmentalists may 
not be subjected to any acute environmental problems, and 
are motivated by general environmental concerns. These 
differences between immediate and non-immediate 
environmental concern are summarized below in table 1.
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parents with young children 
and women
younger adults, ■ 
higher educated 
and politically liberal
20 "Generally" because some citizens' groups organize 
to protest a proposal of some kind, such as the building of 
a toxic waste dump in their community.
26 Proximity to contamination problems is an important 
determinant of environmental concern (see L. C. Hamilton 
"Concern about toxic wastes: Three demographic predictors," 
1985; A. G. Levine, Love Canal. 1982; N. Freudenberg, Not In 
Our Backyards. 1984).
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Immediate Environmental Concern in Milford
The environmental concern observed in Milford, New 
Hampshire following the discovery of toxic contamination of 
one of its main wells is an example of immediate 
environmental concern. The environmental concern in Milford 
was immediate and local, and limited exclusively to a 
concern over a problem in the town’s own "backyard." The 
impetus for the concern was clearly the threat to the health 
and safety of townspeople, as well as the inconvenience 
resulting from the loss of a safe water supply. The aim of 
the concern was to conserve the water supplies that were not 
contaminated, and to secure a new water supply as soon as 
possible. And, as is generally the case with immediate 
environmental concern, concern in Milford was strongest 
among younger adults, parents with young children, and 
women.
On February 15, 1983 the residents of Milford, New 
Hampshire {population 8685) were informed that their public 
water supply had been contaminated by toxic wastes.27 
Routine state testing had detected unsafe levels of 
chlorinated hydrocarbons in the Savage well, which had
27 The Milford survey data were collected and first 
analyzed by Professor Lawrence C. Hamilton. This discussion 
of the Milford Case Study is based on an earlier paper 
entitled "Reflectivity and toxic wastes: An empirical, 
Meadian analysis," which I co-authored with Professor 
Hamilton and presented to the Environmental Sociology 
Section of the American Sociological Association during its 
annual meeting in New York, NY, August 30, 1986.
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provided the town with 40% of its total water supply.2e 
Following the discovery of the contamination, town officials 
"promptly took steps to notify the public, and closed down 
the well from which the contaminated samples had been 
drawn."2 9
While it was unclear exactly who or what was responsible 
for the contamination, suspicion pointed to one or more of 
the four manufacturing firms located near the Savage well. 
According to Hamilton, between the years 1948 and 1979 one 
or more of these firms had been dumping chemicals in the 
town landfill, located within the same aquifer. 
Interestingly, in 1978 one of the industries was involved in 
a clean-up after heavy metals were discovered overflowing 
from the firm's property into a drainage swale. However, 
because there was "no capability to test for volatile 
organic chemicals at the level of parts per billion" the 
possibility that the contamination might have affected
29 According to Hamilton, chlorinated hydrocarbons are 
commonly used as industrial degreasers. The testing had 
been been performed by the Water Supply and Pollution 
Control Commission. L. C. Hamilton, Household Conservation 
During Water Emergencies: Two Case Studies (Durham, NH:
Water Resource Research Center, University of New Hampshire, 
1984), p. 2.1.
29 As Hamilton points out, "The actual concentrations 
reported were "only" two to five times higher than those 
considered safe. The problem was thus perceived as serious, 
but not acute, and it received little attention outside of 
the local area. In New Hampshire alone, there were at least 
44 other sites listed as posing a similar "imminent threat" 
to public health at that time." Household Conservation 
During Water Emergencies. 1984, p. 2.1.
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ground water supplies was not investigated.30
Along with the notification of the contamination came a 
plea for voluntary conservation. As water demands increased 
with the advent of spring, the town placed restrictions on 
outdoor water use in May. Efforts were being undertaken to 
secure a new well in neighboring Amherst, New Hampshire, but 
this well would not come on-line until July. While the 
restrictions issued in May were successful, the town 
nevertheless found it necessary to ban outdoor water use on 
June 22.31 In early July the Amherst well came on-line, and 
on July 18 it was announced that the shortage was officially 
over.
As in more serious water contamination incidents, such 
as the one experienced in upstate New York's Love Canal, 
visible health effects were apparently not widely noticed in 
Milford. In the case of Love Canal, visible health effects 
were the impetus to testing; in Milford, contamination was 
discovered through routine state testing. In addition, 
unlike Love Canal where the entanglement of special 
interests with the local political apparatus resulted in 
foot-dragging and stalling, the response of Milford
30 Ibid., p. 2.2.
31 The town threatened to cut-off the water-service of 
violators of this ban. Hamilton reports that within the 
first week of the ban 15 warnings were issued, but no actual 
cut-offs occurred. Household Conservation Purina Water 
Emergencies. 1984, p. 2.5.
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officials to the contamination incident was immediate and 
direct. For these reasons there was no need for Milfordians 
to organize to force political action from their local or 
state government, as is often the case when water supplies 
become contaminated.
Nevertheless, the Milford incident presents itself as an 
interesting social phenomenon. Since the Milford data set 
contains open-ended questions that asked townspeople for 
their comments and opinions regarding the incident, it 
provides an excellent opportunity for studying the 
interpretive dimensions of immediate environmental 
concern.32 The analysis discussed below aims to understand 
and explain the interpretive differences among the Milford 
townspeople regarding the political importance of water- 
protection issues in the wake of the contamination incident.
32 Professor Hamilton's primary concern was the 
response of townspeople to Milford's water conservation 
program.
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The Milford Case Study
Shortly after the February anouncement informing 
residents of the contamination Professor Lawrence Hamilton 
collected survey data33 revealing widespread concern over 
the crisis. In a follow-up survey conducted by Hamilton, 
residents were asked to compare the level of importance 
which they attached to "protecting the town water supply" 
before the contamination incident, to how they felt after it 
had occurred. Townspeople who acknowledged experiencing a 
change in their interpretation of the importance of water 
protection issues were asked to explain the cause of the 
change. Our analysis focuses on the written statements 
provided by townspeople in answer to this question.
The measurement technique used, called numerical 
magnitude estimation, is explained in detail in Hamilton's 
original report of the findings. Briefly, it consists of 
asking respondents to choose any number, relative to a fixed 
reference criterion, in order to describe the magnitude of 
the importance of a specific issue or concern. The 
principal benefit of magnitude estimates is that they 
provide interval level measurements without the truncation 
of extreme opinions that can happen in fixed-choice ordinal
33 A copy of the survey and details regarding response 
rate may be found in Household Conservation Purina Water 
Emergencies. 1984.
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scales.34 The magnitude estimate questions on this survey 
provided respondents with an opportunity to say how much 
their interpretations of the importance of water protection 
had changed. The open-ended follow-up question provided 
them with an opportunity to explain, in their own words, why 
their interpretation had changed.
A total of 163 respondents provided magnitude estimates 
of the importance of "protecting town water supplies" before 
and after the contamination had occurred. The estimates 
provided indicated that half of these people (49.7%) thought 
protecting water supplies to be equally important, both 
before and after the contamination was discovered. Three 
people (1.8%) stated that they now thought water protection 
was less important than they had previously thought, 
presumably reflecting a feeling that the contamination 
problem had been exaggerated. The remainder of the 
respondents (48.5%) indicated that they now thought water 
protection to be more important in light of the 
contamination incident. It is reasonable to suspect that 
actual interpretive changes were even more widespread, but 
many people preferred not to admit that they had previously 
been complacent about potential water-contamination 
problems.
On the survey following the magnitude estimate question
34 This technique was developed by M. Lodge in 
Magnitude Scaling; Quantitative Measurement of Opinions 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981).
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was an open-ended question that asked those who experienced 
a change in their interpretation of the importance of water 
safety to explain why. Sixty-seven of the seventy-nine 
respondents who had indicated interpretive change provided 
written statements in response to this question. While some 
of these statements were ambiguous, sixty of the sixty-seven 
statements included explanations for the changes. Among 
these sixty statements, twenty-four provided explicit 
reasons for their increased concern over water protection. 
These statements were categorized according to their degree 
of specificity and are presented below in tables 2. and 3.
Table 2. Specific statements explaining change in 
environmental concern in Milford.
1) "... having a shortage of water made our family 
appreciate the importance of such a natural resource."
2) "... short supply makes one realize the importance 
of water."
3) ”... we don’t realize how important water is until 
it is in short supply."
4) "... we felt the loss of water and can more so 
realize its importance."
5) "... fear of ever losing it (clean water) made me 
realize even more not to take it for granted."
6) "... when an abundant water supply is not available, 
you immediately realize its importance."
7) ”... problems with polluted wells made me more aware 
of the need for fresh water that is free from 
contaminants."
8) "... the recent emergency made me more aware of the 
importance of protecting our water supply."
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Table 3. General statements explaining change in 
environmental concern in Milford.
I) "... one's level of consciousness is raised signifi­
cantly when problems occur or issues come to a head."
2 ) ”... we don't really feel the impact of a crisis 
until it directly affects our lives. It makes one 
pause and think about environmental problems."
3) "... concern is always greater when presented with 
(a) crisis situation."
4) "... the importance of pure water ... becomes more 
vivid when the problem strikes home."
5) "... you never worry about water until the well runs 
dry."
6) "... when the crunch comes people realize how impor­
tant something is and take steps to protect it."
7) "... the possibility of the occurrence of water 
problems was brought to my attention by this incident."
8) "... I have increased awareness of the need to have 
water."
9) "... I simply realize more fully how susceptible 
our water supply is to toxic contamination."
10) "... this problem never really made an impact on me 
until it hit home."
II) "... before the water crisis I never worried about
a water problem."
12} ”... I never really gave the water situation much 
thought before the problem arose."
13) "... since we had no problems never gave it a 
thought."
14) "... until this happened I really didn't think much 
about water supply."
15) "... I had not considered our water supply an 
important issue until complications set in."
16) "... it was a rude awakening to realize that we
are not immune from such serious problems."
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Reflectivity and Interpretive Change
As we shall see in chapter six, the social-theoretical 
options available to the sociologist studying interpretation 
are extremely limited. While in Max Weber's work we find 
the methodological grounding of an "interpretive sociology," 
as well as programmatic statements regarding its purpose and 
task, Weber does not inquire into the nature of 
interpretation itself. This shortcoming of Weber's is in 
fact the point of departure for Alfred Schutz's 
conceptualization of phenomenological sociology. However, 
as we shall see, Schutz's approach to the study of 
interpretation is formalistic and sterile and incapable of 
guiding a substantive analysis of interpretive differences. 
In the work of G. H. Mead, however, we find an analysis of 
reflectivity which may be used to study the interpretive 
differences observed in Milford. Despite the fact that Mead 
does not study interpretation per se, he does provide a 
comprehensive theory which explains the emergence of "mind" 
and meaning, and discusses the process of social action in 
terms of one's interpretations of the expectations of 
others. Thus, while limited, Mead's thoughts on 
reflectivity may be used to analyze the interpretive 
differences observed in Milford.
Mead deals extensively with the process of reflection in 
the collection of writings published posthumously under the
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rubric The Philosophy of the Act (1938).30 His approach
conceptualizes the human act as a process consisting of a
series of stages. According to Mead, the human act differs
fundamentally from the actions of animals in that it
contains a "manipulatory" stage. Language enables us to
bring into our "manipulatory" field objects which are not
immediately present. This enables us to "rehearse" probable
outcomes of possible actions within our mind and make
"reflective" decisions regarding our behavior.36
According to Mead, reflection emerges as a response to
problematic situations. Problematic situations are
encountered when we experience obstacles en route to the
realization of goals.37
Reflective thinking arises in testing the means 
which are presented for carrying out some 
hypothetical way of continuing action 
which has been checked.36
It follows from this pragmatic view of reflection that we
30 The majority of sociological writings which refer to 
Mead draw from the collection of his writings entitled Mind,
Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1934) . Recently, The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1938) has attracted an
increasing amount of attention. One of the more ambitious
and comprehensive attempts to draw out the sociological 
import of this collection is Robert S. Perinbanayagam's
Signifying Acts. 1985.
36 G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act. 1938, pp. 79-
83.
37 I am here translating Mead's behaviorist vocabulary 
into common verbage. Mead's actual definition of a 
problematic situation is "frustrated impulse."
38 G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act. 1938, p. 79.
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tend to accept things as they are until experience tells us 
otherwise, that is, until the realization of a goal is 
frustrated. Interestingly, the statements provided in 
tables 2. and 3. are completely consistent with Mead's view 
of reflection, and may, in fact, be viewed as empirical 
evidence in support of his view that reflection emerges as a 
response to problematic situations. For example, among the 
specific statements presented in table 2., comments such as 
"short supply makes one realize ..." and "shortage of water 
made our family appreciate ..." claim a causal relation 
between the problematic effects of contamination and 
interpretive change.
On another level, many of the comments lend credence to 
the related notion that human behavior generally tends to be 
habitual and unreflective. For example, the statement "... 
you never worry about your water until the well runs dry" 
suggests that in lieu of experience which contradicts the 
assumptions of normalcy and status quo such assumptions will 
remain unquestioned. That is, they will continue to be left 
un-thought or unreflected upon.
While these data may be cited as empirical evidence in 
support of Mead's thoughts on reflectivity, it is not our 
intention to test Mead's thoughts empirically. Our 
intention instead is to employ Mead's concepts to explain 
the interpretive differences which we observed in Milford. 
Mead's thoughts on reflectivity may be used to explain why
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some townspeople came to view the protection of water 
supplies as an important political issue following the 
crisis while others did not. We may begin by studying the 
statements presented in tables 2. and 3. from a Meadian 
perspective.
According to Head, we will interpret a situation as 
problematic if it appears as an obstacle to the realization 
of goals. We can establish several of the goals held by the 
townspeople who came to view water protection as important 
by studying their statements presented in tables 2. and 3. 
When we examine these statements three explicit reasons for 
the interpretive change are evident: 1) "fear" (of losing 
clean water); 2) "short supply" (of water); and 
"inconvenience" (resulting from reduced and/or contaminated 
supply). When these reasons are understood in terms of 
Mead's thoughts on reflectivity, specific goals can be 
deduced from the reasons provided. Fear of losing clean 
water suggests the goal of clean water: short supply 
suggests the goal of adequate or abundant water suppIv: and 
inconvenience suggests the goal of convenient access to a 
water supply. Coming full circle we can explain the 
interpretive change experienced by this group as follows. 
Toxic contamination of water supplies in Milford was an 
obstacle to the realization of goals (clean water, adequate 
or abundant supply, convenient access to a water supply). 
Experiencing these obstacles gave rise to reflection, and
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subsequently, interpretive change.
The unchanged interpretations are more difficult to 
explain.39 The magnitude estimate measurement technique 
discussed earlier was used to ask respondents to estimate 
the importance of water protection issues as compared with a 
fixed reference criterion. The reference criterion in this 
case was "routine town business," which was assigned an 
arbitrary numerical value of 20.49 It is interesting that, 
even after experiencing the contamination. 35% of those 
surveyed stated that they did not interpret the protection 
of town water supplies to be any more important than 
routine-town business. In terms of Mead's thoughts on 
reflectivity, this means either one of two things. Either 
1) these people failed to view the contamination incident as 
a problematic situation, or 2) having interpreted the 
incident as a problematic situation, they reflectively 
decided that the incident was no more important than routine 
town business. Let us examine each of these possibilities.
Regarding possibility number one, when we consider the
39 This is largely due to the fact that the Milford 
follow-up survey lacked an open-ended question specifically 
directed at respondents who did not experience interpretive 
change.
40 Hamilton operationally defined "routine town 
business" as "... decisions about police, fire, and 
ambulance services, public employee salaries, public works 
contracts, and zoning decisions." This description is taken 
from the Milford follow-up survey which can be found in 
appendix B, in Hamilton's Household Conservation Purina 
Wtaer Emergencies. 1984.
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universality of the goals found among members of the 
"changed” group (i.e., clean, accessible, and adequate 
supply of water), it defies common sense to think that such 
goals would not be found to be held by members of the 
"unchanged" group. In fact, these goals may very well be 
considered basic needs. It is unlikely, then, given the
basic importance of what was threatened by the
contamination, that any resident of Milford could have come 
to view the contamination as anything but a problem.
This brings us to possibility number two. Possibility 
number two suggests that the unchanged group might have 
viewed the contamination as a problematic situation, but 
upon reflection, decided that, while a problem, the issue of
water safety was nevertheless no more important than routine
town business. This, however, is unlikely, for it is 
counter-intuitive to think that once the issue was viewed as 
a problem it then could have been viewed with no more 
importance than the routine and mundane aspects of town 
business.
The unlikelihood of both of these possibilities suggests 
an inherent limitation in using Mead's thoughts on 
reflectivity to explain the interpretive differences 
observed in Milford. It appears that his view breaks down 
when it is applied in this context because it reduces the 
interpretive process to a means-ends relation. As in all 
cases of means-ends discernment, the ends present no
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problems when they are readily apparent or given. For 
example, given the end or goal of clean, accessible and 
adequate supplies of water, it is easy to explain how one 
might come to interpret the need to give political priority 
to water safety protection. In this case, political 
priority to water protection may be viewed as the means to 
the ends mentioned above. However, when the goals or ends 
are not given, and must be decided. Mead's approach tells us 
little, for such reflective acts are no longer responses to 
the frustrated attainment of ends or goals, but instead 
concern decisions regarding the values of goals themselves.
Within the context of studying interpretation, Mead's 
thoughts on reflectivity appear limited in another sense.
The view that reflection is a response to problematic 
situations appears meaningless when we realize that people 
differ in their interpretations of what constitutes 
problematic situations. This does not amount to a rejection 
of Mead’s thoughts on reflectivity; it simply demonstrates 
the limitations of his approach when it comes to explaining 
interpretive differences. As we have seen, at least two 
aspects of Mead's view of reflection are supported 
empirically by the Milford data set. The first is Mead's 
general view that the frustration of goals leads to 
reflection. This generalization, however, must be qualified 
for the frustration of goals is only one of several 
conditions for reflectivity. That this is the case is
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supported by the argument that decisions over the meaning of 
values involve reflective thought prompted by concerns which 
are not the result of the frustration of goals, but rather, 
the result of an interest in meaning and value for their own 
sake.
The second aspect of Mead's view that is supported by 
the data pertains to the notion that human interpretation 
tends to be habitual and unreflective. That is, the Milford 
data suggest that people tend to assume that things are 
acceptable until this assumption is contradicted by 
experience. It is this aspect of Mead's view which is 
particularly interesting because it is supported not only by 
the Milford data, but by case studies of towns where similar 
contamination problems surfaced, and by the bulk of 
interpretive-sociological research. The general tendency 
regarding immediate environmental concern is that the safety 
of one's local environment is taken-for-aranted until 
experienced to be otherwise. As Professor Hamilton and I 
stated in an earlier paper, this tendency is unfortunate, 
for if the concern and activism so often visible in the wake 
of contamination crises had only been present prior to such 
incidents, the effects of the contamination could have been 
minimized or eliminated in the first place. This 
observation raises serious questions about the nature of 
human interpretation, questions the implications of which 
reach well bevond the boundaries of environmental sociology.
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The habitual or "assuming" nature of interpretation observed 
in Milford suggests that the nature of interpretation may be 
inherently problematic. Milfordians took the safety of 
their water for granted until they were told otherwise. In 
this case the nature of interpretation may be construed as 
problematic on the basis of the argument that had the safety 
of the water not been taken for granted, preventative 
measures, such as proper industrial zoning, could have been 
established, that could have eliminated the cause of the 
contamination in the first place.
From our observations of immediate environmental concern 
in Milford it is safe to say that the nature of 
interpretation calls for rigorous empirical analysis. In 
light of the fact that the nature of interpretation has 
received limited attention within interpretive sociology, a 
comprehensive theoretical analysis of the nature of 
interpretation must be considered a necessary preliminary to 
its empirical study. Moreover, given the limited discussion 
of the nature of interpretation within interpretive 
sociology it is clear that in order to conduct a 
comprehensive study of interpretation we must go beyond the 
confines of sociology.
Given these observations, the central research question 
of this work is the following: what is the nature of 
interpretation? In addition, in light of our observations 
regarding the habitual or taken-for-granted nature of
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interpretation, we will want to ask in what sense might the 
nature of interpretation be considered problematic? Once we 
have answered these questions we will be able to outline the 
empirical study of interpretation within sociology and 
establish the importance of conducting such research. In 
order to analyze the nature of interpretation we will turn 
to the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. It is our view that it 
is in Gadamer's work, in particular in his major work Truth 
and Method, that we find the most comprehensive analysis of 
the nature of interpretation available today. Gadamer's 
analysis of the nature of interpretation therefore presents 
itself as our central focus.
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CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF INTERPRETATION
He may define our research problem as a threefold task 
consisting of the following questions.
1) What is the nature of interpretation?
2) Is interpretation inherently problematic?
3) What are the implications of the answers to these 
questions for sociology?
In this chapter we will seek to answer the first two of
these questions by analyzing the philosophical hermeneutics
of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The focus of our discussion falls
primarily on Gadamer's analysis of the nature of
interpretation, as presented in Truth and Method.* Because
some of his key concepts are appropriated from Martin
Heidegger, our discussion of Gadamer necessitates a
discussion of Heidegger. Our discussion of Heidegger is
extremely selective, however, focusing for the most part on
his conception of understanding as presented in Being and
Time.2 He will, however, briefly discuss the traditional
* Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: 
Crossroad, 1986), translated and edited by Garrett Barden 
and John Cumming from the second German edition, originally 
published in English in 1975. The first German edition was 
published in 1960.
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962).
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hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey 
before returning to our discussion of Gadamer in order to 
illustrate the historical importance of Heidegger and 
Gadamer for the general development of hermeneutics.
Our discussion of Gadamer focuses on his analysis of the 
nature of interpretation as presented in Truth and Method. 
According to Gadamer, interpretation is by nature 
prejudiced. This claim is based on Heidegger’s argument 
that interpretation depends on a preconscious understanding 
of its object. Gadamer goes beyond Heidegger, however, by 
focusing his attention on explicating the linguistic nature 
of understanding and interpretation, a dimension which 
Heidegger identifies but does not elaborate upon. On the 
basis of Gadamer*s view of the linguistic nature of 
understanding we are able to operationally define 
"prejudices” as preconscious linauistical concepts.
Gadamer comes to define the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation as the hermeneutical problem; that is, as a 
problem which affects all forms of interpretive experience. 
It is in this sense that Gadamer makes the claim that the 
scope of hermeneutics is universal. Gadamer*s response to 
the universality of the hermeneutical problem is 
hermeneutical reflection, which will be analyzed in 
chapters four through seven.
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An Overview of Gadamer*s Truth and Method 
Hans-Georg Gadamer was born in Germany in 1900, studied 
philosophy by way of philology under Martin Heidegger and 
others at Marburg, and later became full professor at 
Heidelberg following the Second World War.3 No stranger to 
America, he has spent numerous semesters conducting seminars 
in philosophy at Boston College. His magnum opus, Truth and 
Method, was first published in German in 1960. The second 
edition of the work became available in English in 1975.
It should be emphasized that Gadamer is not the least 
bit concerned with sociology's purpose or problems. Gadamer 
is first and foremost a philosopher, and it is for 
philosophy that his efforts are explicitly intended. When 
he refers to the "human sciences" he does so in reference to 
history, philosophy, legal studies, theology and aesthetics, 
making no mention of sociology. This presents the 
sociologist reading his work with a difficult task, for any 
significance it may hold for sociology must be discerned 
indirectly by way of philosophy.
From a sociologist's perspective it is reasonable to 
ask, given Gadamer's ambivalence toward sociology, why 
should we bother to concern ourselves with him? Moreover,
3 For an insightful discussion of Gadamer's
intellectual background see R. Sullivan's introduction to
his translation of Gadamer*s Philosophical Apprenticeships
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). This work is an
autobiographical account of Gadamer's intellectual 
development.
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in what sense might philosophy be considered relevant to 
sociology more generally? The answer to the first question 
is simple: despite Gadamer's ambivalence toward sociology, 
his analysis of interpretation speaks directly to our 
central research problem. Regarding the second question, 
the practical importance of philosophy may be explained by 
way of reference to a point made by a philosopher at a 
recent public lecture.4 When addressing the question of the 
relevance of philosophy, the professor stated that perhaps 
the most tangible, practical feature of philosophy has to do 
with the “annoyance factor." The annoyance factor refers to 
philosophy's ability to raise questions which are 
uncomfortable to consider, never mind answer. In this 
sense, philosophy may assist sociology by providing it with 
challenging questions and research topics. In light of this 
Gadamer appears on target when he states that philosophical 
hermeneutics may “open new dimensions of questioning” in the 
sciences.9 It will be argued in chapter seven that the more 
significant implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics for 
sociology turn on its ability to present to sociology 
important and interesting research topics and questions.
4 This point was made in a lecture given in the spring 
of 1988 at the University of New Hampshire by Professor 
Charlotte Hitt of the philosophy department of the 
University of New Hampshire.
9 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics. 
translated and edited by David E. Linge (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1977), p. 39.
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In Truth and Method Gadamer traces the history of the 
human sciences and hermeneutics and enters into a dialogue 
with its principal representatives. These representatives 
include Plato and Aristotle as well as several pre-Socratic 
Greek philosophers; modern philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, 
Husserl, Heidegger and numerous figures from the German 
romanticist and historicist traditions, including 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Truth and Method is not 
systematic in its philosophical analysis of hermeneutics, 
and as Howard points out, it "is a far-ranging and difficult 
work.”6 What makes the work difficult is Gadamer's style of 
exposition. Unlike the approach of many philosophers, he 
does not "simply state the theses that he seeks to defend, 
and argue for them in the usual manner." He instead 
proceeds indirectly by "interpreting, questioning, and 
conversing with texts."7 While the title of the work 
suggests a comparative analysis of the concepts of "truth" 
and "method," Gadamer*s comparison is extremely subtle and 
more suggestive than definitive. In fact, Gadamer never 
once in the work provides definitions of the terms which 
form the center of his analysis. This approach may 
frustrate some, for the meaning of the work cannot be
6 Roy J. Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 122.
7 Richard Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 
114.
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plucked from any one passage or summary; nor can Gadamer be
pinned down regarding exactly what he means by "truth" and
"method." Nevertheless, the tension which Gadamer
establishes between these two concepts permeates the entire
work, and a careful reading of it shows that his
interpretation of the relationship between truth and method
is anything but ambiguous. As Bernstein points out, in
Gadamer's Truth and Method
themes, concepts, and interpretations enter and 
interweave in his reflections so that they mutually 
support each other and exhibit a textured vision of 
philosophical hermeneutics, and how it is revelatory 
of human finitude.8
Explaining Gadamer*s subtle yet critical distinction 
between truth and method may be done in several ways. For 
example, one could focus on Gadamer's extensive treatment of 
aesthetic experience (in Part One of Truth and Method) and 
explain how he demonstrates that the experience of art is a 
limiting case of method's claim to truth. That is, we 
experience an interpretation of the meaning of art which is 
true for us regardless of methodological considerations.
Such experiences are therefore beyond the jurisdiction of 
method. This would be one way of illustrating Gadamer's 
critique of method. However, I believe a better way would 
be to refer to Gadamer's analysis of experience as it 
relates to the core of scientific research, which is
e Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism. 1983, 
p. 114.
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experimental experience. Gadamer shows how the experimental
experience in science has the same structure as common
experience. This means that the truth which science claims
through experimentation and replication is derived, most
primarily, from experience itself. This insight is
extremely important for it is the key to understanding
Gadamer*s distinction between quotidian understanding and
thematized or methodological knowledge.
Modern science ... carries through in its methodology 
what experience has always striven after. Experience 
is valid only if it is confirmed; hence its dignity 
depends on its fundamental repeatability. But this 
means that experience, by its very nature, abolishes 
its history. This is even true of everyday experience, 
and how much more for anv scientific version of it.
Thus it is not just a chance one-sided emphasis of 
modern scientific theory, but has foundation in fact, 
that the theory of experience is related teleoloqicallv 
to the truth that is derived from it.*
This is perhaps the most crucial point of Gadamer*s
conception of the relationship between truth and method.
That which is true is given in experience, whether it be
quotidian experience or a "planned" experience such as that
which takes place during a scientific experiment.
The fact that experience is valid, so long as it is 
not contradicted by new experience, is clearly 
characteristic of the general nature of experience, 
no matter whether we are dealing with its scientific 
form, in the modern experiment, or with the experience 
of daily life that men have always had.10
We will discuss Gadamer*s conception of truth in greater
• Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 311, author's 
emphasis.
10 Ibid., p. 314.
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detail later in this chapter. What is important at this 
point is to realize that Truth and Method is not a rejection 
of scientific research. It is an exposition of the 
interpretive nature of human experience, and as such 
provides us with a more complete picture of what scientific 
research is as compared with common interpretive experience. 
Scientific experience is a special case of interpretive 
experience, a derivative mode of interpretation the truth 
claims of which are grounded not in scientific theory, but 
in the structure of experience itself.
While Gadamer's explication of the limitations of 
scientific method is very important, it is not the aspect 
with which our discussion is most concerned. We are 
primarily concerned with Gadamer's analysis of the nature of 
interpretation. Indeed, it is through his analysis of the 
nature of interpretation that Gadamer is able to demonstrate 
the derivative nature of scientific experience. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, through his analysis of the 
nature of interpretation Gadamer is able demonstrate the 
prejudiced condition of interpretation and redefine the 
hermeneutical problem.11 As we shall see, it is Gadamer's 
re-conceptualization of the hermeneutical problem, and his
11 The term "hermeneutical problem" is used generally 
to denote the problems associated with interpretation, 
problems which were the concern of traditional hermeneutics. 
In the work of Gadamer, the "hermeneutical problem" takes on 
universal significance in that he demonstrates how the 
conditions of interpretation are part of the structure of 
experience itself.
58
response to it, which is the key to grasping the essential 
importance of his hermeneutics for sociology.
It should be clear, then, that in Gadamer's view, 
hermeneutics is not at all limited to a critique of 
scientific method, nor is it limited to the problem of 
method at all.12 Gadamer's hermeneutics concerns the 
interpretive and linguistic nature of experience itself.
His hermeneutics "is not, therefore, a methodology of the 
human sciences."13 The aim of Truth and Method is to reveal 
the interpretive nature of common and methodological 
experience. In Gadamer's own words, his intention is:
... to discover and bring into consciousness
12 Sociologists must be careful not to misinterpret 
Gadamer's argument as an attempt to debunk science. It 
cannot be over-emphasized that his aim regarding scientific 
method is to demonstrate that it does not have a monopoly on 
truth. Essentially, his is an argument that establishes 
what scientific method actually is, as distinguished from 
what it is typically interpreted as. While his approach is 
fundamentally different from the respective scientific 
analyses of Kuhn or Wittgenstein, Gadamer's conclusion 
regarding science is generally the same in that he argues 
that scientific reasoning is not a primary but derivative 
mode of interpretation. In Kuhn science is derivative in 
the sense that political and personal characteristics often 
motivate scientists to act in self-interested defense of 
decaying theoretical corpora, suggesting that the sub­
culture of science cannot be logically disentangled from 
one's more primary social situation. See Thomas Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970). In Wittgenstein, science is 
considered derivative in that it is a language game 
dependent on a much broader, non-scientific, or "meta­
language" game. See Susan Heckman, Hermeneutics and the 
Sociology of Knowledge (South Bend, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 117-129, for a comparison of 
Wittgenstein and Gadamer.
13 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986. p. xiii.
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something that methodological disputes serve 
only to conceal and neglect, something that does 
not so much confine or limit modern science as 
precede it and make it possible.14
Hhat Gadamer succeeds in bringing into consciousness is the
constitutive importance of our inherited linguistic
tradition for interpretive experience. Our linguistic
tradition "precede(s) and make(s) science possible" in that
it is the very condition of interpretation.10 Gadamer's aim
is therefore to examine the condition and nature of
interpretive experience by exploring that which constitutes
or makes it possible.16
While it would be reductionist to view Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics as an "offspring of Heidegger's
14 Ibid., p. xvii.
10 Gadamer's move is analogous to that taken by G. H. 
Mead in Mind. Self and Society. 1934. Mead's goal was to 
overcome vulgar behaviorism by demonstrating the 
constitutive significance of language for social selves. 
Gadamer's goal is to overcome the exaggerated claims of 
rationalism and scientism by demonstrating the constitutive 
significance of our linguistic tradition for interpretation 
both within and outside of science.
16 Gadamer actually likens his goal in Truth and Method 
to Kant's goal in his Critique of Pure Reason. For Gadamer 
his principal question is, "how is understanding possible?" 
Truth and Method. 1986, p. xviii. It should be noted that 
the concepts of understanding and interpretation in 
philosophical hermeneutics are part of the same experience. 
Following Heidegger, Gadamer defines understanding as our 
way of being, as our preconscious way of relating to the 
world. It is the meaningful way in which we relate to the 
world. Interpretation is what is provided by understanding 
in particular situations.
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thinking,"17 it is nevertheless true that the key concepts 
which form the foundation of Gadamer's analysis of 
interpretation are appropriated from Heidegger's Being and 
Time. We shall proceed then with a discussion of several 
Heideggerian concepts which prove seminal in Gadamer's work.
17 R. Sullivan, in his introduction to his translation 
of Gadamer's Philosophical Apprenticeships. 1985, p. ix.
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Heidegger's Being and Time 
In the first few pages of the work that was to win him 
"world fame in a single stroke,"18 Heidegger makes several 
observations that impress upon him the necessity of studying 
human understanding as a preliminary to studying the meaning 
of human existence. Being and Time opens with Heidegger's 
criticism of the Western philosophical tradition for failing 
to answer what he considers to be the fundamental question 
of philosophy: the question of the meaning of being.10 
Heidegger points out that the early Greeks had wrestled with 
the question, but since that time, the question has 
essentially been "forgotten." By "forgotten" Heidegger 
means that the question itself has been trivialized to the 
point of neglect. But it is not simply the case that the 
question has come to be neglected, but rather, that, there 
is a sanctioned belief against its even being asked. As 
Heidegger writes, ”... a dogma has been developed which not 
only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be 
superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect."20 As a 
result, despite the advancements of science and the many 
technological innovations they have occasioned, the modern
18 This is how Gadamer describes the impact of Being 
and Time in Philosophical Apprenticeships. 1985, p. 45.
10 As Heidegger writes, "with the question of the 
meaning of Being, our investigation comes up against the 
fundamental question of philosophy." Being and Time. 1962, 
pp. 49-50.
20 Heidegger, Being and Time. 1962, p. 21.
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world is one within which the meaning of being is obscured. 
It is Heidegger's intention, therefore, to raise anew the 
question of the meaning of being.
When Heidegger sets himself to the task of asking 
himself the question of the meaning of being he experiences 
difficulty. This difficulty stems from his own 
preconceptions regarding the relevance of the question 
itself. It becomes clear to him that these preconceptions 
are in fact the result of his participation in the very 
philosophical tradition which he is attacking. The 
difficulty which he experiences is therefore a function of 
the Western philosophical tradition's own disregard for the 
question of the meaning of being, as it now manifests itself 
in his own effort to raise the question. The difficulty 
which Heidegger experiences by simply raising the question 
leads him to conclude that an inquiry into the structure of 
understanding is a necessary preliminary to his analysis of 
the meaning of being. Heidegger's experience in the 
beginning of Being and Time is summarized nicely by 
Bernstein.
We are "thrown" into the world as beings who understand 
and interpret - so if we are to understand what it is 
to be human beings, we must seek to understand 
understanding itself, in its rich, full and complex 
dimensions.31
Owing to this realization, what begins for Heidegger as a
31 Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism. 1983, 
p. 113.
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philosophical inquiry into the question of the meaning of 
being becomes for him a study into the structure of human 
understanding. Before discussing Heidegger's conception of 
understanding it will prove worthwhile to explore the 
sociological importance of Heidegger's ruminations in the 
beginning of Being and Time.
The experience which Heidegger describes in the 
beginning of Being and Time anticipates his analysis of the 
structure of understanding and foreshadows the conclusions 
he would reach. The difficulty he experiences when raising 
the question of the meaning of being leads him to the 
realization that the meaning which the question has for him 
is somehow already given to him preconsciously before he 
actually experiences it. Heidegger concludes that the 
experience of his own understanding of the question is 
illustrative of the structure of understanding in general. 
That is, Heidegger concludes that the structure of 
understanding consists of preconscious meanings which are 
the result of one’s existence within a particular temporal 
or historical situation. Heidegger's conceptualization of 
this insight will be discussed in detail in the pages that 
follow. He may, however, at this point suggest how this 
aspect of Heidegger's work may be related to the issue of 
social structure within sociology, thereby providing a 
social-theoretical backdrop against which our discussion of 
Heidegger's analysis of understanding may be read.
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It is extremely important to note that Heidegger locates 
the meaning carried by the Western philosophical tradition 
within himself. This meaning is not merely within his mind, 
but part of the structure of his being; part of the way he 
relates to the world in general. In sociological terms, 
this means that Heidegger locates the determinate effects of 
social structure as something that is part of himself, part 
of his very being, as distinguished from 1) external social 
facts which constrain him from without, 2) or a conscious or 
deliberative process which takes place within his mind. He 
does not, however, embrace a strict structuralist account of 
human agency, a view that would deny any mediating effect of 
the agent on social structure. Indeed Heidegger's ability 
to raise the question of the meaning of being despite 
Western philosophy's view that the question itself is 
superfluous attests to this. What Heidegger's analysis 
succeeds in doing is to specify the structural conditions 
which are constitutive of understanding and experience. We 
will discuss this in more detail when we take up 
Gadamer's appropriation of this Heideggerian insight. We 
mention it here briefly in the hope that it may give the 
reader a social-theoretical angle from which to read the 
discussion of Heidegger which follows.
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Heidegger’s Conception of Understanding
The first point which should be made regarding
Heidegger's conception of understanding is that it is
ontological.22 "Understanding is a mode of being, rather
than a mode of knowledge.”a3 That is, Heidegger does not
view understanding as a cognitive process only, but instead
equates understanding with existence itself.
"Understanding" for Heidegger is, first of all, 
an "existentiale." That means, simply, that it 
is a necessary and universal structure of the world 
of ordinary experience."24
To say that understanding is part of the structure of human
experience itself is to say that understanding is something
which happens naturally simply by virtue of the fact that we
exist. This means that all social action contains "an
implicit 'understanding' of what the action intends or is
all about."28 Understanding is our way of relating to
something without necessarily thinking about it; without
having to be consciously aware of the way we are related to
that which we are related. In the words of Brockelman
to exist humanly means to be already related, 
to necessarily be involved in and with things and
22 Whereas epistemology may be defined as the study of 
theories of knowledge, ontology may be defined as the study 
of theories of being or existence.
23 Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science. 1978, 
p. 148.
24 Paul T. Brockelman, Time and Self (New York; 
Crossroad, 1985), p. 56.
28 Ibid., p. 57.
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others. Putting it another way, there is no such 
thing as human experience apart from the environment 
or other people.8*
There is no such thing as human understanding apart from the
environment or other people. This is the meaning of
Heidegger's view that understanding is our mode of being,
our way of existing in the world. Understanding is
therefore constitutive of experience itself.
Understanding is not one type of activity, to be 
contrasted with other activities. Understanding is 
universal and may properly be said to underlie and 
pervade all activities.27
Heidegger uses the term Dasein to denote human 
existence. Translated, the term means "being-there."2* He 
coins the word intentionally to emphasize in each instance 
of its use the temporal condition of existence. To exist is 
to be somewhere, and that place where we are is always 
already understood in terms of where we have been. This is 
because time is a necessary condition of existence and our 
experience is structured by it. He don't exist in time so 
much as we exist temporally. As Brockelman states, 
"temporality is the very form of doing, the structure of
26 Paul T. Brockelman, Existential Phenomenology and 
the World of Ordinary Experience (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1980), p. 54.
27 Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism. 1983, 
pp. 113-114.
28 Literally, the term means "there-being," but this 
expression tends to confuse rather than clarify. By 
expressing Dasein as "being-there" the notion of historical 




The temporal, preconscious structuring of understanding 
and experience is expressed by Heidegger in terms of his 
concept of the "fore-structure of understanding." The fore­
structure of understanding might be thought of as a complex 
of presuppositions that make understanding possible by 
"projecting" a general sense of meaning during experience.30 
By "projection," Heidegger means that we experience 
situations with a general sense of anticipation. The 
projection or anticipation which is the nature of 
understanding is therefore also part of our experience. 
Because we exist temporally, we exist in a way that is 
always, in a sense, ahead of ourselves. For example, when 
we go to a party we arrive with preconceptions of what we 
will experience, expectations of what we will find once 
there. These expectations are part of the nature of 
experience itself resulting from the temporal or "fore" 
structuring of understanding.
The notion that we experience according to the 
preconscious expectations projected by our fore-structure of
89 Brockelman, Time and Self. 1985, p. 24.
so ^ e  fore-structure of understanding is actually a 
threefold notion, consisting of fore-sight, fore-having, and 
fore-conception. For a detailed discussion of these three 
aspects of the "fore-structure" and their relationship to 
understanding see J. Mehta, Martin Heidegger: The Wav and 
the Vision (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), pp. 
70-71.
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understanding is known as the "hermeneutic circle."31
Traditionally, this phrase has been used to denote the
"perpetual movement from the particular to the total and
back to the particular," whereby meaning is understood.32
When we pick up a book and begin reading, for example, we
already have a sense of what the book means, and it is by
way of this general sense that we are able to form our
particular interpretation of its meaning. This general
sense of meaning is provided by our preconscious relation to
the world; that is, by our understanding. One implication
of this traditional notion of the hermeneutic circle is that
particular parts of a text cannot be understood without
reference to a general sense of the meaning of the whole,
and, conversely, the meaning of a text as a whole turns on
the meaning of its parts.
This hypothetico-circular movement of understanding 
the parts in terms of a projected sense of the whole 
and revising the latter in the light of a closer 
investigation of the parts, has as its goal the 
achievement of a unity of sense, that is, an 
interpretation of the whole in which our detailed 
knowledge of the parts can be integrated without 
violence.3 3
In Heidegger the hermeneutic circle takes on new
31 Bauman states that the notion of the hermeneutic 
circle has been traced back to Friedrich Ast. Hermeneutics 
and Social Science. 1978, pp. 26-28.
32 Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science. 1978, p. 28.
33 F. R. Dallmayr and T. A. McCarthy, Understanding and 
Social Inquiry {South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1977), p. 289.
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significance, owing to his analysis of the preconscious 
structuring of experience. Rather than being viewed simply 
as a circle involving the dialectical relation between a 
particular whole (for example, a text or a life) and its 
parts, the traditional view of interpretation, the structure 
of understanding itself becomes viewed as circular in that 
it depends on the preconscious meaning which its fore­
structure projects.
Understanding is projection, and what it projects 
are expectations that precede the text. They 
"jump the gun," as it were, because they anticipate 
a meaning for the whole before arriving at it. What 
the interpreter projects in advance is what he 
understands already- that is, before beginning.34
This means that the meaning of that which is experienced
cannot be separated from the expectations which are
projected in the experience of understanding. In this
sense, interpretation is circular in so far as that which
makes it possible precedes it. This means that
interpretation always has already understood the meaning of
its object before it makes that meaning explicit. This is
the significance of Heidegger's rendering of the hermeneutic
circle. Interpretation is circular in that it cannot
proceed without a prior understanding of its object. In
Heidegger's words,
any interpretation which is to contribute under­
standing, must already have understood what is
34 Weinsheimer, Cadamer's Hermeneutics. 1985, p. 166.
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to be interpreted.35
Heidegger's notion of the fore-structure of 
understanding enables us to conceptualize the significance 
of temporal existence. It is important to note, however, 
that human existence is both concrete and temporal; that is, 
historical. Our temporal existence is such that we 
anticipate the future in terms of our understanding of the 
past. This means that our personal history, our biography, 
is constitutive of the way we will be related to the world 
at any given moment. To be already related to the world 
means that our existence is historically situated. The term 
simply denotes the fact that we are always immersed in a 
particular historical context and our experience is 
structured by the preconscious relations which the context 
provides. The main implication of this is that history is 
the condition of experience. even before there is 
consciousness. Stated differently, understanding already 
happens before experience, and is therefore ontologically 
more primary than consciousness. This notion, the notion 
that meaning exists prior to consciousness, is the central 
notion of phenomenology.36
38 Heidegger, Being and Time. 1962, p. 194.
36 According to Roy Howard, "...that meaning occurs as 
a given prior to any conscious action" is the "original 
thesis of phenomenology." Three Faces of Hermeneutics, 
p. 120. Interestingly, Heidegger's notion that there exists 
meaning prior to intentional consciousness is consistent 
with G. H. Mead's view of meaning. According to Mead, 
"awareness or consciousness is not necessary to the presence
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It should be clear, then, that in Being and Time human 
understanding is not viewed as an act of consciousness, but 
as an ontological event, as the way we exist. Defined 
ontologically as our way of being, understanding takes on 
new importance: understanding becomes the condition of 
experience itself. This means that our experience is 
structured by our existing understanding of the world; what 
we are is structured by our understanding of what we have 
been. This is also true of conscious experience and 
reflection. Conscious experience is always already 
structured by our understanding, by our preconscious 
relationship to the world. This insight, for our purpose, 
is Heidegger's special achievement, for it enables Heidegger 
to discuss the conditions of consciousness in a way not done 
within sociology. While it is true that Mead also attempts 
to ground consciousness in experience, he fails to specify 
the structure of experience beyond simply saying that such 
meaning is part of a more general "field" of meaning. By 
contrast, Heidegger specifies the structure of preconscious
of meaning in the process of social experience" Mind. Self 
and Society. 1934, p. 77. Mead supports this claim by 
describing how, during the process of social interaction, 
one person is related to another through an exchange of 
symbolic gestures the meaning of which is implicitly 
understood. Mead concludes, "meaning is thus not to be 
conceived, fundamentally, as a state of consciousness, or as 
a set of organized relations existing or subsisting mentally 
outside the field of experience into which they enter; on 
the contrary, it should be conceived objectively, as having 
its existence entirely within this realm itself." Mind.
Self and Society. 1934, p. 78.
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meaning in terms of his concept of the "fore-structure of 
understanding." This insight proves crucial for Gadamer for 
it enables him to establish the importance of preconscious 
meaning for the nature of interpretation.
As Weinsheimer points out, "fundamental to Heidegger's 
Being and Time is that knowledge of the world cannot be 
detached from being in the world, nor subject from 
object."37 We are born into a specific historical situation 
that structures our very existence. This means that our 
experience of time is not only subjective but historical: 
our experience of time is the experience of history. The 
importance of this is that concrete temporality or 
historicity is the structure of understanding, and as such, 
is constitutive of conscious experience. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that according to Heidegger the meaning 
of what we are or have been can never be fully grasped 
consciously. Traditionally, Western philosophy has 
conceptualized human existence in terms of its conscious and 
self-conscious moments. According to Heidegger, however, 
such moments are actually highly sophisticated modifications 
of ordinary, practical experiences, which are for the most 
part tacit and preconscious. Such experiences are simply 
the way we understand and are related to the world. In 
Heidegger, to be bound by history means that we are always
37 Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer1s Hermeneutics: A Reading 
of Truth and Method (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1985), p. 161.
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related to the world in a wav which is constitutive of our
interpretation of that relation, related in a primordial or 
preconscious way such that our conscious appropriation of 
experience and meaning is structured by this relation.
Heidegger's view of the concrete-temporal and circular 
structure of understanding is implicit in Gadamer*s view of 
experience. We experience in terms of our understanding of 
previous experiences. When we experience something which 
contradicts a prior understanding the prior understanding is 
negated. This is what Gadamer is referring to in the 
passage which we quoted earlier in the first part of this 
chapter: the preconceptions projected in understanding are 
subject to contradiction and change in light of new and 
contrary experience.38 It is this feature of interpretive 
experience which has inspired some hermeneuticists to view 
the hermeneutic circle as a spiral rather than a circle.
This is because "spiral" suggests growth and development,
3 8 The quotation to which I am referring to is the 
following:
modern science . .. carries through in its 
methodology what experience has always striven 
after. Experience is valid only if it is 
confirmed; hence its dignity depends on its 
fundamental repeatability. But this means that 
experience, by its very nature, abolishes its 
history. This is even true of everyday experience, 
and how much more for anv scientific version of it. 
Thus it is not just a chance one-sided emphasis of 
modern scientific theory, but has foundation in 
fact, that the theory of experience is related 
teleoloqicallv to the truth that is derived from
it. (Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 311.)
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which is the nature of interpretive experience.
Since Gadamer gets his notion of the circularity 
involved in all understanding from Heidegger we need to 
pause and consider more thoroughly Heidegger's break with 
the traditional notion. Traditional hermeneutics viewed the 
hermeneutic circle as an obstacle to be overcome. The 
methodological efforts of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, as we 
shall see, were designed to overcome what they considered to 
be the distortive effects of the temporal distance 
separating subject (historian) and object (for example, a 
person, historical period, or social group). In terms of 
the traditional view of the hermeneutic circle, temporal 
distance appeared as an obstacle because the meaning 
projected by the subject was alienated from the context 
within which its object was produced. In traditional 
hermeneutics, the hermeneutic circle is the basis for the 
concern over interpretation as a method.39
But Heidegger views the hermeneutic circle quite 
differently. He realizes that without the projective 
activity of the fore-structure of understanding 
interpretation would be impossible. This is because 
interpretation is dependent on the general sense of meaning 
which the fore-structure of understanding provides. Any
39 From the view of positivism, the hermeneutic circle 
is a vicious circle because it establishes the impossibility 
of attaining a completely "objective" interpretive 
perspective free from the effects of history.
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attempt to overcome the hermeneutic circle is therefore 
mistaken.
If we see this circle as a vicious one and look 
out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just "sense" 
it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of 
understanding has been misunderstood from the 
ground up.40
Heidegger’s point is that we must not delude ourselves into 
thinking that we can escape the circular structure of 
interpretive experience.
40 Heidegger, Being and Time. 1962, p. 194.
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Heidegger and Traditional Hermeneutics
Heidegger's conception of the hermeneutic circle in
Being and Time implies a radical critique of the
epistemological grounding of reason which typifies the
Western rationalist philosophical tradition. The
rationalist view of reason holds that one can transcend the
hermeneutic circle and obtain an objective interpretive
perspective; that is. obtain an interpretive perspective
free from presuppositions, or at least free from
presuppositions that have not already in some acceptable way
been justified. This, however, amounts to a denial of the
ontological nature of understanding. Once understanding is
defined ontologically as the condition of conscious
knowledge, then the hope of ever becoming fully conscious of
the conditions and assumptions of knowledge is shattered.
This is because, in the ontological view of understanding,
interpretation involves the projection of preconceptions in
understanding and is therefore always constituted through a
pre-conscious understanding of its object. As Dallmayr and
McCarthy write,
there can be no question of the interpreter ridding 
himself of all preconceptions and prejudgments. This 
is a logical impossibility- the idea of an interpreter 
without a language. Nor is it possible to bring to 
consciousness all-at-once and once-and-for-all one's 
preconceptions and prejudgments.« 1
The thought of a presuppositionless interpretation is a
41 Dallmayr and McCarthy, Understanding and Social 
Inquiry. 1977, p. 289.
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logical impossibility because presuppositions or 
preconceptions are the condition of interpretation; that is, 
they make interpretation possible.42 These preconceptions 
are part of the fore-structure of understanding and stem 
from our practical relations to the world, which are tied to 
our historical situation. In light of this the 
Enlightenment's view of reason, which assumes that reason 
can transcend its historical condition, must be rejected.
It should also be clear that, in addition to being 
radical in its critique of rationalism, Heidegger's work is 
a radical departure from traditional hermeneutics. Before 
returning to our discussion of Gadamer, it will prove 
worthwhile to specify precisely what is radical about 
Heidegger's hermeneutics. We will proceed, then, with a 
discussion of the positions of two important predecessors of 
Heidegger the writings of which are generally taken to be 
representative of traditional hermeneutics.
Mueller-Vollmer writes that Friedrich Schleiermacher and 
Wilhelm Dilthey are responsible for "transforming 
hermeneutics from the study and collection of specialized 
rules of interpretation for the use of theologians and 
jurists to that of a genuine philosophical discipline 
(Schleiermacher) and general theory of the social and human
42 We will be able to clarify this point further in our 
discussion of Gadamer by examining his notions of 
linguisticality and prejudices.
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sciences (Dilthey)."43 However, while it may be true that 
modern hermeneutics begins with Schleiermacher, it is 
nevertheless the case that Schleiermacher remains within the 
confines of traditional hermeneutics in a number of 
important respects.44
Very much a product of the German romanticist tradition, 
Schleiermacher (1768-1833)49 believed that in order to 
interpret the meaning of a text the interpreter must 
understand the text as an "expression of its author's 
individuality."46 This means that the hermeneuticist must 
seek to understand the mental life of the author of the text 
under consideration. By grasping the mental life of the 
author, Schleiermacher believed one could bridge the 
temporal distance separating oneself from the text, enabling 
the subject to recover the meaning originally intended.
43 Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ed., The Hermeneutics Reader 
(New York: Continuum, 1988), p. ix.
44 In this sense Ivan Oliver is correct in placing 
Schleiermacher within the tradition of the "old” 
hermeneutic, as distinguished from the "new" hermeneutic of 
Heidegger and Gadamer. See Ivan Oliver, "The 'old* and the 
'new' hermeneutic in sociological theory." The British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 34, 1983, pp. 519-553.
4 9 Friedrich Schleiermacher was a respected classical 
philologist and the founder of modern Protestant theology. 
See Mueller-Vollmer's succinct yet comprehensive discussion 
of Schleiermacher's importance for the development of 
hermeneutics in his introduction to The Hermeneutics Reader. 
1988. For a discussion of Schleiermacher's project of a 
universal hermeneutics see Gadamer's Truth and Method. 1986, 
pp. 162-173.
46 Mueller-Vollmer, The Hermeneutics Reader. 1988, p.
4.
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While Schleiermacher's method aimed to reconstruct the 
mental life of a text's author, he did not view this as a 
psychological process, as is often claimed.47 
Schleiermacher believed that "mental facts articulated as 
speech are not independent of language.1,48 This suggests 
that Schleiermacher rejected the notion of empathy as an 
interpretive method in favor of a more comprehensive method 
of historical and linguistical reconstruction. However, 
while the specifics of Schleiermacher's interpretive method 
are the subject of debate it is clear that he viewed 
understanding as a methodological operation to be used to 
overcome the problems resulting from the temporal 
(historical) distance separating subject from object.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) lived during the time which 
saw the rise of social science. Drawing upon the work of 
Schleiermacher, he sought to formulate a methodological 
alternative to the positivism of Comte, and thereby expanded 
the scope of hermeneutics to include the methodological
4 7 Mueller-Vollmer claims that this is a mistake which 
Gadamer makes in his interpretation of Schleiermacher. He 
also claims that Dilthey was responsible for "spreading a 
one-sided and distorted notion of Schleiermacher's 
theories." That Dilthey might have misrepresented 
Schleiermacher is especially unfortunate given that 
Dilthey*s writings on Schleiermacher had "cannonical value 
and were generally accepted." Mueller-Vollmer's The 
Hermeneutics Reader. 1988, p. 8. It may very well be the 
case that Gadamer1s alleged misinterpretation of 
Schleiermacher is the result of the considerable influence 
which Dilthey had on him.
48 Mueller-Vollmer’s The Hermeneutics Reader. 1988, p.
11.
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problems of the human and social sciences. Against Comte, 
Dilthey argued that because the subject matter of the social 
sciences differs fundamentally from that of the natural 
sciences, the two require equally different methodologies. 
According to Dilthey, the essential difference between the 
two is that human behavior is lived-throuah. and is 
therefore meaningful; whereas natural processes are not. 
Dilthey conceptualized Verstehen as a method whereby the 
social scientist could understand the meaning underlying 
behavior.4 9
The Verstehen method was Dilthey’s response to the 
hermeneutical problem resulting from the temporal or 
historical distance which separated the subject from its 
object. Dilthey conceptualized Verstehen as a process 
whereby one could re-live the experience of an author or 
historical figure and thereby overcome the gap in meaning 
resulting from historical difference.90 Dilthey believed
49 For a discussion of Dilthey's view of hermeneutics 
see Gadamer's discussion in Truth and Method. 1986, pp. 192- 
214. For a more sociologically oriented description see 
Mark J. Goodman, "Type methodology and type myth: Some 
antecedents of Max Weber's approach." Sociological Inquiry, 
Vol. 45 No. 1, 1975, pp.45-58; and J. Turner and L. Beeghley 
The Emergence of Sociological Theory (Homewood, Illinois: 
Dorsey, 1981) pp. 203-204.
00 Dilthey's method is often construed as a 
psychological process of reconstruction based on empathy.
In his early work, Dilthey's approach is more psychological 
than in his later work. While this issue lies beyond the 
scope of this study it is important to point out that the 
nature of Dilthey's conception of Verstehen is a contested 
issue in philosophy.
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that if this could be done rigorously the historian or 
social scientist could claim an objective understanding of 
human behavior on par with the objective explanations 
attained within natural science.
The traditional view of hermeneutics, exemplified in the 
work of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, has two important 
features. First, it views hermeneutics as a method capable 
of recovering meaning experienced or intended by a distant 
historical subject. Second, in traditional hermeneutics the 
temporal distance resulting from our historical situatedness 
is viewed as an obstacle to interpretation. As we have 
seen, historical situatedness refers to the fact that all 
interpretation and expression is context-specific. The 
writing of a text takes place within one historical context, 
and its interpretation may take place within another. The 
context or historical situatedness of each is then 
different. Traditional hermeneutics views this 
"difference,1* the temporal distance separating the two 
situations, as an obstacle that must be overcome.
As mentioned earlier in our dicussion of the hermeneutic 
circle, this view of historical difference is turned on its 
head by Heidegger. According to Heidegger, it is our 
presence within a particular historical context which makes 
interpretation possible in the first place. Only by 
existing in an historical context do we have the general 
sensibility which makes interpretation possible. Contrary
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to traditional hermeneutics' pejorative view of our 
historical condition, Heidegger acknowledges its 
constitutive significance: historical situatedness makes 
interpretation possible.01 Heidegger also overturns 
traditional hermeneutics' methodological view of 
understanding. As we have seen, by defining understanding 
ontologically as our preconscious way of relating to the 
world, Heidegger establishes the primacy or constitutive 
significance of understanding for experience and 
consciousness. In Heidegger's view, thematic or 
methodological approaches to interpretation are derivative 
modes of interpretation.
It should be clear, then, that Heidegger's work marks a 
radical divergence from traditional hermeneutics and its 
"methodological" view of understanding. The traditional 
view, central in the work of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, 
imported into sociology by Weber, and presently maintained 
by such thinkers as Habermas, defines understanding narrowly 
as a method to be used to understand texts and social 
action. The core insight of Heidegger's hermeneutics, 
elaborated by Gadamer, and drawn upon here as an underlying
01 While it is true that Dilthey grasped the 
constitutive significance of history for interpretation, he 
failed to realize its significance for hermeneutics in 
general. It is my position that Dilthey's methodological 
view of hermeneutics shows that he viewed the constitutive 
role of history for interpretation pejoratively in the sense 
that our historical situatedness gives rise to problems 
which could only be overcome methodologically.
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theme, is the notion that understanding is a practical 
relation, our way of being in the world. It is, a natural 
capability exercised routinely by all human beings.
At this point we may restate the intentions of our 
study. Like Heidegger and Gadamer, we are not concerned 
with studying the methodological aspects of hermeneutics and 
interpretation. We are instead concerned with studying the 
nature of interpretation itself. While it would be 
perfectly logical for us to focus on the general 
implications of Heidegger's ontological view of 
understanding for the philosophy of social science, 
specifically, for the longstanding debate between 
objectivist and subjectivist social science, this is not our 
intention.02 Our purpose instead is to trace the
02 If our intention were one of methodological critique 
we might begin by drawing out the significance of 
Heidegger's insights as they pertain to Comte's view of 
positive social science and its social function. For 
example, Comte's view of social science as a privileged 
exercise in objective pronouncement evaporates into pure 
folly under the light of Heidegger's insight, which 
redefines understanding as an ontological rather than 
epistemological event. According to Heidegger, the world as 
we know it is not given to us by science or the elite 
intelligensia. It is instead given to us in meaningful 
experience, and this meaningfulness mediates subsequent 
experience through the general sense of understanding which 
it provides. (While it is true that social science 
contributes to the content of culture and tradition its 
contribution is largely indirect and secondary to the 
normative content rooted in tradition.) The implication of 
this for the objectivist-subjectivist, or positivist- 
humanist debate is significant: scientific reasoning must 
now be viewed as a derivative mode of interpretation, a 
special case of common sense, the primary mode simply being 
our experience of culture, tradition, and language in 
everyday life. Arguments to the contrary notwithstanding,
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development of Heidegger's insights in the work of Gadamer. 
He will continue, therefore, with our discussion of Gadamer, 
focusing for the most part on his analysis of the nature of 
interpretation.
this does not amount to a rejection of science, but a 
clearing of the air, so to speak, surrounding the nature and 
limitations of science.
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Gadamer and the Prejudiced Nature of Interpretation
Our discussion of Heidegger focused on his analysis of 
the nature of understanding. Our discussion of Gadamer will 
focus on his analysis of the linguistical nature of 
interpretation. It is important to make clear that while 
Gadamer examines the linguistic nature of interpretation his 
discussion does so with an eye towards resolving the 
problems that have been the concern of traditional 
hermeneutics. Most of the examples which he uses to express 
his concepts are examples of text analysis or jurisprudence. 
He, of course, are interested in the general importance of 
Gadamer's analysis of interpretation and our discussion of 
it is therefore selective. Because we will appropriate only 
those Gadamerian concepts that pertain to the nature of 
interpretation in general, we may apply them to our study of 
interpretation as it relates to the social construction of 
reality and of social action.
It is clear from Heidegger's discussion of the 
hermeneutic circle in Being and Time that he views 
interpretation as the manifestation of preconscious 
understanding. According to Heidegger, our interpretations 
are actually manifestations of meanings which are already 
understood. Gadamer, too, views interpretation as the 
manifestation of preconscious understandings. Inter­
pretation is always an interpretation of some under­
standing. According to Gadamer, "interpretation is not
8 6
something pedagogical for us ... but the act of 
understanding itself."03 At the risk of belaboring the 
point, we may say that understanding is the way we are, 
while interpretation is an expression of what we are and the 
way we understand. Understanding and interpretation are 
therefore, "indissolubly bound up with each other."04 This 
is why Heidegger's analysis of the fore-structure of 
understanding is so important for Gadamer, for every insight 
which Heidegger attains regarding the nature of 
understanding is directly relevant to Gadamer's study of the 
nature of interpretation.
It is important to note at this point the fundamental 
difference regarding the respective goals of Being and Time 
and Truth and Method. Heidegger's work is essentially an 
analysis of human understanding, a task which he views as 
preliminary to his attempt to actually raise again the 
question of the meaning of being. It is fair to say that 
Heidegger's concern over the nature of understanding extends 
only as far as it assists him in answering the question of 
the meaning of being. By contrast, Gadamer's concern is 
much broader. He is concerned with drawing out the 
implications of Heidegger's disclosure of the fore-structure 
of understanding for philosophy in general. This was to 
ultimately lead Gadamer to the conclusion that interpretive
03 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 350.
04 Ibid., p. 340.
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experience is linguistic, and to the conclusion that the 
scope of hermeneutics, as philosophy, is universal.
As we have seen, the fore-structure of understanding 
includes preconceptions08 that are projected to form a 
general sense of meaning constitutive of interpretive 
experience. For Gadamer, this Heideggerian concept is a 
philosophical and hermeneutical watershed. Writes Gadamer, 
"against the background of this kind of existential analysis 
.... the problems of a hermeneutics of the human sciences 
suddenly look very different."86 Gadamer continues, "the 
present work is devoted to this new aspect of the 
hermeneutical problem.”
To Gadamer, the significance of Heidegger's concept is 
that we, being historically situated, project our own 
preconceptions whenever we interpret something. What is 
critically important is that Gadamer re-defines 
preconceptions as prejudices. This raises Heidegger's 
concept of the fore-structure of understanding to a new 
level of importance because it asserts that prejudices are
88 Our use of the term "preconceptions" demonstrates 
the limitations imposed on thought by language. We are 
using the term to denote the preconscious meaning which is 
experienced and projected in understanding. In this sense, 
our use of the term "preconceptions" is partially incorrect, 
for we are using it to denote meanings which are not 
"conceptual" at all, but are in fact, preconscious 
experiences. The term "presupposition" similarly fails to 
render accurately the preconscious nature of what is being 
projected in understanding.
86 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 232.
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the condition of interpretation. According to Gadamer,
"this recognition that all understanding inevitably involves
some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real
thrust."07 Why Heidegger's analysis of the fore-structure
of understanding is so important for Gadamer should now be
clear. When interpretation is viewed as the expression of
particular meanings which have already been understood,
interpretation may be viewed as being prejudiced.
In contemporary American society the term "prejudice"
has strictly pejorative connotations. It is Gadamer*s
contention, however, that such connotations amount to a
distortion of the traditional meaning of the term.
According to Gadamer, prior to the Enlightenment, the term
"prejudice" simply meant preliminary judgment.
It is not until the Enlightenment that the concept of 
prejudice acquires the negative aspect we are familiar 
with. Actually 'prejudice' means a judgment that is 
given before all the elements that determine a 
situation have been finally examined.08
Thus, in Gadamer's view, prejudice does not necessarily mean
"false judgment." The term actually means preliminary
judgment, a judgment which is tentative and incomplete.
Gadamer believes that it is necessary to "rehabilitate"
the concept of prejudice. This is one of the most
misunderstood aspects of his work. As Bernstein points out,
07 Ibid., p. 239.
08 Ibid., p. 240.
89
it is also one of the boldest.09 Some commentators, such as 
Habermas, have misconstrued Gadamer's position and have 
portrayed him as a political conservative, suggesting that 
Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice is tantamount to 
defending tyrannical authority.00 As we shall see, nothing 
could be farther from the truth. Gadamer's defense of 
prejudice must not be construed as an attempt to defend the 
inhuman and destructive actions which are associated with 
world views that are typically described as being 
prejudiced. Instead, Gadamer wants to reintroduce into our 
tradition an aspect of the term's meaning which has been 
deformed by the Enlightenment, and by doing so, help us 
become conscious of the determinate history which operates 
behind our backs in the form of prejudices. "Prejudice" is 
simply used by Gadamer to denote the preconscious meanings 
provided by the fore-structure of understanding. This means 
that there are true prejudices as well as false prejudices.
Gadamer's notion that there are true and false 
prejudices is understandable in light of Heidegger’s concept 
of the fore-structure of understanding. Once it is granted 
that prejudices invariably play a role in interpretation, 
equating prejudices with false judgments would amount to a
09 Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism. 1983, 
p. 127.
00 See Jurgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth 
and Method" in Dallmayr and McCarthy, eds. Understanding and 
Social Inquiry. 1977, pp. 335-363.
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condemnation of the truth status of all interpretation.
What is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of 
the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact 
that there are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do 
justice to man’s finite, historical mode of being.61
By showing that prejudices are not necessarily false,
Gadamer is preserving the possibility of the legitimacy of
prejudices, true prejudices, as the ground of
interpretation. According to Gadamer, there are true and
false prejudices, and the hermeneutical problem we all face
is to draw a distinction between the two.
We are now in a position to relate Heidegger's and
Gadamer's views of the nature of interpretation to our
central research problem. In answer to our first question,
'what is the nature of interpretation?', we may respond that
interpretation is by nature prejudiced. What does this
mean? It means that interpretation is constituted in
understanding through prejudices the truth status of which
is assumed during their moment of application. This is the
nature of interpretation. What is the significance of this?
The significance of the prejudiced nature of interpretation
is that, owing to the preconsious application of prejudices,
interpretation is always at risk of being unknowingly or
preconsciouslv falsely constituted. Because prejudices are
preconsciously applied in understanding false prejudices are
not consciously experienced, and therefore are free to
61 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 246.
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"operate behind our back," so to speak, and distort our 
conscious interpretations.
It is critically important at this point to consider our 
earlier discussion of Gadamer's view of the structure of 
experience. As we have seen, Gadamer holds that 
preconceptions projected in understanding are subject to 
contradiction and negation in light of new and contrary 
experience. Does not this trivialize his notion of the 
prejudiced nature of interpretation? If experience has the 
structure of a corrective which, in a sense, automatically 
negates false prejudices in light of contradictory 
experience, this means that the existence of false 
prejudices is not at all problematic, for their existence is 
likely to be transitory, their effect insignificant, owing 
to the corrective structure of experience. In other words, 
the effect of false prejudices will fail the test of 
experience and hence be negated. This is a critically 
important question. What does make the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation significant and problematic, however, is the 
fact that prejudices are linauistical. Our use of language 
carries with it implicit pre-understandings which are 
typically not experienced during our use of language. 
Language is somewhat of a shell game in the sense that 
linguistical concepts are used unconsciously to denote 
assumed meanings which typically are left unquestioned. The 
term "freedom," for example, only has meaning in terms of
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the assumptions of meaning which people implicitly associate 
with it. These assumptions of meaning, or prejudices, are 
both constitutive and representative of our actual relation 
to the world. This is why the term will mean one thing to 
an American businessman, and something quite different to a 
peasant in Nicaragua who spent most of his life under the 
rule of Somoza. For example, the businessman might 
associate private property ownership with freedom. By 
contrast, owing to a history within which private property 
ownership meant the control of land by a handful of families 
in Nicaragua, the peasant might easily come to associate 
state ownership of land with the term freedom. The point we 
are trying to make is simply that the tacit meanings 
constitutive of linguistical concepts typically escape 
conscious experience because our use of language is 
typically unconscious. It follows that, unless one comes to 
question the prejudices or preconscious linguistical 
meanings carried in language, then false prejudices are free 
to constitute false interpretations that have the appearance 
of truth. The broader sociological significance of this is 
explored on the theoretical and topical levels in chapter 
seven. At this point suffice it to say that, in light of 
Gadamer's view of the prejudiced nature of interpretation, 
what sociologists have for years described as the "social 
construction of reality," may be more accurately described 
as the "social fabrication of reality"; for Gadamer reveals
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prejudices, both true and false ones, as having a 
constitutive effect on our interpretive experience which is 
more primary than that provided through conscious thought. 
Hence it would appear more accurate to describe the social 
construction of reality as a fabrication, as a weaving of 
conscious interpretations and social actions structured by 
true and false prejudices.63
This brings us to the question regarding the problematic 
nature of interpretation. The notion that interpretation is 
by nature prejudiced is essentially no different than the 
notion of the hermeneutic circle: both assert that 
interpretation cannot proceed without a preconception of its 
object. However, Heidegger emphasizes that if we view the 
hermeneutic circle as something vicious or problematic we 
have misunderstood the experience of interpretation from the 
ground up. Does this mean that we must accept as non­
problematic the prejudiced nature of interpretation?
Gadamer would say no. According to Gadamer we can 
acknowledge the facticity of the hermeneutic circle and
63 When we consider the notion that interpretation 
cannot proceed without a preconception of its "object," the 
problems surrounding the interpretation of texts or social 
action become more than methodological problems. Hence, the 
hermeneutical problem becomes the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation itself. What this means is that Heidegger 
and Gadamer have indeed opened up a new dimension of the 
hermeneutical problem; one which goes beyond a 
methodological concern over interpretation to include the 
prejudiced nature of interpretation in general, and its 
relationship to everyday life, social action, and the social 
construction or fabrication of reality.
9 4
still pursue the potentially problematic implications of the 
fact that false prejudices are free to distort interpretive 
experience unknowingly. In Gadamer‘s view, then, it is not 
that interpretation is by nature problematic, but rather, 
that the preconscious application of false prejudices is 
problematic. Gadamer in fact construes the preconscious 
effect of false prejudices as a form of domination, and as 
we shall see, it is his practical concern over the 
domineering effect of false prejudices which motivates him 
to explore the possibilities for overcoming them.63
The extent to which the prejudices constitutive of 
interpretive experience across society are actually false is 
an open question and merits study. The extent to which 
empirical evidence can be brought to bear on Gadamer1s 
theoretical insights is also worth examining. However, 
before discussing the possibilities for studying prejudices 
we must first examine Gadamer's own response to his insights 
regarding the prejudiced nature of interpretation.
63 It should be noted that it is not Gadamer's 
intention to embark on an effort to test the truth status of 
the prejudices constitutive of all interpretations. This of 
course, would be an impossibility. But aside from the 
impossibility of such a task, it would be inappropriate to 
think that all interpretations need to be examined with 
regard to the truth status of their prejudices. Gadamer 
clearly views it important to explore the philosophical 
prejudices which constitute philosophical interpretations, 
and he does just this throughout Truth and Method. 
Sociologists would have to examine various types of social 
interpretations and decide upon the appropriateness of 
studying them in each case.
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CHAPTER IV
LINGUISTICALITY, PREJUDICE AND HERMENEUTICAL REFLECTION
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss Gadamer's 
response to his own conclusions regarding the nature of 
interpretation. Gadamer's response is a call for the 
cultivation of "effective-historical consciousness," which 
is attained through hermeneutical reflection. Gadamer’s 
conception of hermeneutical reflection is complex and must 
be dealt with carefully and with reference to Gadamer's more 
general project. Generally, hermeneutical reflection 
pertains to the process whereby we experience the prejudiced 
nature of interpretation and as a result attain a more 
informed and developed interpretation of an object of 
experience. A subtle yet critically important aspect of the 
experience of hermeneutical reflection is that it is not 
merely an act of conscious reflection but is, in essence, a 
linguistic experience involving critical dialogue.
Deliberate hermeneutical reflection occurs when we 
intentionally maintain that our interpretations are 
prejudiced and aim to treat our interpretations and those of 
others sceptically. As we shall see, this is what Gadamer 
does throughout Truth and Method.1 It should be emphasized,
1 By contrast, random hermeneutical reflection occurs 
when, owing to unexpected circumstances, we consciously 
experience the prejudiced nature of interpretation and as a
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however, that the actual experience of particular prejudices 
is not a consciously guided event. It is, rather, something 
that happens to us whether we like it or not, according to 
our relationship to the world. It does not occur according 
to what we consciously think our relationship to the world 
is.
Another important aspect of hermeneutical reflection is 
that while it may involve becoming aware of certain 
prejudices, these moments of awareness must be viewed as 
temporary experiences. That is, it is not as though we 
transcend certain prejudices once and for all and then 
proceed to interpret reality afterwards free from their 
influence. Prejudices are part of the nature of 
interpretation, and in this sense they make interpretation 
possible. The actual "overcoming” of prejudices is 
something which is experienced according to one's historical 
situation or relation to the world, and as such cannot be 
consciously intended or scientifically engineered.
In this chapter we will discuss three critically 
important aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutics all of which are 
closely tied to the notions of prejudice and hermeneutical 
reflection. The first of these is Gadamer's notion of 
"linguisticality." This term refers to Gadamer's view that 
the nature of interpretation is linguistical.
result begin questioning what we had typically taken for 
granted.
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Linguisticality also means that prejudices themselves are 
linguistic, and this clears the way for their specification 
and empirical study. The second important concept which we 
will discuss is that of "effective-historical 
consciousness." This refers to the experience of becoming 
consciously aware of the meaning-constitutive effects of 
history which are the condition of experience. It is 
essentially an attitude or interpretive posture which seeks 
to remain aware of its own prejudiced nature. The final 
concept which we will discuss in this chapter is Gadamer's 
notion of truth, which is unique and controversial.
Gadamer’s position is that truth is not something which is 
consciously decided, but something which is experienced. 
This does not mean that conscious thought has no place in 
deciding matters of truth; but rather, that our conscious 
deliberations of truth are simply epiphenomena of a 
preconscious experience of truth; an experience given in 
understanding owing to our practical relationship to the 
world. We will discuss this unusual view of truth after 
first discussing Gadamer's notions of linguisticality and 
effective-historical consciousness. Following our 
discussion of these three important concepts we will define 
Gadamer's concept of hermeneutical reflection.
As we have seen, the task of traditional hermeneutics 
was to overcome the problems inhibiting the interpretation 
of texts and historical periods. It is therefore not
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surprising to find Gadamer concerned over the new dimension
of the hermeneutical problem which he and Heidegger have
uncovered.2 Indeed, Gadamer's conclusions regarding the
prejudiced nature of interpretation lead him to redefine the
task of hermeneutics.
Thus we are able to formulate the central question of a 
truly historical hermeneutics, epistemologically its 
fundamental question, namely: where is the ground of 
the legitimacy of prejudices? What distinguishes 
legitimate prejudices from all the countless ones which 
it is the undeniable task of critical reason to 
overcome?3
In order to answer these questions Gadamer must 1) further 
specify the meaning and nature of prejudices, 2) establish 
how prejudices are identified, and 3) discuss the "ground" 
of the legitimacy of prejudices and the process through 
which legitimate prejudices are distinguished from 
illegitimate (false) ones. Gadamer completes this threefold 
task, but as is usually the case in Truth and Method, he 
does so circuitously and in some respects implicitly. Yet 
when we analyze the central notions which he develops in the 
remainder of Truth and Method the answers to these questions 
are easily discerned. It is in Gadamer’ s discussion of 
linguisticality, which occupies the center of Part Three of 
Truth and Method, that we find an implicit connection 
between prejudices and preconscious linguistical concepts.
2 This new aspect of the hermeneutical problem is the 
notion that interpretation cannot proceed without a 
preconception of its object.
3 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 246.
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This specification of the meaning of prejudices in terms of 
preconscious linguistical concepts is further supported by 
an examination of Gadamer’s own approach in his analysis of 
the prejudices of the Enlightenment. The specification of 
what prejudices are enables us to establish precisely how 
they are identified; and Gadamer*s own discussion of 
effective-historical consciousness may be taken as an 
example of how this is done in practice. Finally, in order 
to answer the question regarding the process through which 
legitimate prejudices are distinguished from false ones we 
will examine Gadamer's concept of truth. Once we have 
discussed these three key aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutics 
- his notions of linguisticality, effective-historical 
consciousness and truth -, we will be able to specify the 
nature of hermeneutical reflection and its relationship to 
the prejudiced nature of interpretation. This chapter, 
therefore, concentrates on specifying the nature of 
Gadamer1s key concepts; in particular, the concepts of 
prejudice and hermeneutical reflection. Once this is done 
we will be able to begin relating Gadamer?s hermeneutics to 
sociology in general. This will be done by first discussing 
the social-theoretical reception of Gadamer (chapter five), 
then by relating his analysis of interpretation to the 
contributions of interpretive sociology (chapter six), and 
finally by exploring in chapter seven the theoretical and 
practical possibilities which Gadamer's work presents for
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sociology.
The Linguisticality of Understanding 
The term "linguisticality" refers to Gadamer's view that 
the nature of understanding, and hence, the nature of 
experience itself, is linguistic. This is a strong claim 
and its meaning is easily misinterpreted. For example, on 
one level it suggests that there can be no experience which 
is not linguistic. If this is the meaning of the claim, 
however, it would have to be rejected, for we have all had 
experiences which are not linguistic. But this is not the 
meaning of Gadamer's claim. Gadamer is simply claiming that 
the nature of understanding is linguistic, and experience is 
therefore conditioned by language. That is, experience is 
expressed and mediated through language.
Gadamer's claim is actually twofold. First, as we have 
stated, he is claiming that the nature of understanding is 
linguistic. The second claim follows from the first: given 
that the nature of understanding is linguistic, it follows 
that the nature of experience must also be linguistic, for 
as we have seen in chapter three, experience is structured 
in understanding. He will analyze both of these claims, 
beginning with the more primary one.
He have seen that Gadamer follows Heidegger in viewing 
interpretation as the way understanding happens, as the 
manifestation of understanding in particular situations. It
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was this equation that made Heidegger1s work so important 
for him. But Gadamer goes beyond Heidegger by focusing his 
attention on explicating the linguistic structure of 
understanding.4 The key to grasping Gadamer's view that the 
nature of understanding is linguistic lies in the 
relationship between "projection" and "application." As we 
have seen, Heidegger uses the term projection to specify the 
temporal structure of understanding. The fore-structure of 
understanding contains preconceptions which are projected in 
understanding. Gadamer uses the concept of application to 
demonstrate the practical nature of understanding. Using 
legal hermeneutics as an example, Gadamer shows how all 
understanding involves relating or applying the meaning of 
the object under consideration to one's historical situation 
or context. Application, as an element of hermeneutical 
experience (the interpretation of meaning) thus refers to 
the fact that the meaning of something is in effect the 
relation it has to one's life activity. In the case of 
legal hermeneutics, the meaning of a particular law does not 
actually exist outside of its application to a particular 
case. The law comes alive, in a sense, when it is applied. 
This view runs counter to the view of Judge Bork, for
4 It should be noted that even in Being and Time 
Heidegger was aware of the linguistical nature of 
experience. It is simply that he did not expound upon this 
until later works, opting instead to dwell initially upon 
the existential-historical conditions of the meaning of 
being.
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example, who in his hearing before the Senate committee on 
his Supreme Court nomination argued for an interpretation of 
the Constitution outside of historical context.0 This is 
the explicit way in which Gadamer uses the term application.
But there is another meaning of application implicit in 
Gadamer’s work which I believe is the key to establishing 
the legitimacy of his claim that the nature of understanding 
is linguistic. As we shall see in our discussion of 
effective-historical consciousness, the key to becoming 
aware of the effects of history for experience lies in 
becoming aware of the anterior influences of linguistical 
concepts. The prejudice of the Enlightenment against the 
authority of tradition, for example, presents itself as an 
object of Gadamer's critical analysis in the form of a 
linguistical concept. The fact that this prejudice reveals 
itself to Gadamer as a linguistical concept enables him to 
subject it to critical discourse. The significance of this
0 It is possible to argue that Bork's view that the 
Constitution should be interpreted in terms of its "original 
intent" does in fact take into account the historical 
context of the Constitution. It does not, however, take 
into account the historical context of those who will be 
applying it and those who will be affected by its 
application. It is with respect to this aspect of 
interpretation, the question of the bearing and relevance of 
the meaning of an interpretation for its interpreters, that 
Gadamer rejects the notion that we should attempt to 
preserve an original intended meaning. It is not merely 
that such an attempt would create problems (for example, 
what was the intended original meaning?), but rather, that 
the very act of interpretation itself makes the meaning of a 
text one's own. This means that, in Gadamer's view, the 
meaning of a text is inescapably tied to the historical 
situation of its interpreter.
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lies in the fact that Gadamer1s analysis demonstrates bv 
example that prejudices are linguistical in nature: they are 
implicit in our linguistic expressions and may be challenged 
in the medium of language.
Why is this important for our analysis of Gadamer's 
claim that the nature of understanding is linguistic? By 
defining the prejudices projected in understanding as 
preconscious linguistical concepts, language becomes part of 
the nature of understanding. In other words, the projection 
of preconscious linguistical meanings in understanding means 
that linguistical concepts are applied in understanding, and 
this means that language cannot be logically distinguished 
from understanding. Gadamer writes:
... understanding always includes an element of
application and thus produces a constant further
development in the formation of concepts.6
This passage may be interpreted on two distinct levels 
corresponding to the two meanings we have attributed to 
application. Explicitly, the development of concepts is 
furthered as a result of the application of understanding to 
our relationship to the world. That is, the practical 
importance which understanding has for our relationship to 
the world gives rise to new meanings, and the experience of 
these meanings leads to the further development of our 
relationship to the world. This "further development" of 
concepts is the result of the fact that experience will
6 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 364.
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negate projected (prior, given) meaning if the latter is 
contradicted by the former. This is the notion which we 
discussed above in the context of the relationship between 
truth and method: "experience is valid, so long as 
it is not contradicted by new experience."7 However, owing 
to our tacit or unconscious use of language the "corrective" 
structure of experience cannot be said to apply in the case 
of the implicit application of linguistical concepts in 
understanding. Unless our unconscious use of language 
becomes conscious, the corrective structure of experience 
can have no effect on prejudices constitutive of 
interpretation. Becoming conscious of our unconscious use 
of language is therefore a critically important experience.
To summarize, then, we may say that Gadamer uses the 
concept of application in two senses. 1) To show how all 
understanding is practical in terms of our relationship to 
the world, and 2) to illustrate how the structure of 
understanding is linguistic in that understanding always 
involves the application of preconscious linguistical 
meanings. It is in this second sense that the linguistic 
nature of understanding is demonstrated philosophically.
The demonstration of the linguistic nature of 
understanding opens up new dimensions in hermeneutics. 
Specifically, it suggests that experience itself is 
hermeneutical. This is because Gadamer's discussion of the
7 Ibid., p. 314.
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linguistic nature of understanding shows the inter­
relatedness of understanding, interpretation, and 
application, all of which are part of experience itself.
What do we mean by this? As we have seen, understanding is 
our way of being in the world and is hence constitutive of 
experience; and interpretion is defined by Gadamer as the 
way understanding happens, the manifestation of 
understanding in particular situations. This means that 
interpretation is also part of the nature of experience. We 
have also seen that understanding and interpretation both 
involve application. On one level, preconscious meanings 
are applied implicitly when they are projected in the fore­
structure of understanding. On a different level, 
understanding and interpretation involve explicit 
application in the sense that the meaning which they provide 
is always applied practically in terms of one's relation to 
the world. This means that understanding, interpretation 
and application are inter-related and inseparable; together 
they constitute the structure of experience itself. Indeed, 
it is for this reason that Gadamer claims that the scope of 
hermeneutics is universal. Hermeneutics is universal 
because human experience is by nature hermeneutical. That 
is, experience always involves understanding, interpretation 
and application. It follows that experience itself is 
structured linguistically.
We have discussed in philosophical terms the linguistic
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nature of understanding, and have touched upon the related 
notion that the nature of experience is also linguistic. It 
is nevertheless true that, in some sense, Gadamer*s view 
that the structure of experience is linguistic lacks face 
validity.8 At first glance his claim may appear invalid 
because it may be interpreted to mean that there can be no 
experiences that are not linguistical. One may raise doubts 
with regard to this claim by simply thinking of an instance 
when one experiences something that cannot be put into 
words. Doesn’t such experience contradict the notion that 
the structure of experience is linguistic? Gadamer 
disagrees:
Indeed, language often seems ill-suited to express what 
we feel. In the face of the overwhelming presence of 
works of art the task of expressing in words what they 
say to us seems like an infinite and hopeless under­
taking. It seems like a critique of language that our 
desire and capacity to understand always go beyond any 
statement that we can make. But this does not affect 
the fundamental priority of language.
Gadamer continues:
the critical superiority which we claim over 
language is not concerned with the conventions of 
linguistic expression, but with the conventions of 
meaning that have found their form in language. Thus 
it says nothing against the essential connection
8 "Face validity" is a basic methodological concept 
which appears in the literature on social research methods. 
The concept refers to the validity that a measurement 
instrument suggests at first glance. If, for example, 
someone was to suggest measuring one's tendency toward 
criminal behavior by asking them whether or not they were a 
Red Sox fan, we would conclude that the measure lacked face 
validity. Because being a Red Sox fan is not logically 
related to criminal behavior, we would conclude at first 
glance that the question was an invalid measure.
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between understanding and language.9 
When Gadamer refers to the "critical superiority which we 
claim over language," he is referring to our ability to 
criticize the appropriateness and limitations of words and 
their usage. It is this criticism which makes Gadamer's 
position appear untenable. As Gadamer puts it, however, 
such criticism does not undermine the constitutive 
significance of language for meaningful experience. This is 
because such criticism speaks only to the shortcomings of 
typical meanings that have found their form in language.
That is, it is merely criticism of the fact that at times, 
language appears impoverished by its inability to provide us 
with words capable of expressing the richness of meaning 
which is experienced. Such criticism, however, does not 
undermine the fact that language is not merely a tool or 
instrument but our mode of expression.10 In the same 
section Gadamer explains that this type of criticism in fact 
"confirms" the connection between understanding and 
language. This is because "all such criticism which rises 
above the schematism of our statements in order to 
understand again finds its expression in the form of 
language." In other words, language is the medium through 
which we express the limitations of language. Gadamer
9 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 362.
10 This is what Gadamer apparently means by the phrase 
"conventions of linguistic expression.”
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writes, "Hence language always forestalls any objection to
its jurisdication."l 1
As our mode of expression language permeates our
experience, and therefore, our very existence. To Gadamer,
"language is not a mere tool we use, something we construct
with which to communicate and differentiate." Hor is it
"just one of man's possessions in the world, but on it
depends the fact that man has a world at all." As our mode
of expression, language is that through which our world of
meaning is constituted.
... in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all 
knowledge of the world, we are always already 
encompassed by the language that is our own.
He grow up, and we become acquainted with men 
and in the last analysis with ourselves when we 
learn to speak. Learning to speak does not mean 
learning to use a preexistent tool for designating 
a world already somehow familiar to us; it means 
acquiring a familiarity and acquaintance with the 
world itself and how it confronts us.12
Gadamer's linguistic view of experience is not unique.
Within sociology, his view may be likened to that of G. H.
Mead.13 Like Gadamer, Mead goes beyond a strictly
instrumentalist view of language, such as Marx's view of
11 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, pp. 362-363.
12 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics. 1977, pp. 62-63.
13 There are also similarities, as well as differences, 
between Gadamer's view of language and that of the later 
Wittgenstein. See Susan Hekman, Hermeneutics and the 
Sociology of Knowledge. 1986, pp. 117-128, for a comparison 
of the two.
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language as practical consciousness.14 In the compilation 
of his teachings entitled Mind. Self and Society. Mead 
claims that sociality is the necessary condition for the 
emergence of language, and it is the development of language 
which gave rise to "mind." Because language is the 
condition of mind, and sociality the condition of language, 
Mead concludes that the structure of mind is social.
This also means that the structure of mind is 
linguistic. To Mead, language is the very condition of the 
emergence of meaningful experience. In Reek's words, 
"language for Mead is the field from which mind emerges and 
in which it dwells."111 It follows that it is language 
itself which makes possible the development of social 
selves, or socialized individuals, capable of acting in 
accordance with what they understand to be the expectations
14 Despite several fundamental differences, the 
similarities between Mead and Gadamer are surprisingly
extensive. Perhaps the biggest difference between the two 
regards their respective theories of truth. It is notable 
that Mead was well versed in German Idealism and had studied 
Rant and Hegel closely. Most interesting is Mead's 
description in a letter of the impact which Hegel's 
dialectic had upon him. See David Miller, Georae Herbert 
Mead; Self. Language and the World (Austin, Texas:
University of Texas Press, 1973), p. xiv. In addition to 
their respective treatments of language, the two are also 
very similar in their respective views of the phenomenon of 
play. Gadamer's treatment of play is presented in Part One 
of Truth and Method, and is also discussed in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics. Mead's treatment of play appears in Mind.
Self and Society.
18 Andrew J. Reck, ed. Selected Writings. (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), p. xxviii.
110
of others.16 In abstract terms, mind is the liaison between 
self and society, and that which makes this relation 
possible is language. In concrete terms, language is the 
structure of society within us.
Gadamer writes, "a view of language is a view of the 
world." This is reflected by the fact that certain 
linguistic expressions are suggestive of the kind of 
experience typical of the culture or world within which the 
language is spoken. Like Mead, who views language as a 
social emergent, Gadamer writes, "... language has no 
independent life apart from the world that comes to language 
within it."17 A language lives through the experience of 
life which it expresses. As Mead writes, "we have to 
realize that language is part of our conduct."18
Gadamer1s explication of the linguistic nature of 
understanding and experience is his unique contribution to 
hermeneutics. While the importance of the linguistic nature 
of existence is noted by Heidegger, it is Gadamer who 
explicates the significance of linguisticality for the
16 It is interesting to note that this notion of social 
behavior, which is predicated on shared meaning, is 
essentially no different than Weber's view of social action 
as action that takes into account the behavior of others and 
is thereby oriented in its course.
17 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 401.
18 Mead, Mind. Self and Society, 1934, p. 124.
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nature of interpretive experience.1* As Gadamer himself 
notes, "the linguistic nature of the human experience of the 
world gives to our analysis of the hermeneutical experience 
an extended horizon."20 This extended horizon lies in the 
specification of prejudices as preconscious linguistical 
concepts. This means that prejudices are linguistical 
meanings which are meaningful for us in a preconscious way 
during their projection in the fore-structure of 
understanding. Stated differently, prejudices are already 
understood linguistical meanings which are projected 
preconsciously in understanding.
The importance of Gadamer's explication of the 
linguisticality of understanding is that it clears the way 
for the sociological study of prejudices by enabling us to 
define prejudices in terms of preconscious linguistical 
concepts. The sociological significance of this will become 
clearer after we specify the relationship between prejudices 
and social structure. But even at this point, we can see 
that Gadamer*s explication of the linguisticality of 
understanding clearly opens new dimensions of questioning in 
sociology. For as Gadamer writes, "from the way that words 
change, we can discover the way that customs and values
19 As David Couzens Hoy points out, "Gadamer's most 
original contribution to the history of hermeneutics is his 
linguistic turn." The Critical Circle (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1982), P. 5.
20 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 405.
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change."21 This means that through the sociological
analysis of prejudices or preconscious linguistical concepts
sociologists may be able to study culture, societal values,
and various aspects of social structure. More important,
perhaps, is that it suggests that through the analysis of
implicit linguistical concepts we will be able to identify
prejudices and study them. As Gadamer writes,
the language that lives in speech, which takes in all 
understanding ... is so much bound up with thinking 
and interpretation that we have too little left if we 
ignore the actual content of what languages hand down 
to us and seek to consider only language as form. 
Unconsciousness of language has not ceased to be the 
actual modality of speech.22
The experience of becoming aware of one's prejudices is
therefore tantamount to becoming conscious of one's
unconscious use of language. This insight help will clear
the way for the identification and study of prejudices, and
ultimately, the study of the relationship between prejudices
and hermeneutical reflection.
21 Ibid., p. 407.
22 Ibid., p. 366.
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Effective-Historical Consciousness
Through our discussion of Gadamer's explication of the 
linguisticality of understanding we have been able to 
specify the meaning of prejudices: prejudices are 
preconscious linauistical concepts. It is our participation 
in a linguistic tradition which provides us, through 
experience, with these preconscious linguistical concepts 
which structure experience. The key to becoming aware of 
these prejudices rests on our ability to become conscious of 
our own linguistic tradition, and, more specifically, our 
unconscious use of language.23 This is indeed why Gadamer 
so meticulously traces the history of the meaning of 
linguistical concepts before he uses them in his research.
To do otherwise would be to submit to the "tyranny" of 
hidden prejudices; to submit to the determinate effects of 
preconscious meanings operating behind our back as a result 
of the linguistical nature of understanding and 
interpretation. "If thought is to be conscientious," writes 
Gadamer, "it must become aware of these anterior 
influences."24 As Gadamer states in the introduction to 
Truth and Method
the following investigation tries to satisfy this
23 Gadamer's conception of tradition is important for 
he views tradition as linguistical in nature, and therefore 
the repository of the prejudices which are the condition of 
our understanding. This aspect of tradition in Gadamer's 
work is discussed in the pages that follow.
24 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. xv.
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demand by combining as closely as possible an 
inquiry into the history of concepts with a factual 
exposition of its theme.20
Gadamer’s method of research and exposition is an example of
deliberate hermeneutical reflection, which seeks
relentlessly to become conscious of the effects of history
operating in its own interpretation of that which is its
focus; that is, it seeks to become conscious of an otherwise
unconscious use of language. While this is the aim of
hermeneutical reflection, it is crucially important to
emphasize that we can never become completely aware of the
full structuring effect of our historical situation. That
is, our awareness of the structuring effects of history is
always limited. This is because there is no moment when
interpretation is not already understood prior to its
conscious appropriation. To become conscious of the
prejudiced nature of interpretation, therefore, does not
involve a transcendental moment within which our prejudices
are "overcome." We instead become conscious of the
prejudiced nature of interpretation, thereby placing
ourselves in an interpretive posture open to the experience
of certain, particular prejudices. Hermeneutical
consciousness is an attitude which views its own
interpretations sceptically, while at the same time
refraining from objectivism's false hope of a complete
historical transcendence.
3 0 Ibid., p.xv.
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There can be no complete conscious transcendence of 
history because our historical situation is itself 
constitutive of understanding and interpretation. This is 
why the consciousness or awareness of the anterior 
influences in our understanding and experience can never be 
complete or exhaustive. Hermeneutical reflection is the act 
of experiencing the general linguistical-historical 
condition of one's own mode of expression. It is an 
experience which is "... the corrective by means of which 
the thinking reason escapes the prison of language, and is 
itself constituted linguistically."2« When we reflect 
hermeneutically, when we experience the meanings which we 
typically hold unconsciously, we become conscious of the 
effects of our prejudices. Gadamer describes this as the 
process of developing an "effective-historical 
consciousness." The hermeneutical awareness which Gadamer 
seeks to maintain throughout Truth and Method is an example 
of this. Perhaps the clearest example of Gadamer's own 
effective-historical consciousness is his discussion of the 
meaning of authority. Because in this discussion Gadamer 
demonstrates effective-historical consciousness by example, 
we will analyze it in order to further specify its meaning.
Heidegger's critique of the assumptions of the 
Enlightenment is replayed, in a sense, on a different level 
in the work of Gadamer. Whereas Heidegger questions the
Ibid., p. 363.
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assumptions of the Enlightenment's view of reason, and
therefore attacks the Enlightenment on the philosophical
level, in Truth and Method Gadamer attacks the Enlightenment
on a practical level. Gadamer's critique is aimed at the
Enlightenment's unbounded and indiscriminate undermining of
authority and tradition.
Within the Enlightenment, the very concept of 
authority becomes deformed. On the basis of its 
concept of reason and freedom, the concept of 
authority could be seen as diametrically opposed 
to reason and freedom: to be, in fact, blind 
obedience. This is the meaning that we know, from 
the usage of its critics, within modern 
dictatorships. But this is not the essence of 
authority.2 7
According to Gadamer the essence of authority rests on
recognition and knowledge. It cannot be "bestowed," but
instead rests on an act of reason which acknowledges the
superior judgment of another in particular situations. This
means that legitimate authority depends not on force but on
consent. For example, when we yield to the authority of a
medical expert we do so because we recognize the superior
judgment of the medical expert regarding matters medical.
The legitimate status of authority, of course, does not
preclude the existence nor the preponderance of illegitimate
authority. Gadamer writes
the distinction the Enlightenment draws between faith 
in authority and the use of one's own reason is, in 
itself, legitimate. If the prestige of authority takes 
the place of one's own judgment, then authority is in
27 Ibid., p. 248.
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fact a source of prejudices.28 
We may interpret this passage to mean that the authoritative 
relation requires a responsibility on behalf of the 
consenting party.88 This responsibility is one of active 
interpretation and questioning. That is, if the consenting 
party simply yields to authority figures because of their 
prestige, then the consenting party is placing itself in a 
vulnerable situation by inviting the misuse of authority.
One example of the responsibility required of the 
consenting party would be the authoritative relationship 
between a medical doctor and a patient. For example, within 
the American medical establishment it has been widely 
believed that once a women has a caesarean birth, she should 
always have a caesarean birth. Interestingly, there is no 
statistical or medical evidence supporting this precept, and 
critics of the medical establishment claim that it exists 
because it is generally less problematic for a doctor to 
schedule a "section" then it is for him or her to deal with 
the unpredictability of vaginal deliveries. In light of 
this situation, if a pregnant woman who has had a caesarean 
simply takes the advice of her doctor without questioning 
the reasons for his or her advice, she is acting 
irresponsibly, and may pay the price by having unnecessary
28 Ibid., p. 247.
29 It is, of course, also true that the authoritative 
relation requires responsibility on behalf of the person or 
group claiming authority.
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major surgery. According to Gadamer, legitimate authority 
requires vigilance on the part of the consenting party.
Gadamer's position regarding authority is similar to his 
position toward tradition. The authoritative weight of 
tradition is not necessarily dogmatic, as the Enlightenment 
would have us believe. Tradition simply does not linger by 
virtue of its own inertia. It lives in the experience of 
those existing in a given historical situation. As Gadamer 
writes
... tradition is constantly an element of freedom 
and history itself .... it needs to be affirmed, 
embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, 
preservation, such as is active in all 
historical change.30
When tradition does embody dogmatic beliefs it is not the
fault of tradition, but the fault of those existing within
the tradition who accept such beliefs irresponsibly and
unquestioningly. The importance of Gadamer's view of
tradition will become more apparent when we discuss his
conception of truth. At this point it is worth noting
Gadamer's acknowledgement of what in sociology is termed
"agency," the affective and mediating abilities of the
individual within social relationships. By viewing
tradition as a mutually affective relation between agent and
history, and authority as a communicative contract between
agents, Gadamer avoids the problems of 1) structuralism,
and its deterministic view of social action, and
30 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 250.
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2) subjectivism, and its exaggerated view of the 
transcendental aspects of social action in relation to 
history. This "middle" position regarding agent and 
history, or agency and social structure, is also implicit in 
Heidegger's work, for example, in the opening ruminations of 
Being and Time which we have already discussed. Indeed, it 
is arguable that the location of social structure within the 
existence of the individual in the form of preconsious 
meanings based on one's relation to the world actually 
renders sociology’s dichotomy between agency and structure 
obsolete. This is because what is traditionally referred to 
as social structure, language, meaning, social and economic 
relations, norms and formal behavioral precepts, are recast 
as part of the structure of experience itself, not as 
"external" forces which act over and above the individual. 
While Heidegger's argument that the meaning of being always 
appears temporally may appear abstract to some, it actually 
offers a more accurate and concrete conceptualization of 
what social action is as compared with sociology's 
traditional conceptualization of it. According to 
Heidegger, the structure of social action is most 
essentially temporal, not economic or political. The 
significance of the temporal structure of social action has 
already been explicated in terms of the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation. This means that the structure of 
experience, be it a social relation, a labor or economic
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relation, or a political relation, is also prejudiced. In 
each case our experience of the meaning of the relation is 
already structured by what we have been.
This aspect of social action calls for demystification 
and rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis. The 
anterior effects of the temporal structure of experience 
occur behind us. they precede us and exist as conditions of 
experience. The meaning and significance of social 
structure for social action is the structure of social 
action itself. Social structure does not linger above over 
us like a cloud or deity, but is instead the very condition 
of our existence and social action. By contrast, the view 
that holds "social structure" to consist of forces "over and 
above" individual experience proceeds from a false premise 
and can only lead to the obfuscation of reality. Where 
actual external force exists it exists in the intended and 
unintended consequences of individual and organized social 
action, action the structure of which is temporal, and 
therefore, historical and social. Actual constraint can be 
and must be traced to the social action of humans and the 
effects of their social action upon the existence of others. 
It is arguable that sociology's abstract dichotomy between 
agent and structure has actually served to conceal the true 
structure of power and domination, for it acquits the guilty 
party of responsibility for the actions it commits, by 
collapsing these actions into a reified construct within
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which the guilty becomes anonymous. If there is one clear 
task of political sociology that has largely been neglected 
it is to establish the connection between power and 
domination at the level of individual social action. Only 
then will those responsible for preserving traditions of 
domination and exploitation be identified and thereby become 
the focus of critique. As long as the focus of social 
critique falls on abstract constructs comprised of anonymous 
individuals its effect can be little more than ideological.
Gadamer's discussion of authority is important for it 
demonstrates the nature of hermeneutical reflection and 
effective-historical consciousness by example. Rather than 
adhere to the Enlightenment's pejorative view of authority, 
which remains more or less intact today (and hence, is one 
of our prejudices), Gadamer sees beyond it and is able to 
show another aspect of the meaning of authority, which is 
not apparent in the Enlightenment's view; and this is 
accomplished by analyzing the Enlightenment's prejudice 
against authority.
We may use the notion of "horizon" to further specify 
what Gadamer means by effective-historical consciousness. 
Gadamer defines horizon as "the range of vision that 
includes everything that can be seen from a particular 
vantage point."31 In our culture the term horizon is most 
closely related to the term "perspective." However,
31 Ibid., p. 269.
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perspective is often used casually to signify one's opinion, 
as in the expression "my perspective is ..." But this usage 
does not do justice to the meaning intended by Gadamer*s use 
of horizon. To have an horizon is to be able to see beyond 
that which is in front of you; beyond that which is 
immediately apparent. One acquires an horizon when one is 
able to see beyond one's own immediate prejudices; beyond 
the preconscious meaning of something which is projected in 
understanding. To have a perspective, then, in the sense of 
having an horizon, is to acquire an interpretive stance that 
is partly open, a stance which is conscious of its own 
prejudiced nature. Closed-minded persons, persons stubborn 
in their beliefs, have only a limited horizon because the 
prejudiced nature of their interpretive experience is either 
ignored or denied. To have an horizon is to have become 
aware of the general historical condition of interpretive 
experience. When one reads Gadamer on authority and 
overcomes one's own prejudice against authority one 
experiences an opening up of an expanded horizon, a more 
fully developed and realized interpretation of the meaning 
of authority. The development of a horizon is therefore an 
accomplishment. When two people engaged in conversation are 
aware of the prejudiced nature of their respective 
interpretations, their openness to meaning facilitates what 
Gadamer terms a "fusion of horizons," a mutually experienced 
deepening of understanding between them. This means that
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the richest interpretive experiences are reserved for those 
who are able to treat their own interpretations sceptically, 
for this is the condition of effective-historical 
consciousness. Its effect is interpretive development and 
personal growth.
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Gadamer1s Concept of Truth
True prejudices can be distinguished from false 
prejudices by appeal to the commonly shared meanings 
that constitute the human linguistic community.
True prejudices are always self-reflexive, that is, 
they reveal us to ourselves; they are prejudices 
that constitute our way of life and our self- 
understanding. False prejudices do not meet 
these criteria.32
We have specified the meaning of prejudices and have 
discussed how they may be identified. What remains of our 
threefold task in this chapter is to establish how true 
prejudices may be distinguished from false ones. This 
requires us to examine Gadamer's theory of truth.
It seems perfectly logical to think that once a 
prejudice is experienced through hermeneutical reflection 
the next step is to make a conscious judgment regarding its 
legitimacy. Perhaps one of the most perplexing aspects of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics is that he views such a step as 
unnecessary. According to Gadamer, the notion that 
legitimate and illegitimate prejudices must be distinguished 
through conscious judgment is mistaken. This is because, in 
Gadamer's view, the truth status of prejudices is revealed 
implicitly when the prejudice is itself experienced.
Gadamer's concept of truth is very different from that 
with which we are accustomed. In our culture we are perhaps 
most familiar with the correspondence theory of truth, which 
considers propositions to be true when they correspond to
32 Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge. 
1986, pp. 114-115.
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the facts. It is Gadamer's position that this is only one 
way in which truth is experienced. It is our lived 
experience, which takes place within a historical situation, 
which enables us to experience truth. Truth is therefore 
grounded in our experience of tradition and culture. In so 
far as conscious thought or reflective deliberation enters 
into the experience of answering questions of truth it does 
so secondarily, as epiphenomena of preconscious 
understanding. In other words, before we make what we may 
think is a conscious decision regarding truth, the decision 
has already been made in understanding. As difficult as 
this is to accept, it is really the only possible view of 
truth available once one accepts the notion of the 
prejudiced nature of interpretation. Just as interpretation 
cannot proceed without a preconception of its object, 
neither can a conscious judgment of truth proceed without a 
preconscious prejudgment of truth.33 We experience the 
truth of situations according to the linguistic meanings 
resident in understanding, not as a result of our conscious 
reflection upon such experience.
33 We must keep in mind the mediating experience of 
hermeneutical reflection in this context. Arguably, one 
could treat his conscious interpretation of truth in a 
situation sceptically and attempt to become conscious of the 
constituative effect of prejudices operating in 
understanding. In this way, Gadamer*s view of truth cannot 
be construed as being deterministic. The central point of 
his view of truth nevertheless is preserved: we experience 
truth and this experience is always more than what we are 
consciously aware of.
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Gadamer's view of truth may appear untenable to many 
sociologists. This is because it runs counter to a 
rationalist view of truth. Sociologists generally believe 
that they consciously decide the correct or true 
interpretation of meaning in situations according to the 
available data. Moreover, Gadamer*s experiential view of 
truth runs counter to the authority of the intersubjective 
scientific community. But as we know, rejecting a new 
theoretical explanation on the basis of an intersubjective 
scientific consensus does not mean that the new theoretical 
explanation is false. Indeed, it is the experience, which 
eventually takes hold, that a new scientific explanation can 
actually explain more than an old one, which is the 
structure of scientific revolutions. That a new paradigm 
may come to enjoy the endorsement of an intersubjective 
consensus is not itself the result of an intersubjective 
consensus. It is merely a function of the fact that more 
and more scientists, in particular those with political 
power and authority, come over time to experience the 
limitations of the toppled paradigm, and the superiority of 
its replacement. Gadamer*s hermeneutical or experiential 
theory of truth simply acknowledges the fact that the 
criteria for distinguishing true from false, in our own 
lives, are not, most essentially, rational but experiential.
Let us attempt to clarify Gadamer's position by 
providing a concrete example of his conception of truth.
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During the early years of the Reagan administration, amidst 
widespread cuts is social programs spending, the 
Adminstration proposed to serve ketchup in place of 
vegetables in school lunch programs in an effort to reduce 
expenditures. The Administration defended the position on 
the grounds that, scientifically speaking, the status of 
ketchup could be defended as being that of a vegetable.
On a scientific level, the truth status of the decision 
turns on whether or not a group of scientists could reach a 
consensus regarding ketchup's status as a vegetable. And 
this was easy enough to do. But is it true that ketchup is 
a vegetable? According to Gadamer's theory of truth, you 
should ask a member of American society; not a member of a 
scientific community. We may ask ourselves, then, is it 
true that ketchup is a vegetable? Would I serve ketchup to 
my two-year-old daughter if it was my intention to serve to 
her a vegetable? The truth is, ketchup is a condiment, and 
I would not serve it as a vegetable. While it is of course 
the case that my consideration of the question involves 
conscious thought or deliberation, it is also the case that 
this deliberation refers not to a theory of knowledge but to 
my experience of ketchup. Gadamer would assert that my 
conscious deliberation and the interpretation it provides 
are in fact epiphenomena of my preconscious experience; 
epiphenomena of the prejudices in my understanding. The 
truth regarding ketchup is based on my own experience;
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experience which takes place within my culture and
tradition. Another way of saying this is that I have a
practical understanding of the truth regarding ketchup,
which manifests consciously in the judgment that ketchup is
a condiment. In a word, I live ketchup as condiment.
As we have been emphasizing all along, experience itself
is structured by our temporal and historical situation.
This means that experience is structured by the way we are
related to the world, and is therefore social. This means
that the answer to Gadamer's question 'where is the ground
of the legitimacy of prejudices?' is ... the shared social
meanings carried through tradition and experienced in
everyday life. More specifically, the ground of truth is
our existence within and relationship to our linguistic
community and tradition.
The criteria by which we distinguish true from 
false are found not in 'method' but in the 
common understandings of the linguistic 
community and in our critical examination 
of and openness to tradition.34
This description of Gadamer's conception of truth mentions
its two most important features. The first concerns the
grounding of truth in our experience of the linguistic
community and tradition. This relation does not involve a
conscious or explicit appeal as does the relation between a
scientist and the intersubjective scientific community, and
34 Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge. 
1986, p. 117.
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thus does not involve consensus. Our experience of truth 
instead contains an implicit appeal to the shared meanings 
of our tradition. Truth is grounded in an implicit appeal 
in the sense that prejudices resident in our linguistic 
tradition provide implicit criteria in the form of 
prejudices that are constitutive of experience. It is an 
appeal in the sense that these meanings are the structure of 
our experience and operate as prejudices in understanding.
The second aspect referred to by Hekman in the passage 
quoted above, however, is a little more involved. To say 
that hermeneutical reflection contains an implicit appeal to 
shared social meaning is to say that hermeneutical 
reflection has the structure of a question.311 This is 
because the meaning which structures experience is always 
contrasted with the actual meaning which is experienced.
This returns us again to that all-important and recurring 
theme in Truth and Method: experience is valid so long as it 
is not contradicted by new experience. If the preconscious 
meaning is contradicted in hermeneutical experience, then it 
will be negated. This, once again, is perhaps the most 
important feature of Gadamer's conception of the nature of 
experience. It means that the very experience of 
contrasting a prejudice with interpretations experienced in 
a dialogue has the impicit structure of a question, for the
as Gadamer writes that hermeneutical reflection 
automatically involves a "questioning of things." Truth and 
Method. 1986, p. 238.
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experience places a demand on the meaning of the prejudice 
in so far as the prejudice is now being experienced openly 
in the light of different experiences of meaning. Hence, in 
dialogue false prejudices reveal themselves as such when 
they are negated by contradictory experience. This is what 
is meant by Gadamer's notion that false prejudices do not 
amount to anything when they are "worked out"; they are 
contradicted in light of subsequent experience or a 
conscious recollection of an antecedent experience.
It would seem that the key to overcoming false 
prejudices, and this is indeed a matter of great importance 
to Gadamer, as it should be to sociologists, does not lie in 
establishing abstract or objective criteria by which 
prejudices may be judged consciously. The key instead 
simply involves bringing prejudices into conscious 
awareness; that is, identifying preconscious linguistical 
concepts which are typically assumed and bringing them into 
dialogue. This is all we can really do to facilitate the 
overcoming of false prejudices, for the decision regarding 
the truth status of prejudices will already be implicit in 
the experience of that which has been brought into 
discussion. It is therefore the absence of critical 
discourse on the meaning of prejudices which is a social 
problem; not the notion that we are at a loss as to how we 
might resolve differences of opinion. It is not as if one 
can claim a judgmental position regarding the truth status
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of one's interpretation, for conscious judgments are 
provided by preconscious experience in understanding. This 
means that the emancipatory interest of reason has been 
fulfilled once we are able to experience the latent meaning 
of a prejudice, for the truth regarding the prejudice which 
is experienced will be given in the experience itself. This 
is why Gadamer views our linguistic tradition as the ground 
of the legitimacy of prejudices. Tradition forms the ground 
of truth not by providing us with dogmatic, absolute, 
truths; but by supplying us, if you will, with the 
linguistical prejudices which constitute our experiences of 
understanding and interpretation, thereby enabling us to 
experience the truth when it happens to us.
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What is Hermeneutical Reflection?
Gadamer does not provide a specific definition of 
hermeneutical reflection. Nevertheless, a definition of it 
may be discerned from his more general discussion of the 
nature of interpretation. First, hermeneutical reflection 
originates in preconscious experience and has the structure 
of an experience. This means that hermeneutical reflection 
is prompted by an experience of understanding, an experience 
involving much more than simply conscious thought. This 
experience often times is an unsettling feeling, such as a 
feeling of uncertainty or a feeling that the meaning of 
something experienced does not ring true. How does the 
unsettling feeling which gives rise to hermeneutical 
reflection differ from Mead's problematic situation? As we 
discussed earlier, Mead's notion of problematic situations 
assumes the presence of a goal or deliberate behavioral end 
the attainment of which has been frustrated. Gadamer's 
condition for hermeneutical reflection does not depend on 
the frustration of goal attainment, but rather, on the 
frustration of understanding. Understanding cannot be 
reduced to a purposive goal or end, for it is the condition 
of our existence.
The second important feature of hermeneutical reflection 
is that it gives rise to a linguistic expression which has 
the structure of a question. This does not necessarily mean 
that hermeneutical reflection gives rise to a question in
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the strict sense of the word; but to an expression of 
meaning the nature of which contrasts with a previous 
experience of meaning in such a way as to call the original 
meaning into question.36 Hermeneutical reflection is 
therefore a discursive experience involving either an 
implicit or explicit questioning of the meaning of something 
in terms of pre-understandings or prejudices.
Thus defined, hermeneutical reflection would appear to 
take prejudices as its focus only once these prejudices have 
given rise to an unsettling interpretive experience. Under 
what situations might prejudices give rise to an unsettling 
interpretive experience? Only when they are the intended 
focus of discursive experience or otherwise become the focus 
of discourse as a result of unexpected circumstances or 
happenstance. The former may be termed deliberate 
hermeneutical reflection, the latter spontaneous 
hermeneutical reflection. An example of spontaneous 
hermeneutical reflection would be a moment in which a 
prejudice is revealed on the basis of an unplanned 
juxtapositioning of meanings which gives rise to an 
embarrassing or unsettling interpretive experience. For 
example, a person finds oneself in conversation with a 
feminist and upon using a male pronoun to describe God is 
revealed by the feminist for having a prejudiced
36 Recall Gadamer's notion of the nature of experience 
and how subsequent experienes may have the effect of 
negating prejudices.
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understanding which assumes that God is male. In this 
instance the focus of the discourse might come to fall on 
the prejudice which has been revealed, and the non-feminist 
might be led back through discourse to a conscious 
examination of the prejudice itself. Such revelations are 
part of life itself for the truth about ourselves is often 
revealed in those moments which otherwise might be 
considered trivial or non-consequential. It should be 
clear, then, that hermeneutical reflection is a common 
experience, it is not a "privileged" experience reserved for 
intellectuals, scientists or philosophers. It may occur 
naturally according to the flow of common experience.
It may also, however, be prompted by the conscious 
acknowledgment of the prejudiced nature of interpretation, 
an acknowledgement which gives rise to an intentional 
reflection on one's or another's prejudices. Such instances 
would be examples of deliberate hermeneutical reflection.
The paradigm case of deliberate hermeneutical reflection is 
provided by Gadamer himself in his analysis of authority and 
prejudice.
Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of our definition of 
hermeneutical reflection is its lack of specificity and 
detail. However, to specify its meaning any further at this 
time would be impossible for Gadamer's treatment of 
hermeneutical reflection is not systematic, and further 
specificity without theoretical or empirical direction would
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amount to little more than speculation. We have no choice 
other than to begin with what we can reasonably accept to be 
true regarding the phenomenon, and direct our efforts at 
researching it under the assumption that its meaning will 
become clearer in due time. We will outline how 





RECEPTION OF GADAMER*S HERMENEUTICS
In this chapter we will focus on the critical social- 
theoretical reception of Gadamer*s hermeneutics by 
discussing the writings of Anthony Giddens and Jurgen 
Habermas. These leading social theorists are unique in that 
they have both taken Gadamer to task on a number of his 
conceptualizations. While Giddens* analysis of Gadamer is 
somewhat cursory, it is nevertheless very important for it 
is literally the only substantive discussion of Gadamer 
penned by a non-Continental social theorist. By contrast, 
in Germany Gadamer*s social-theoretical significance has 
received considerable amount of attention. Habermas has by 
far been the most vocal critic of Gadamer. Habermas has 
written the definitive social-theoretical review of Truth 
and Method, and has played an important part in legitimizing 
the study of Gadamer within social theory.
Habermas, and to a lesser extent Giddens, must both be 
credited for introducing Gadamer*s hermeneutics to a number 
of social theorists, and in this sense, their respective 
writings on Gadamer must be viewed as important 
contributions to the effort of establishing the sociological 
significance of his work. However, while Giddens1 and
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Habermas1 contributions to the social-theoretical reception 
of Gadamer are important, it is nevertheless the case that 
both misunderstand several of Gadamer's key points and 
consequently fail to grasp the full significance of his work 
for social theory and sociology.
The aim of our discussion in this chapter is to explore 
the criticism that Gadamer has received from these two 
leading social theorists. By exploring such criticisms 
we will be better able to assess the potential importance of 




As we discussed in the introduction to this work. 
Continental hermeneutics has generally been ignored in the 
English-speaking world. Among contemporary Anglo social 
theorists only Anthony Giddens has commented on Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. Nowhere in the work of the more widely 
published American social theorists, such as Jeffrey 
Alexander, George Ritzer, or Jonathan Turner will you find 
any mention of Gadamer; or anything more than a passing 
mention of hermeneutics. When such theorists do mention 
hermeneutics, they typically do so in reference to Weber's 
method of Verstehen. reciting the standard social- 
theoretical interpretation of Dilthey while ignoring the 
contemporary developments within hermeneutics.1
In addition to offering Anglo-American social theorists 
an introduction to Gadamer's general ideas, Giddens has also 
speculated on the importance of Gadamer's work for social 
theory, particularly with regard to the implications of the
1 The social-theoretical significance of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics has yet to be explored by American social 
theorists. Jeffrey Alexander makes no mention of Gadamer in 
his four volume effort Theoretical Logic in Sociology 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). Jonathan 
Turner also ignores Gadamer in The Structure of Sociological 
Theory (Chicago: Dorsey, 1986). The same is true of George 
Ritzer Sociological Theory (New York: Knopf, 1983). When 
these theorists do mention hermeneutics it is in reference 
to the methodological development of Max Weber. I am 
unaware of any American social-theoretical effort to explore 
the significance of Gadamer for sociology; Anthony Giddens* 
attempt to do so is the only which I know of in Anglo social 
theory.
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ontological status of understanding for the agency-structure 
problematic. Giddens has also suggested that sociologists 
begin studying the "tacit" understandings which structure 
experience. Unfortunately, he has not discussed in any 
specific sense how this might be accomplished. Perhaps the 
most significant implication of Giddens' discussion of 
Gadamer is that it is an indication of the fact that Anglo- 
American social theorists are at least beginning to take 
note of the social theoretical and sociological relevance of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics.
Giddens' discovery of hermeneutics came in the wake of 
his encounter with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Peter Winch.
These figures fall outside of the classical hermeneutic 
tradition but, given their concern over the centrality of 
language and interpretation, have been viewed by some to 
represent an analytical version of hermeneutics.2 In his 
New Rules of Sociological Method Giddens turns his attention 
to Gadamer after examining the work of Wittgenstein and 
Winch, and it would appear safe to say that his interest in
2 Roy Howard, for example, views the work of 
Wittgenstein and Winch as one strain of hermeneutics, the 
other two being the psychoanalytic hermeneutics of Habermas 
and Apel, and the ontological hermeneutics of Heidegger and 
Gadamer. See Three Faces of Hermeneutics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982). We will not discuss 
the work of Wittgenstein or Winch in this work for their 
contributions do not bear directly on Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. It may be noted that Habermas has used 
Gadamer's hermeneutics to indicate shortcomings in 
Wittgenstein's view of language. See J. Habermas, "A review 
of Truth and Method" in F. Dallmayr and T. McCarthy, eds., 
Understanding and Social Inquiry. 1977, pp. 335-363.
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Gadamer grew out of his initial concern over these figures.3
As the following quotation demonstrates, Giddens sees
important theoretical convergence around the notion of the
"social foundation" of self-consciousness and
interpretation, and this observation has led him into new
theoretical areas, areas which include the works of
Heidegger and Gadamer.
Talcott Parsons has argued that the most significant 
convergent idea in modern social thought concerns the 
'internalization of values' as independently arrived at 
by Durkheim and Freud; I think a better case can be 
made for the notion of the social (and linguistic) 
foundation of reflexivity such as was independently 
arrived at, from widely varying perspectives, by Mead, 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger- and, following the latter, 
Gadamer.4
The great importance which Giddens attributes to the notion 
that the foundation of reflexivity® is social stems from the 
realization that the meaning experienced by social agents 
must also be part of the structure of social action itself. 
This realization evidences an important theoretical 
development in Giddens' work for it eventually leads him to 
construct a theory of social reality which takes at its 
center the mediating or interpretive activity of social 
agents. This development brings Giddens into contact with
3 Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method 
(New York: Basic, 1976).
4 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. 1976, p.
19.
9 Giddens uses the term "reflexivity" to denote the 
phenomenon of "self-awareness." See New Rules of 
Sociological Method. 1976, p. 18.
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the work of the the later Wittgenstein, Peter Winch, Alfred 
Schutz, Harold Garfinkel and Continental hermeneutics. The 
primary focus of our immediate discussion falls on Giddens* 
analysis of Gadamer.
Following Heidegger, Giddens takes as his point of 
departure the notion that understanding is ontological. But 
unlike Heidegger, who is exclusively concerned with 
establishing the importance of the ontological nature of 
understanding for the question of the meaning of being, 
Giddens attempts to establish its importance for the 
relationship between meaning and social action. Giddens* 
discussion of the social theoretical implications of 
Heidegger's ontological view of understanding undermines 
traditional sociology's abstract distinction between 
individual and social structure. As Giddens states in the 
introduction to New Rules of Sociological Method, "the 
problem of the relation between the constitution of society 
by actors, and the constitution of those actors by the 
society of which they are members, has nothing to do with a 
differentiation between micro- and macro-sociology; it cuts 
across any such division."6 In a later work, Giddens argues 
that "structured properties of social activity ... are 
constantly recreated out of the very resources which
6 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. 1976, p.
2 2 .
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constitute them."7 Hence, in Giddens1 view, social 
structure is not an entity over and above individual human 
existence, it is instead a conceptualization which simply 
denotes the extension of "social practices" across "time and 
space."8 This view evidences the influence of the early 
Heidegger on Giddens, particularly with respect to 
Heidegger's thoughts regarding the temporality of being.9
The central importance which the hermeneutical notion of 
the ontological nature of understanding has had for Giddens' 
theoretical development is evidenced by the emphasis which 
he now places on "knowledgeability, 1,10 a term which he uses 
to signify the mediating ability of social agents. To 
Giddens, actors are not cultural zombies. They are instead 
knowledgeable agents who act according to their 
interpretation of reality. This knowledgeability, cautions 
Giddens, is not limited to conscious knowledge, for it 
includes tacit understandings which form the basis of our
7 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. xxiii.
8 Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social 
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) p.
8.
9 For his discussion of Heidegger see Anthony Giddens, 
Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), pp. 3-4; and also, his introduction 
to The Constitution of Society. 1984.
10 As we have seen, Giddens uses the term to denote the 
mediating and interpretive capabilities of social agents.
The term appears in both Profiles and Critiques in Social 
Theory. 1982 and The Constitution of Society. 1984.
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practical relation to the world. In The Constitution of 
Society Giddens draws a distinction between two levels of 
knowledgeability, 1) discursive consciousness and 2) 
practical consciousness. Discursive consciousness refers to 
"what actors are able to say, or give verbal expression to, 
about social conditions, including especially the conditions 
of their own action." By contrast, practical consciousness 
refers to "what actors know (believe) about social 
conditions, including especially the conditions of their own 
action, but cannot express discursively."11 Giddens' view 
of practical consciousness is thus his version of 
Heidegger's "understanding." It is not adequately clear, 
however, why Giddens feels that practical consciousness 
cannot be expressed discursively. This claim may be viewed 
as an attempt on Giddens' part to acknowledge the circular 
nature of interpretation; by emphasizing the practical- 
relational and preconscious aspects of understanding Giddens 
remains consistent with the philosophical-hermeneutical 
notion of the prejudiced nature of interpretation. However, 
it appears problematic for Giddens to claim that practical 
consciousness cannot be experienced discursively, for this 
is inconsistent with Gadamer's notion of hermeneutical 
reflection. While it is true that practical consciousness 
can never be fully manifest in consciousness, and therefore
11 Giddens, The Constitution of Society. 1986, pp. 374-
375.
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can never be fully articulated discursively, it is also true
that we can become aware of some of our practical
preconscious understandings (prejudices) through
hermeneutical reflection. Despite this problem, it is
nevertheless clear that Giddens is headed in the right
direction by attempting to account for the open-ended,
dialectical construction of social reality by specifying the
nature of knowledgeability in ontological terms.
Giddens1 increased concern over knowledgeability became
apparent with the publication of his New Rules of
Sociological Method. The work is a survey of recent
developments in social theory and hermeneutics, all of which
suggest revolutionary changes in the conceptualization of
sociological methods. These developments are tied to one
key insight, that being the realization that understanding
is an ontological phenomenon the experience of which is not
reserved merely for social scientists. This of course is
one of Heidegger's key insights, and that which Gadamer
draws upon to develop his own hermeneutics. As the
following quote illustrates, it appears that Giddens has
grasped one of the main points of Gadamer's hermeneutics, if
only in the most general of terms.
In the tradition of the Geisteswissenschaften in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, verstehen 
was regarded above all as a method, a means of studying 
man, and as such depended upon the the 'reliving' or 
're-enactment' of the experiences of others .... But 
what these writers (Dilthey and Weber) called 
'understanding' is not merely a method for making sense 
of what others do, nor does it require an empathic
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grasp of their consciousness in some mysterious or 
obscure fashion: it is the very ontological condition 
of human life in society as such.12
According to Giddens, the social theoretical significance of
the ontological status of understanding is that "self-
understanding is connected integrally to the understanding
of others."13 This means that the construction of meaning
in the minds of individuals is socially constituted. This
is why Giddens comes to place great importance in what he
terms "reflexivity" or "self-awareness." However, while it
may be true that Giddens grasps the general distinction
between understanding (as the ontological condition of
being) and method (as a thematized derivative of quotidian
understanding) it is apparent from the rest of his
discussion of Gadamer that he fails to grasp its full
significance. This may be inferred from analyzing Giddens*
contradictory position regarding the universality of
hermeneutics. His own comments, such as the one quoted at
length above, suggest that his would be a position which
supports the notion of the universality of hermeneutics, for
it is precisely the ontological status of understanding
which makes hermeneutics universal. Nevertheless, Giddens*
commentary on Gadamer is sprinkled with comments which
suggest just the opposite. For example, Giddens mistakenly
12 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, 1976, p. 
19, author's emphasis.
13 Ibid., p. 19.
146
interprets hermeneutics' claim to universality to mean that 
its proponents believe that the study of social activity can 
be "purely hermeneutic."14 As we have seen, however, the 
universality of hermeneutics simply refers to the fact that 
experience itself is hermeneutical in that it involves 
understanding, interpretation and application. In this 
sense, all experience, and therefore, all scientific 
experience, is hermeneutical. This, however, does not 
preclude the possibility of conducting scientific research 
into the nature of social reality, research that would be 
constituted in hermeneutical experience, but would not be 
"purely hermeneutic." Can experience ever be "purely 
hermeneutic?" What does this mean? According to Gadamer 
experience is always hermeneutical but this does not mean 
that experience is purely or exclusively hermeneutical.
While hermeneutical, experience is always influenced by the 
economic and social relations constitutive of a particular 
historical situabion, and may include the application of a 
conscious interpretation of the meaning of the situation to 
social action. This means that while experience is by 
nature hermeneutical, it can in no meaningful sense of the 
word be reduced to being "purely hermeneutic." In all 
fairness to Giddens, when considered in terms of the rest of 
his discussion his use of "purely hermeneutic" would simply 
seem to denote the idea of a type of research free of any
14 Ibid., p. 58.
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methodological or theoretical dependencies. However, while 
it is true that Gadamer rejects methodological approaches in 
so far as they require one to claim a false detachment from 
one's linguistical tradition it would be absurd to suggest 
that a hermeneutically informed analysis of society would be 
unable or unwilling to draw on various theoretical 
conceptualizations.
Giddens' assertion that Gadamer would choose to reduce 
the study of social activity to a purely hermeneutical 
approach is understandable in light of several other 
assertions which indicate that he does not understand the 
full meaning of the ontological status of understanding. 
Rather than taking the notion of the universality of 
hermeneutics as an expression of the fact that human 
experience is itself hermeneutical, Giddens mistakenly 
interprets the universality of hermeneutics to mean 
something quite different. Giddens writes "the 
'universality of hermeneutics' could only be sustained if 
man were wholly transparent to himself, in a world of 
perfect Hegelian rationality."10 This indicates that 
Giddens seriously misunderstands Gadamer's conception of the 
universality of hermeneutics, for as we have seen, Gadamer 
is adamant regarding the historical-linguistic boundedness 
of understanding. Not only can we never become "wholly 
transparent" to ourselves, a claim Giddens attributes to
10 Ibid., p. 58.
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Gadamer, but the very experience of reality involves the 
projection of prejudices which themselves can never be made 
fully explicit. The universality of hermeneutics, 
therefore, does not mean that we are evolving to a point 
where everything will be understood, but simply, that we are 
interpretive beings who exist in historical situations which 
are constitutive of interpretive experience.
To make matters worse Giddens likens hermeneutics * claim 
to universality to positivism's claim to a privileged 
position regarding the explanation of human conduct! 
According to Giddens, hermeneutics and positivism "each 
aspire(s) to cover the whole range of human behaviour, to 
accomodate it to its particular logical scheme."16 This 
evidences the fact that, despite Giddens' general 
acknowledgement of the ontological status of understanding, 
he mistakenly views hermeneutics as a methodological program 
the purpose of which is to serve or, in the most extreme 
case, subsume, social science. His view of hermeneutics is 
a top-down view; a view which sees hermeneutics as a 
methodological discipline that intends to climb above all 
other social scientific disciplines and rule from the top- 
down. Quite the opposite is the case. Gadamer's 
hermeneutics is not a methodology, it concerns the nature of 
interpretive experience, and can have no disciplinary 
ambitions for it pertains to an aspect of all disciplines,
16 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
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that aspect being interpretive experience itself. As part 
of experience itself interpretation is constitutive of 
social science research. In this sense its importance is 
primary. Hermeneutics is universal by virtue of the nature 
of experience; not by virtue of an experience of nature 
which intends to dominate related fields and disciplines.
Giddens' failure to grasp the insight that experience 
itself is hermeneutical, the central insight of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, raises questions regarding the quality of his 
reading of Gadamer. It is also a clear indication of the 
fact that, despite his general comments, Giddens has not yet 
grasped the full meaning of the ontological status of 
understanding. If it were the case that Giddens fully 
grasped the significance of the ontological status of 
understanding he could hardly arrive at the criticisms of 
Gadamer which he has published. As for his reading of 
Gadamer, his commentary in New Rules of Sociological Method 
reads more like a paraphrasing of Habermas' critique of 
Gadamer than it does an original analysis of the primary 
work. While Giddens does translate and cite several 
passages from the original German edition of Truth and 
Method (Warheit und Methode), his substantive criticisms are 
generally supported by singular references to secondary 
literature, rather than through a sustained theoretical 
analysis of Gadamer's own argument. This may partly explain 
the blatent contradiction in Giddens1 reading of Gadamer
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regarding the universality of hermeneutics. Giddens
criticizes the "hermeneutic philosophers" for allegedly
believing that "all human action has to be understood,"17
and at the same time advocates an ontological view of
understanding. The ontological view of understanding is one
which views understanding as part of all human experience.
The implication of this is not that all human action "has to
be understood," but rather, that all human action is already
understood. It is understood preconsciously by virtue of
the hermeneutical nature of experience itself.
Another interesting aspect of Giddens' interpretation of
Gadamer is that Giddens appears to be criticizing the fact
that hermeneutical analysis is inescapably historical.
Giddens writes
a purely hermeneutic account of the social sciences 
places out of court the possibility- which is actually 
a necessity- of analysing social conduct in terms 
which go beyond those of actors situated in particular 
traditions, and which are of explanatory significance 
in relation to them.18
The problem with this criticism is that it belittles
hermeneutics for its inability to explain social action in
terms other than those indigenous to the tradition within
which certain social action has taken place. In other
words, Giddens is attacking the historical sensitivity and
cultural accountability of a methodological hermeneutics,
17 Ibid., p. 59.
18 Ibid., p. 62.
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and criticizes hermeneutics for its rejection of trans-
historical nomological propositions. Giddens' error in this
case is not that he has misinterpreted another aspect of
Gadamer's hermeneutics, but rather, that, despite his
ontological view of understanding, he adheres to a false
view of consciousness which assumes that one can actually
construct interpretations of reality which are free of the
historical effect of one's situation. This view of
consciousness, of course, is rejected by Gadamer, for he
takes such a view to be mythical, since all propositions
originate and reside within a linguistic tradition. But
this does not place out of court the possibility of
generating nomological propositions, only the claim that
they are trans-historical. What makes such general
observations true when they indeed are true is not that they
are trans-historical and representative of a universal
causal truth; but rather, that they pertain to different
historical situations which overlap in such a way as to
render one causal interpretation applicable in both cases.
Another interesting aspect of Giddens' critique of
Gadamer is that he rejects Gadamer's theory of truth, but
unfortunately fails to provide any reasons for his rejection
of it. Giddens writes
Gadamer argues that hermeneutics is 'a discipline 
which guarantees truth.' But this means that 
truth inheres in being, the fundamental error of 
existentialist phenomenology, and one not rescued
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by Gadamer's appeal to dialectics.19 
While it may be the case that Gadamer exaggerates when he 
states that hermeneutics guarantees truth, this by itself 
does not undermine the basis of his experiential theory of 
truth. As we have seen, the main point of Gadamer's theory 
of truth is that truth is not decided, but rather, 
experienced.20 It is unclear exactly what Giddens means by 
the statment "truth inheres in being," but it seems clear 
that he is failing to entertain the full meaning of 
Gadamer's theory of truth, and is content to reject it out 
of hand without providing any specific reasons. This is not 
the only instance in which Giddens criticizes Gadamer by way 
of a passing, unsupported comment. For example, in Profiles 
and Critiques in Social Theory Giddens supports the 
"modified realist theory of science" of Hesse and Bhaskar 
and praises them for not "succumbing to the historicism of 
Gadamer."21 Meanwhile, nowhere in this volume, nor in any 
of the other three volumes of Giddens cited in this chapter, 
does he discuss the relationship between Gadamer and
19 Ibid., p. 62.
20 Another way of saying this is that when truth is 
consciously decided it is because it has already been 
experienced in understanding.




The final point regarding Giddens' critique of Gadamer 
concerns the relationship between hermeneutics and method. 
Giddens fails accurately to portray Gadamer's critique of 
method, and accordingly misconstrues its importance for 
sociology.23 Gadamer's complaint against method has two 
main points. First, by arguing that history or our 
linguistical tradition is constitutive of interpretive 
experience, Gadamer claims that methodological experience is 
a conceptual or thematic derivative of quotidian 
understanding. This point is not problematic for Giddens, 
as he himself has argued a similar position. Second, owing 
to the typical methodological requirement of denying one’s 
"subjectivity" or biographical understanding in order to 
attain an "objective" interpretive perspective, Gadamer 
indicts method for forcing the researcher into a false 
belief regarding one's actual historical situation. The 
significance of this, according to Gadamer, is that 
deliberately ignoring one's historicity while experiencing 
the meaning of something (while doing research) can only 
amount to a self-alienating experience. This is because the 
quality of the interpretation experienced will turn in part
22 Such a discussion would prove worthwhile as it would 
bear considerably on the issue of the value of nomological 
propositions.
23 See Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. 1976, 
p. 64.
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on the preconscious understanding of the researcher. If 
this preconscious understanding is consciously denied in 
favor of some other interpretive criteria, the experience of 
meaning will be confused and alienated. Stated differently, 
Gadamer rejects method because it typically requires a false 
separation between oneself and the all pervasive linguistic 
tradition, a separation which can only confound what passes 
for truth.
Disappointingly, Giddens ignores this second point of 
Gadamer's critique of method. Whereas it is Gadamer's aim 
to demonstrate the narrowness and alienation of method as a 
concept, Giddens tries to widen the definition of method to 
include common practices such as those described by 
ethnomethodology. While it is true that Gadamer fails to 
provide a precise definition of method in Truth and Method, 
it is nevertheless clear that he uses the term to refer to a 
"controlled alienation" guided by prescribed conceptual or 
thematic guidelines. Giddens, on the other hand, uses the 
term "method" very generally to refer to consistencies of 
social interpretation. From a Gadamerian perspective, the 
distinction between the former and the latter is critical.
To construe the common social practices of everyday life as 
"methodological" is therefore problematic, for such 
practices do not assert a false separation between conscious 
experience and one's linguistic tradition. However, by 
failing to focus specifically on the content of Gadamer's
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critique of method Giddens incorrectly collapses what is 
otherwise a critical distinction between common social 
practices and "method."
For all of its shortcomings, however, there are some 
bright moments in Giddens' discussion of Gadamer, and it is 
to these that we now turn our attention. First, despite the 
fact that Giddens fails to grasp the meaning of the 
universality of hermeneutics, he does see an application of 
hermeneutics within sociology beyond text interpretation. 
This application is conceptualized on two levels in Giddens1 
work. On a theoretical level Giddens attempts to develop a 
"hermeneutically informed social theory."24 That Giddens 
has afforded central importance to knowledgeability in his 
theory of structuration indicates that he has already 
partially realized this goal. In a more general theoretical 
sense Giddens' concept of the "double hermeneutic" is 
further evidence of the impact which hermeneutics has had on 
his theoretical development. The "double hermeneutic" 
refers to two aspects of the ontological nature of 
understanding. First, it refers to the fact that the 
subject matter of sociology, meaningful social action, is 
interpreted twice; once by social actors, and again by the 
sociologist studying them. The double hermeneutic thus 
refers to the fact that sociologists aim to interpret
24 Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory. 
1982, p. 5.
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meanings that have themselves already been interpreted. 
Second, the double hermeneutic also refers to the fact that 
sociologically produced knowledge invariably feeds back into 
society and becomes re-interpreted as part of the larger 
social reality.20
While Giddens' notion of the double hermeneutic may not 
be terribly original, it does enable sociologists to grasp 
two aspects of the sociological implications of hermeneutics 
that they otherwise might never have considered. Secondly, 
while Giddens fails to provide any specific suggestions 
regarding the sociological analysis of the ontological 
status of understanding he is clearly on the right track 
when he identifies the "pre-reflective character of 
experience" as one aspect of the hermeneutic problem, and 
highlights the importance of presuppositions and the "tacit 
manner" in which "activities are made sense of" as important 
social phenomena.26 In The Constitution of Society Giddens 
calls for the sociological analysis of what he terms 
"practical consciousness," and the tacit understandings 
which underly social action. However, while Giddens writes 
that "it would be an error to suppose that the non- 
discursive components of consciousness are necessarily more
28 por Giddens' discussion of the "double hermeneutic"
see Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory. 1982, pp. 1-
17.
26 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. 1976, p.
64.
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difficult to study empirically than the discursive" he fails 
to offer any suggestions as to how this might be done.27 In 
chapter seven we will address the question of how 
sociologists might begin to study the relationship between 
preconscious understandings (prejudices), conscious 
interpretations and social action.
27 Giddens, The Constitution of Society. 1984, p. xxx.
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Habermas' Reading of Gadamer 
In West Germany Gadamer's work has received a 
considerable amount of attention. Among German social 
theorists the most vocal critic of Gadamer's hermeneutics 
has been Jurgen Habermas.28 For more than twenty years now 
Habermas has been involved in a debate with Gadamer 
regarding the scope of hermeneutics and its relationship to 
social science and sociology. The Habermas-Gadamer debate 
has had the effect of forcing Gadamer to explicate the 
critical side of his hermeneutics, an aspect of his 
hermeneutics that was latent and subject to misinterpre­
tation prior to his debate with Habermas.29 In this sense, 
Gadamer has benefited greatly from his exchanges with 
Habermas. By contrast, it appears that Habermas has not 
benefited so greatly from the debate. This inference may be 
drawn from the fact that Habermas has not followed Gadamer's 
lead with respect to the critical dimensions of his 
hermeneutics, and has excluded Gadamer's insights from the 
formulation of his most comprehensive theoretical statement,
28 The German philospher of social science Karl-Otto 
Apel has also studied Gadamer's hermeneutics closely. His 
writings are generally philosophical, however, whereas 
Habermas' are more social-theoretical.
29 There is no shortage of literature on the debate 
between Gadamer and Habermas. Among the more readable and 
insightful commentaries is Jack Mendelson's "The Habermas- 
Gadamer debate." New German Critique, Vol. 18, 1979, pp. 44- 
73. For a more challenging commentary see Dieter Misgeld, 
"Critical theory and hermeneutics: The debate between 
Habermas and Gadamer." In On Critical Theory, edited by 
John O'Neill (New York: Seabury Press, 1976).
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The Theory of Communicative Action.30 While his theoretical 
turn away from Gadamer has, in our opinion, rendered 
problematic Habermas1 practical intentions regarding the 
empirical study of communicative action, his exchanges with 
Gadamer have nevertheless helped clear the way for other 
social theorists to explore the significance of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics for social theory.
While it is now generally agreed that their positions 
are considerably closer than had at one time been 
believed,31 Habermas and Gadamer remain in disagreement over 
two crucially important points, one being the question of 
the universality of hermeneutics; the other being the 
methodological implications of Gadamer's view of the nature 
of interpretation. We will examine the nature of Habermas' 
critique of Gadamer after placing Habermas' concern over 
hermeneutics in its proper social-theoretical context.
As is well known, Jurgen Habermas is considered the heir 
of the tradition of social theory known as critical 
theory.32 This tradition grew out of an effort to inform
3 o Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 
volumes 1 and 2, translated by Thomas McCarthy.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1984 (vol. 1) and 1987 (vol. 2).
31 See Susan Hekman's discussion of what she describes 
as the "convergence position" with respect to Gadamer and 
Habermas in Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge. 
1986, p. 138.
32 For a comprehensive yet accessible discussion of the 
historical development and theoretical content of critical 
theory see David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory
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the shortcomings of Marxism through a critical appropriation 
of Weber and Freud.33 Among these shortcomings most central 
was Marx's "deterministic" and "positivistic" view of 
historical materialism. In an effort of reconstruction, 
Lukacs stressed the importance of subjectivity and the role 
of consciousness as it relates to social change. Lukacs1 
work drew principally upon Weber's writings on 
rationalization, and this was a theme that was to exert 
great influence over the central figures of critical theory. 
Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse were 
greatly influenced by Weber's theory of rationalization and 
drew upon it to formulate their criticism of advanced 
industrial society. They viewed one of the most crucial 
problems of the twentieth century to be the eclipse of human 
reason by a strictly instrumental form of rationality. The 
problem with instrumental reason was considered to be its 
ability to reduce economic, political and ethical questions
{Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). See also 
Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the 
Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research. 
1923-1950 (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).
33 our discussion of critical theory draws heavily on 
David Held, as well as the writings of Thomas McCarthy, 
including his introduction to the first volume of Habermas' 
The Theory of Communicative Action, and his The Critical 
Theory of Jiiraen Habermas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985, first 
published in 1978). Another important work on Habermas is 
Garbis Kortian, Metacritiaue. translated by John Raffan (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Kortian's work 
places Habermas within the larger context of German 
philosophy and contrasts Habermas' philosophical commitments 
with other critical theorists.
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to the form of a simple means-ends or cost-benefit analysis. 
Weber appealed to critical theorists because he articulated 
in sociological terms the anxiety which seemed to be 
spreading during the early decades of this century as a 
result of the ever-expanding application of instrumental 
reason to all forms of life. By the nineteen thirties, this 
feeling of anxiety was being reflected in popular culture, 
and the advent of electronic media and mass-culture signaled 
to critical theorists the birth of a new social dimension 
which denied a strict Marxist interpretation. On a 
political level, Marx's critique of political economy 
appeared sophomoric in its inability to explain the rise of 
fascism and the oppressive and disappointing reality of 
Soviet socialism. The core problem of modern man appeared 
to be much more complicated than Marx had suggested. While 
the critical theorists were prepared to maintain the basic 
Marxist formula which viewed social and political relations 
as epiphenomena of economic condition, it was clear that 
Marx's critique needed to be reworked to include such 
phenomena as the institutional- ization of reason and the 
technological nature of modern existence. In articulating 
this critique it was to Weber, and also to Freud, that 
Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse turned.
Whereas Marx views class conflict as the key problem 
underlying other contemporary social problems, it is 
arguable that in Weber's view the key social problem facing
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advanced industrial societies is that of a crisis of reason. 
By reason we mean, most generally, what Giddens describes as 
knowledgeability; the interpretive ability we have which 
enables us to make decisions regarding social action.
Whereas Marx views technological advance as a positive 
development in the sense that he believed it would lead to 
the transformation of the forces of production, and 
ultimately, to the transformation of capitalism, Weber views 
technological advance much more sceptically. Weber's view 
of rationalization or modernization is, in fact, 
paradoxical, for it contains a deep rooted tension regarding 
the pros and cons of the institutionalization of 
instrumental reason. Weber welcomed rationalization in the 
sense that the disenchantment which accompanied it enabled 
Westerners to overcome the destructive and irrational 
consequences of a mystical or romantic world view.34 At the 
same time, however, Weber was torn by the dehumanizing 
consequences which resulted from the institutionalization of 
reason. The "iron cage” of which Weber spoke refers to the 
condition of rational, industrial humankind living in a 
world dominated by complex organizations drawing their 
principal strength (efficiency) from the suppression and 
exclusion of specifically "human" features of action, such
34 Presumably, in a rational world, superstition would 
lose its sway and irrational action, for example, the 
burning of people at the stake for superstitious reasons, 
would no longer take place.
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as emotion and moral sensibility. The suppression of 
emotion and moral sensibility is effected by the 
institutionalization of an "instrumentally-rational" model 
of decision-making. Within this model, the value of ends is 
taken for granted and the cognitive faculty is restricted to 
the narrow task of discerning the most efficient means in 
order that they be realized. When instrumental reason does 
examine the relative value of ends, it does so in a strictly 
utilitarian sense. In such instances the human faculty of 
reason is under-utilized, for its natural ability to 
question the non-quantifiable value of ends is precluded. 
According to Weber, in a bureaucracy, for example, decisions 
are made according to pre-established criteria, without 
regard for the personal questions or suspicions which a 
bureaucrat might have with regard to the meaning of a pre­
determined end. Weber unequivocably viewed this as a 
deformation of human reason, and as such, a form of 
dehumanization. The power of this critique is undeniable, 
and it gave direction to the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and 
Marcuse who, each in his own way, attempted to document the 
deformation of reason and establish its implications for 
contemporary social life. Stated most succinctly, these 
efforts amounted to a critique of contemporary culture and 
consciousness.
bike his forebears, Jurgen Habermas has been profoundly 
influenced by Weber's critique of rationalization. In fact.
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the main concern of his magnum opus. The Theory of 
Communicative Action, concerns the extent to which the 
institutionalization of instrumental reason on a systematic 
level has seeped into the life-world, and as a result, has 
exacerbated the "systematic distortion of communication.”
In common language, this means that Habermas is concerned 
with the extent to which formal modes of discourse and 
interaction, those typical of institutions such as political 
parties, education and complex organizations, have affected 
the realm of everyday conversation and individual life.
This is consistent with the concern of Weber and critical 
theorists over the deformation of reason with one important 
difference. Whereas Weber and the critical theorists took 
as their focus of study reason itself or consciousness, 
Habermas instead takes as his focus language or 
communicative action. This, in fact, is the central point 
of divergence between Habermas and his predecessors.
Habermas has argued that the cul de sac within which 
critical theorists ultimately found themselves stemmed from 
the fact that they had focused their studies at the wrong 
level of analysis. In Habermas' view, more primary than 
consciousness is language and communicative discourse. By 
focusing his research at this level of analysis, Habermas 
believes he will be able to avoid the problems which led the
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earlier critical theorists to their defeatist conclusions.30
Habermas' concern with Gadamer's hermeneutics should be 
read as an outgrowth of the linguistic turn which he has 
given to critical theory. While this turn has brought him 
into contact with Gadamer's writings, it should be 
emphasized that Habermas has also been influenced by 
natural-language and analytic philosophy. It is arguable, 
in fact, that Habermas has been influenced more by these 
schools of thought than he has by Continental hermeneutics. 
The Theory of Communicative Action synthesizes ideas from 
the later Wittgenstien, Austin, Searle, and Chomsky, 
marrying them to the classical contributions of Weber, 
Durkheim, Mead and Parsons. This synthesis takes place 
within the context of Marxist reconstructionism. 
Interestingly, while several of Habermas' works published 
prior to The Theory of Communicative Action include 
extensive discussions of Gadamer's hermeneutics, references 
to Gadamer are curiously absent from both volumes of this 
work.36 This is illustrative of the fact that Habermas'
3 0 There is another point of divergence separating 
Habermas from the critical theorists who preceded him, that 
being his philosophical leanings towards neo-Kantianism.
This point is made by Garbis Kortian in Metacritiaue. 
translated by John Raffan (New York: Cambridge University 
Press,1980). Generally speaking, critical theorists were 
more greatly influenced by Hegel than by Kant. This was 
especially so in the case of Horkheimer.
3 6 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 
volumes 1 and 2, translated by Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1984 (vol. 1) and 1987 (vol. 2).
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social theoretical application of Gadamer's hermeneutics has 
been extremely limited, and that, perhaps more importantly, 
Habermas does not see the potential of applying Gadamer in 
the context of sociology. Nevertheless, among contemporary 
social theorists, Habermas is unique in the sense that he 
more than any other has studied Gadamer's hermeneutics 
closely and has taken him to task on a number of his claims. 
As Dallmayr and McCarthy point out, the growing discussion 
of Gadamer's hermeneutics in the English-speaking world is 
largely due to the efforts of Habermas.37 These efforts 
have contributed greatly to establishing the relevance of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics for social-theoretical questions and 
issues regarding the methodology of the social sciences.
As for the importance of Gadamer's hermeneutics in 
Habermas' work, we have already discussed the fact that 
Habermas does not cite Gadamer in his magnum opus. The most 
tangible application of Gadamer's hermeneutics in Habermas' 
work is found in the latter's methodological critique of 
positivism. It is, indeed, no exaggeration to say that 
Habermas has interpreted the sociological significance of 
Gadamer in strictly methodological terms. This, we will 
argue, is perhaps Habermas' biggest shortcoming regarding 
his encounter with Gadamer, for his methodological
37 F. Dallmayr and T. McCarthy, eds.. Understanding and 
Social Inquiry. 1977, pp. 287-288. Dallmayr and McCarthy 
also credit Karl-Otto Apel for playing an important role in 
introducing Gadamer to Anglo-American philosophers.
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preoccupation with Gadamer has blinded him from seeing the 
wider sociological possibilities presented by his work. 
Perhaps the biggest oversight of Habermas has been his 
inability to trace out the extent to which Gadamer's 
concepts of the prejudiced nature of interpretation and 
hermeneutical reflection might constitute important and 
challenging research topics for sociology.
With the publication of his review of Gadamer's Truth 
and Method.38 it became clear that Habermas was not prepared 
to accept a number of Gadamer’s central points; nor was he 
interested in studying Gadamer's hermeneutics with an eye 
towards establishing its full sociological significance. 
Habermas' review article in fact began a longstanding debate 
between himself and Gadamer, and the opinions of 
commentators are mixed regarding who has emerged with the 
upper hand. One thing is clear. The true benefactors of 
the debate have been its followers, for the debate has 
forced its participants to explicate aspects of their 
positions that had not been entirely clear. At this point a 
consensus has emerged in the secondary literature to the 
effect that the positions of these two thinkers are closer 
than had originally been believed. At least two important 
issues continue to separate the two, however, one being the 
question of the universality of hermeneutics, the other
38 Jurgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and 
Method." in F. Dallmayr and T. A. McCarthy, eds.. 
Understanding and Social Inquiry. 1977, pp. 335-363.
168
concerning the scope and function of critical reflection. 
Related to this second point of contention is Habermas claim 
that Gadamer's hermeneutics lacks a critical dimension and 
must therefore be supplemented with ideology-critique. 
Whereas Habermas adheres to an essentially Cartesian view of 
reflection, a view which believes that one can suspend 
judgment on certain objects of thought, thereby attaining an 
objective interpretive perspective, Gadamer remains 
committed to an ontological view of reflection. This view 
holds that reflection is constituted through personal- 
historical experience, and as such, can never become fully 
free of personal judgment regarding the meaning of the 
objects it seeks to understand. This is because such 
meaning is ultimately a practical relationship of 
understanding, and not merely a conscious relation. As 
such, the emancipatory effect of reflection is much less 
than it might appear to be at first glance. Since the 
prejudices constitutive of the process of reflection must to 
some extent always remain hidden from conscious reflection, 
our conscious interpretations always appear to be more 
autonomous than they actually are. That is, understanding 
always involves more than we can consciously grasp, even 
though we might consciously believe that our consciousness 
may stand alone from the history which constitutes it.
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The Gadamer-Habermas Debate
Our discussion of the debate between Gadamer and 
Habermas will focus on its two key issues: 1) Habermas'
claim that Gadamer's hermeneutics lacks a critical dimension 
and must therefore be supplemented with ideology-critique, 
and 2) Habermas' rejection of hermeneutics' claim to 
universality. While it is true that the first issue may be 
interpreted as a consequence of the second, it was to the 
allegedly a-critical nature of Gadamer's hermeneutics that 
Habermas first turned his attention. It is also the main 
criticism which Habermas develops in his review of Truth and 
Method, the piece which began the exchange with Gadamer and 
that which is considered by some to be the debate's "central 
document."39 We will therefore begin our analysis of the 
debate with a discussion of Habermas' critical review, 
taking as our central focus Habermas' claim that Gadamer's 
hermeneutics is unacceptably conservative.
Habermas' claim that Gadamer's hermeneutics is a- 
critical and therefore must be supplemented with ideology 
critique is grounded in his criticism of Gadamer's 
interpretation of the relationship between tradition and 
reason. Habermas asserts that "Gadamer knows that the 
hermeneutic sciences first developed in reaction to a
39 Dallmayr and McCarthy, Understanding and Social 
Inquiry. 1977, p. 288.
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decline in the binding character of traditions.”40 In this 
respect, Habermas portrays hermeneutics, including Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, as inherently conservative. Habermas grants 
that "understanding- no matter how controlled it may be- 
cannot simply leap over the interpreter's relationships to 
tradition."41 But he argues at the same time that this does 
not mean that traditions are not profoundly changed by 
scientific reflection. In other words, Habermas accuses 
Gadamer of failing to appreciate the power of reflection 
vis-a-vis tradition. Referring to scientific self­
reflection Habermas writes
this type of reflection is no longer blinded by the 
illusion of an absolute, self-grounded autonomy and 
does not detach itself from the soil of contingency 
on which it finds itself. But in grasping the genesis 
of the tradition from which it proceeds and on which 
it turns back, reflection shakes the dogmatism of life 
practices,4 2
Habermas builds his case by criticizing Gadamer's 
rehabilitation of prejudice. He asks rhetorically, "does it 
follow from the unavoidabllity of hermeneutic anticipation 
eo ipso that there are legitimate prejudices?"43 Habermas 
follows this question by accusing Gadamer of a pre- 
Enlightenment conservatism. This inference of Habermas is
40 Habermas, "A review of Gadamer's Truth and Method.” 
in Dallmayr and McCarthy, Understanding and Social Inquiry. 
1977, p. 356.
41 Ibid., p. 357.
42 Ibid., p. 357.
43 Ibid., p. 357.
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based on his reading of Gadamer's defense of the notion of
authority, which in Gadamer's view depends not on obedience
but on reason. Interestingly, in his own summarization of
Gadamer's hermeneutics Habermas provides a description
which, at least on an implicit level, reveals its inherently
critical nature. Yet Habermas fails to grasp this critical
nature despite the fact that it is implied by his own
description of Gadamer's hermeneutics. Summarizing
Gadamer's position Habermas writes
prejudices are ... the conditions of possible 
knowledge. This knowledge is raised to reflection 
when it makes the normative framework itself 
transparent while moving around in it. In this way 
hermeneutics also makes us conscious of that which 
is already historically prestructured by inculcated 
tradition in the very act of understanding.44
Habermas apparently misses the fact that the moment of
becoming conscious of the prestructured nature of our
understanding is a critical moment. It is a moment the
critical nature of which is indistinguishable from the
critical moment described by Marxists when one overcomes
false consciousness and becomes aware of his historical-
economic condition. In a Marxist sense, the unconsious
structuring of experience stemming from one’s economic
condition is grasped through an interpretive experience
which provides an awareness of a force operating behind
one's back, namely, the force of being on the exploited side
of an exploitative economic relation. In a strictly
44 Ibid., p. 357.
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hermeneutical sense, such a moment involves becoming aware 
of the prejudiced nature of interpretation owing to the 
constitutive nature of our historical-situation.
Habermas misinterprets Gadamer's notion that the nature 
of interpretation is prejudiced to mean that reason itself 
is rendered impotent owing to the omnipotence of history. 
This reading, however, suggests that Habermas does not grasp 
one of the most important aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutics. 
This aspect may be explicated by way of a comparison between 
hermeneutics and structuralism. Whereas structuralists 
would tend to view the interpretive experience of the 
subject as epiphenomena of unmediated underlying symbolic 
structures, a Gadamerian would view the interpretive 
experience of the subject as constitutive of, as well as 
constituted by. its historical situation. It is indeed true 
that the interpretive experience of the individual is 
constituted by its historical situation, yet at the same 
time the experience of the individual involves the mediation 
of the linguistic tradition of which it is a part. This is 
what Gadamer means when he points out that traditions do not 
endure simply by virtue of the weight of their own inertia. 
They are lived, and as such, change while they remain more 
or less the same. Habermas, however, fails to grasp the 
significance of the mediating ability of the subject in 
Gadamer's hermeneutics. This undoubtedly stems from the 
rationalist or epistemological view of reason held by
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Habermas, as distinguished from the ontological view of
reason held by Gadamer. Habermas writes
the substantiality of what is historically pregiven 
does not remain unaffected when it is taken up in 
reflection. A structure of preunderstanding or 
prejudgment that has been rendered transparent can no 
longer function as a prejudice. But this is precisely 
what Gadamer seems to imply.40
This quotation shows that Habermas fails to realize that
affecting one's experience of the historically pregiven, and
overcoming it as it functions as a prejudice in any "final"
sense, are two very different matters. From a Gadamerian
perspective, one would agree with Habermas that the
historically pregiven does not remain unaffected when it is
consciously experienced. However, the Gadamerian would
differ fundamentally from the Habermasian with regard to the
nature of this effect. Whereas the Habermasian would view
the historically pregiven as an object that may be posited
and isolated theoretically much as a biologist might isolate
a particular cell and dissect it through critical analysis,
a Gadamerian would deny the possibility of such a
dissection, for in Gadamer's view the historically pregiven
is constitutive of the interpretive experience itself, and
as such, can never be completely isolated as an object of
reflection.46 This is the essence of the hermeneutic
40 Ibid., p.358.
46 For an excellent discussion of this important point, 
see J. Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of 
Truth and Method (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 
p. 48.
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circle. Prejudices are constitutive of interpretive 
experience itself, and therefore cannot be isolated 
epistemologically and objectified, since their isolation 
would require the abandonment of the experience which 
understanding is. Nevertheless, Habermas is correct, in 
some sense, in asserting that the historically pregiven may 
be affected through reflection. It is not, however, 
affected as an object. It is affected instead by virtue of 
the fact that the conscious experience of the historically 
pregiven itself becomes part of one's experience, and as 
such, part of the historically pregiven which is then 
constitutive of future experience. In other words 
reflection affects prejudices not by directly affecting 
particular prejudices in moments of transcendental 
reflection, but by expanding the interpretive horizons 
through which particular prejudices will themselves be 
experienced differently in the future. Hermeneutical 
reflection affects one's understanding, one's way of 
relating to the world. This is distinct from Habermas' view 
of critical reflection as a process of isolating a belief or 
prejudice and then changing it through a conscious decision.
This means that Habermas' notion that once a prejudice 
is rendered transparent it can no longer function as a 
prejudice is fundamentally mistaken. This is because the 
prejudices themselves never become objects of reflection in 
the manner which he claims. This precludes the possibility
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that prejudices could be eradicated in any definite or final 
sense. It nevertheless does allow for the possibility of 
what might be termed, for lack of a better term, the 
outgrowing of particular prejudices over time. But such an 
outgrowing does not stem from a supreme act of reflection; a 
rational purge of the preconscious, if you will. It instead 
occurs as an ontological transformation involving critical 
discourse which may result in personal growth and change. 
Such change would, in turn have the effect of structuring 
interpretive experience differently than it had been 
structured or constituted in the past.
It is not, therefore, the case that Gadamer denies the 
"power of reflection," as Habermas claims.47 It is instead 
the case that he explicates the ontological nature of 
understanding and of its principal insight that being is 
always more than consciousness. In the process, Gadamer 
makes a sober case for the limitations of reason, owing to 
its inescapable historical situatedness. Whereas Habermas 
remains committed to the Enlightenment's view of reason, 
Gadamer simply points out that, compared to our conscious 
beliefs, our actual relationship to the world is a more 
powerful determinant of interpretive experience. This does 
not deny the fact that reflection mediates our relationship 
to the world, it simply emphasizes the fact that this 
mediation always takes place within an historical context.
47 Ibid., p. 358.
176
In light of a number of passages in Truth and Method it 
is understandable how Habermas could construe Gadamer as a 
political and theoretical conservative. In some passages, 
Gadamer suggests a structuralist or determinist view of the 
individual and his relation to history. For example, 
consider the following excerpt from the Part Two of Truth 
and Method.
Long before we understand ourselves through the process 
of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self- 
evident way in the family, society and state in which 
we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting 
mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a 
flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. 
That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more 
than his judgments, constitute the historical reality 
of his being.48
This passage leaves open to interpretation the extent to
which Gadamer is willing to view the reflective activity of
an individual as affective with regard to tradition. From a
Habermasian perspective, a perspective still very much
influenced by the Enlightenment's view of reason, it is not
difficult to infer from this passage that Gadamer is a
conservative who underestimates the power of reflection.
However, when we move beyond this view and emphasize the
historicality or historical situatedness of reflection, as
Gadamer does, this view does not appear conservative so much
as it appears realistic. Gadamer's view of the relation
between reflection and history may, in fact, be interpreted
rather radically, for it suggests that true enlightenment
48 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 245.
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requires much more than a faith in reason. It requires an 
active critical-discursive engagement with one's own 
historical situation, not simply a rational critique of that 
which is objectified as tradition. It is as if the 
Enlightenment severed the mutually constitutive connection 
between self and tradition, and in doing so, could not help 
but posit a somewhat exaggerated and unrealistic view of 
reason, having artificially separated it from its 
constitutive content. Gadamer rejoins what the 
Enlightenment has severed by illustrating the historical 
situatedness of the individual. This reconnection means 
that in order correctly to analyze or criticize tradition we 
must also take into account its constitutive effect in the 
reasoning subject's understanding. This is why an 
interpretive commitment to self-criticism {hermeneutical 
reflection on one's prejudices) follows from Gadamer's 
reconnection of individual and linguistic tradition.
The Enlightenment's severing of subject and tradition 
inadvertently led to a severing of subject and biography, 
for the exercise of reason on behalf of the subject no 
longer had to take into consideration its historical 
situation, having already separated subject from tradition 
and having posited the latter as authoritarian and dogmatic. 
This is why the Enlightnement was satisfied with a 
commitment toward other-criticism, criticism which is 
typically externally directed; and this is why Gadamer's
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interpretation adds a requirement of self-criticism, which 
takes the form of hermeneutical reflection and its goal of 
effective-historical consciousness. This point is very 
important. Once Gadamer accepts the historical or 
prejudiced nature of interpretation he imposes a demand on 
reflection which escaped the intellectual grasp of the 
Enlightenment. The attitude toward reason propagated by 
Kant, the call to have the courage to think for oneself, was 
pretentious in that it mistakenly viewed the "self" as an 
entity unto itself; as a rational subject capable of 
transcending the confines of history through reason. In 
hindsight, such a view may be considered arrogant or 
presumptuous for it presumes that subjects constitute their 
knowledge themselves. It is a view which is, in a word, 
ignorant of the historical and social constitution of 
knowledge. Gadamer has therefore issued a corrective 
through which the Enlightenment’s presumptuous view of 
reason may be squared with historical fact and brought into 
the twentieth century. What Gadamer adds to Kant's call for 
the courage to think for oneself is the need for one to 
think of oneself critically and historically. Because 
prejudices are constitutive of interpretation, it is not 
enough to think for oneself, one must think "with" oneself; 
with onself in the sense that the knowing self is socially 
constituted and co-exists with history. To think with 
oneself is therefore to take into account the constitutive
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linguistic tradition with which our conscious self co­
exists, and upon which it is dependent. One must at the 
same time think about the fact that the experience of 
thinking is itself constituted by assumed meanings the truth 
status of which is necessarily taken for granted during 
their moment of application. If we are to think "for" 
ourselves, and not delude ourselves while doing so, we must 
constantly ask ourselves what it is that is structuring the 
thoughts that we are experiencing; what it is that is going 
on behind our backs without our wanting or knowing. Herein 
lies the essentially critical dimension of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, a dimension which belies the notion that 
Gadamer is a conservative, and also, the notion that 
hermeneutics must be supplemented with ideology critique.
As Wright points out, in Gadamer's view
to deny the necessity with which one's own prejudices 
come into play in the event of understanding is to deny 
the possibility that the truth of one's own prejudices 
come into question.49
As an intellectual tradition Marxism, which remains the core
influence of Habermas' critical theory, has been successful
at other-criticism, but has had difficulty acknowledging its
own prejudices and has generally abstained from self-
criticism. Gadamer views self-criticism (the ability to
question one's prejudices) as a necessary component of
49 Kathleen Wright, "Gadamer: The speculative structure 
of language," in Brice Wachterhauser, ed., Hermeneutics and 
Modern Philosophy. 1986, p. 201.
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other-criticism, if other-criticism aspires to be anything 
more than presumptuous, fallacious, and hypocritical. From 
a Gadamerian view, to deny that the truth of one's 
prejudices is an open question is problematic, since our 
conscious interpretations are always at risk of being 
unknowingly falsely constituted. Moreover, to "claim to be 
free from prejudice is in reality a denial of tradition."80 
Specifically, it is a denial of the fact that our 
understanding is constituted or made possible by the fact 
that we are immersed in a historical situation and speak a 
particular language.
We have been arguing that Habermas is fundamentally 
mistaken to construe Gadamer as a conservative, our argument 
so far being based on Gadamer's emphasis on the importance 
of questioning one's prejudices through hermeneutical 
reflection. An additional argument in support of a non­
conservative and perhaps radical interpretation of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics may be posited in terms of Gadamer's 
relationship to traditional hermeneutics. Like Heidegger, 
Gadamer's position within hermeneutics is radical in that he 
argues against the time-worn methodological view of 
hermeneutics in favor of an ontological and linguistical 
view of hermeneutics. This fact, however, does not enter 
into Habermas' formula. Nevertheless, the fact that
80 Wright, "Gadamer: The speculative structure of 
language," 1986, p. 201.
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Habermas construes Gadamer as a conservative is 
understandable when we take into account the respective 
historical contexts of these two thinkers. As Bernstein 
points out, Gadamer's intellectual development took place 
during a time when the continuity of the German 
philosophical tradition was still intact. Within this 
context the constitutive significance of tradition was 
readily apparent. It was, in fact, the reality of Gadamer's 
historical situation. In this sense the importance of 
tradition was obvious to Gadamer and could not help but 
influence the development of his ideas. By contrast, 
Habermas, thirty years or so younger than Gadamer, matured 
intellectually during a period of political and intellectual 
fragmentation. This may in part explain Habermas' 
eclecticism and propensity for drawing together theoretical 
strands from otherwise disparate schools of thought. More 
importantly, however, was Habermas' witnessing during his 
intellectually formative years of the irrationality of 
Nazism, a witnessing which has left Habermas an embittered 
critic of Heidegger, Gadamer's mentor.81 In this sense, 
Gadamer's discussion of the preconscious structuring of 
experience owing to tradition, and the limitations of reason 
which such a position requires, strikes a sensitive chord in
91 While the extent of Heidegger's involvement in the 
National Socialist German Workers' party was not explicitly 
clear for many years, it is now evident that Heidegger 
supported the party until its demise.
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Habermas. Given his natural suspicion regarding the 
tradition of thought drawn upon by Gadamer, and the numerous 
passages within Truth and Method which suggest a determinist 
bias in favor of tradition vis-a-vis the reasoning subject, 
it is not difficult to see how Habermas could have arrived 
at his conclusions regarding the conservativism of Gadamer.
While we may read Truth and Method with an eye toward 
bringing out and emphasizing its inherently critical 
dimensions it is nevertheless true that these dimensions 
were not terribly pronounced in the work; they were more 
latent than manifest. This undoubtedly contributed to 
Habermas' conservative interpretation of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics and his assertion that it is incapable of 
ideology critique. However, in Gadamer's response to 
Habermas' review of Truth and Method he leaves no doubt as 
to the critical nature of his hermeneutics.02 Before 
discussing Gadamer's response we should summarize the main 
points of Habermas' criticism as presented in his review 
essay. As we have seen, Habermas contends that Gadamer
1) underestimates the power of reflection, 2) absolutizes 
tradition and treats it conservatively as something that
92 What is perhaps Gadamer's most definitive response 
to Habermas' critique of Truth and Method and Gadamer's 
hermeneutics in general appears in the essay "On the scope 
and function of hermeneutical reflection," in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics. Translated by David E. Linge (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), pp. 18-43. (The 
essay "On the scope and function of hermeneutical 
reflection" is translated in this edition by G. B. Hess and 
R. E. Palmer.)
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should be continued and assimilated, and
3) has created an a-critical hermeneutics that must be
supplemented with ideology critique.
In his response to these assertions Gadamer wastes no
time in explicating the critical nature of his hermeneutics.
The essay opens as follows:
Philosophical hermeneutics takes as its task the 
opening up of the hermeneutical dimension in its 
full scope, showing its fundamental significance 
for our entire understanding of the world and thus 
for all the various forms in which this understanding 
manifests itself: from personal experience by the 
individual in society to the way in which he encounters 
society; and from the tradition as it is built of 
religion and law, art and philosophy, to the 
revolutionary consciousness that unhinges the tradition 
through emancipatory reflection.83
It is clear from this definition of hermeneutics that
Gadamer 1) acknowledges the emancipatory and mediating power
of reflection as it relates to tradition, and consequently
2) does not absolutize tradition. It is also clear that 3)
Gadamer sees a critical dimension within hermeneutics, a
revolutionary dimension capable of emancipating us from what
might be dogmatic within our tradition. Regarding
reflection, Gadamer writes "reflection on a given
preunderstanding brings before me something that otherwise
happens behind mv back. Something- but not everything."04
This is because, as we have seen, the full meaning of our
03 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics. 
Translated by David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), p. 18.
84 Ibid., p. 38.
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being cannot be captured consciously. In this sense 
reflection is always limited, but its inherent limitedness 
does not preclude its ability to make us aware of the 
history operative in our preunderstanding. While this 
awareness is never complete or absolute, it is our only 
means of overcoming the dogmatic aspects of our prejudices. 
This is why, despite its limitations, hermeneutical 
reflection is essential and vital.
Habermas infers from Gadamer's emphasis on the 
constitutive and all-inclusive nature of tradition that in 
Gadamer's view tradition is fixed or absolute. But as 
Gadamer points out, this is an incorrect inference. Gadamer 
writes "the principle of hermeneutics simply means that we 
should try to understand everything that can be 
understood."99 This effort of understanding preserves 
tradition only to the extent that that which is mediated is 
experienced as true and worthy of assimilation. In other 
words, tradition is not a static construct. As such it is 
constitutive of, and necessarily mediated by, interpretive 
experience.
Finally, with respect to Habermas' charge that 
hermeneutics is incapable of revealing and criticizing 
structures of political and economic domination, and must 
therefore be supplemented with ideology critique, Gadamer 
responds
99 Ibid., p. 31.
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who says that these concrete, so-called real factors 
are outside the realm of hermeneutics? From the 
hermeneutical standpoint, rightly understood, it is 
absolutely absurd to regard the concrete factors of 
work and politics as outside the scope of hermeneutics. 
What about the vital issue of prejudices with which 
hermeneutics deals? Where do they come from? Merely 
out of "cultural tradition"? Surely they do, in part, 
but what is tradition formed from?
In Gadamer's view tradition is formed through experience
itself, and as such, tradition embodies economic, political
and social experience as much as it does "cultural"
experience. It follows that economic conditions, political
power, and social relations are constitutive of the
prejudices which structure experience. In this sense, they
are an essential part of the historical effect which
hermeneutical consciousness seeks to disclose and make
explicit. Gadamer, in fact, turns the table on Habermas and
counter-accuses him of an overly narrow view of cultural
tradition. From Gadamer's view, it is only through reducing
tradition to a narrow view of culture that hermeneutics
could be portrayed as being a-critical or in need of
assistance from critical theory.86
Gadamer's response to Habermas' accusations is grounded
in his explication and assertion of the universality of
hermeneutics. We have already discussed this notion in
86 Gadamer writes, "the universality of the 
hermeneutical dimension is narrowed down, I think, when one 
area of understood meaning (for instance, the "cultural 
tradition") is held in separation from other recognizable 
determinants of social reality that are taken as the 
'real' factors." Philosophical Hermeneutics. 1977, pp. 30-
31.
186
terms of Gadamer's analysis of the nature of interpretation.
Simply stated, in Gadamer's view hermeneutics is universal
because human experience is itself hermeneutical, that is,
human experience involves understanding, interpretation and
application. It is unfortunate that Habermas does not
provide an account of how Gadamer comes to conclude that
hermeneutics is universal, for this leaves us wondering
exactly what he thinks the notion refers to. In light of
the rest of Habermas' discussion on this issue it appears
safe to say that he does not view hermeneutics' claim to
universality in terms of Gadamer's analysis of the
hermeneutical nature of experience.07 On what grounds,
then, does Habermas consider the claim to rest? As the
following passage suggests, it appears that Habermas
considers the claim to turn on Gadamer's notion of the
historicity of understanding.
Can there be an understanding of meaning in relation 
to symbolic structures formulated in everyday language 
that is not tied to the hermeneutic pre-supposition of 
context-dependent processes of understanding, an 
understanding that in this sense by-passes natural 
language as the last metalanguage?50
07 We may speculate over the possibility that if 
Habermas were to consider the claim in terms of Gadamer's 
notion of the hermeneutical nature of experience he might 
have a different view of both the meaning of the claim and 
its legitimacy. It would seem that if one accepts the notion 
that experience itself involves understanding, 
interpretation, and application, then one must also accept 
Gadamer's claim regarding the universality of hermeneutics.
08 Jurgen Habermas, "The hermeneutic claim to 
universality," in Josef Bleicher, ed., Contemporary 
Hermeneutics (London: Routledge, 1980), p. 189.
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Habermas believes that if he can answer this question in the 
affirmative he has domonstrated the limitations of 
philosophical hermeneutics. Habermas envisions two possible 
routes by which he might attain an such an answer. The 
first is by way of psychoanalysis- "or the critique of 
ideology where collective pheomena are concerned"; the 
second is through the "general theory of natural languages," 
in the tradition of Chomsky and Searle. In the latter case, 
Habermas believes that such a theory may someday be able to 
"attach ... each element of a natural language ... to 
structural descriptions formulated in theoretical language." 
If this could be done then the theoretical language could 
"take the place of the hermeneutical understanding of 
meaning."99 Habermas, however, admits that at this point 
such a notion amounts to little more than speculation. 
However, the same is not true with regard to psychoanalysis, 
and it is by way of psychoanalysis that Habermas believes he 
has refuted hermeneutics' claim to universality. In 
Habermas' view, hermeneutics is not universal because 
hermeneutical reflection is incapable of uncovering 
distorted unconscious motivations which result from 
contradictions inherent in political-economic structures.
We may explore this argument by going back to Habermas'
99 Ibid., pp. 189-190. It would be interesting to ask 
Habermas how this would differ from the failed attempt of 
the Vienna Circle to reduce natural language to formal 
logic.
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Knowledge and Human Interests in which Habermas first 
describes Freud's psychoanalytic model as a form of "depth 
hermeneutics."
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas does not 
discuss Gadamer's hermeneutics but instead contrasts Freud's 
work with that of Dilthey. Nevertheless this effort is 
important to our discussion for his discussion of Freud 
serves as the foundation for Habermas' critique of 
hermeneutics' claim to universality, which is explicated and 
specificied in several later essays.
At this point in our discussion several points are worth 
mentioning. Habermas' turn to Freud is consistent with 
critical theory's general concern over the relationship 
between subjectivity and objective social-economic 
conditions. For this reason Habermas' move is logical and 
is in some sense predictable given his theoretical proximity 
to earlier critical theorists. On a more substantive level, 
Habermas' turn to Freud marks a transitional point in his 
theoretical development. His discussion of "depth 
hermeneutics" clears the way for the completion of his 
linguistic turn, for in analyzing Freud's approach to the 
diagnosis of neuroses Habermas finds it necessary to posit 
an ideal-typical case of non-neurotic communication. This 
effort ultimately leads Habermas to the question of the 
nature of interpersonal communication in an age typified by 
the ever increasing extension of instrumental-reason.
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It should be clear, then, that the turn to Freud is an 
important step en route to Habermas' development of his 
theory of communicative action. And while Habermas 
eventually agrees with his critics and acknowledges the 
infeasibility of applying Freud's psychoanalytic model to 
social-structural critique, certain elements of Habermas' 
Freudian interpretation of hermeneutics remain implicit in 
his work. The most important of these elements is Habermas' 
methodological view of hermeneutics. In introducing the 
chapter on Freud in Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas 
states that "psychoanalysis is relevant to us as the only 
tangible example of a science incorporating methodical self­
reflection."60 Habermas' interest in Freud, and also in 
hermeneutics, therefore, should be read as the result of an 
interest in illuminating the emancipatory dimenions of 
reflection. What distinguishes Habermas from Gadamer with 
regard to reflection is that Habermas begins with a 
scientific or theoretical model of reflection, whereas 
Gadamer, following Heidegger, begins with quotidian 
understanding, and views reflection as the conscious 
experience of understanding. Habermas' view of hermeneutics 
is therefore inherently methodological and therefore 
fundamentally different from Gadamer's.
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas aims to
60 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 
translated by Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972, 
first published in English in 1971), p. 214.
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demonstrate how psychoanalysis, as an exemplar of methodical
self-reflection, may be applied on a societal level in order
to facilitate mass emancipation. Habermas views Freud's
model as a means of disclosing the internal distortion of
three categories of expression (linguistic elements, action
patterns and expressions).
The grammar of ordinary language governs not only the 
connection of symbols but also the interweaving of 
linguistic elements, action patterns, and expressions.
In the normal case, these three categories of 
expression are complementary, so that linguistic 
expressions "fit" experiential expressions; of course, 
their integration is imperfect, which makes possible 
the latitude necessary for indirect communications.
In the limiting case, however, a language game 
can disintegrate to the point where the three 
categories of expressions no longer agree. Then 
actions and non-verbal expressions belie what is 
expressly stated.6 1
According to Habermas, while Dilthey takes the focus of
hermeneutical reflection to be the "subjective
consciousness" of the individual, Freud takes as his focus
that which is "behind manifest memory." Despite the fact
that Freud does not view his work as "hermeneutical,"
Habermas describes his psychoanalytic model as an example of
"depth hermeneutics." According to Habermas, psychoanalysis
probes more deeply than Dilthey*s method of Verstehen
because it "seeks to comprehend ... symbolic structures ...
that are corrupted by the impact of internal conditions."
In Habermas' view these internal conditions are
systematically produced on the social-structural level.
Ibid., p. 218.
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Habermas considers these conditions, or neuroses, to be the 
result of one's social and economic condition. In this way 
Habermas is able to draw the connection between 
psychoanalysis and the overcoming of false consciousness, 
and posit Freud's model as an exemplar of emancipatory 
reason.0 8
Neuroses distort symbolic structures in all three 
dimensions: linguistic expression (obsessive thoughts), 
actions (repetition compulsions), and bodily 
experiential expression (hysterical body symptoms).89
In Habermas' view, these disturbances are incomprehensible
to the actor, and therefore require a systematic "depth
hermeneutical" analysis, such as that posited by Freud.
Two years after the appearance of the German edition of
Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas published an essay
entitled "On Systematically Distorted Communication."60 In
this essay Habermas reiterates in summary form his
interpretation of Freud's psychoanalytic model as presented
in Knowledge and Human Interests. He also outlines what he
considers to be the main features of "normal" communication
communication which is not systematically distorted. This
move became necessary for Habermas since his focus on
neuroses as examples of distorted communication raised the
question of what undistorted communication might look like.
08 Ibid., pp. 215-219.
89 Ibid., p. 219.
60 Jurgen Habermas, "On systematically distorted 
communication," Inquiry Vol. 13 No. 3, 1970, pp. 205-218.
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In this sense, then, Habermas' turn to Freud in Knowledge 
and Human Interests may be viewed as the impetus to his 
conceptualization of an "ideal-speech situation." While the 
soundness of this move may be questioned on a number of 
levels, Habermas' concept is important for this work in a 
real sense, for it unintentionally lends support to the 
argument that hermeneutical reflection is a crucially 
important phenomenon which cannot be reduced to a 
psychological process. For even if there existed an ideal- 
speech situation, a situation free of the social structural 
conditions responsible for psychological neuroses, there 
would still exist the need for the development an effective 
historical consciousness, on both the individual and 
institutional levels, for our conscious interpretation of 
reality would still be constituted bv prejudices. In other 
words, the social relevance of hermeneutical reflection, and 
hermeneutics in general, is not restricted to a certain 
segment of the population, nor by the possibility of a 
historical situation free of symbolic distortion, for it 
concerns the determinate history operative in experience 
itself.
It is important to reiterate at this point that in 
Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas' model of general 
hermeneutics is the philological hermeneutics of Dilthey. 
This is important, for it enables Habermas to argue that 
psychoanalysis can achieve understanding where philological
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hermeneutics cannot. This means that Habermas has already, 
at least implicity, attacked the universality of 
hermeneutics, even when it was not his explicit intention to 
do so. Habermas points out that Dilthey's focus is on the 
"meaning structures" that are "consciously intended." By 
contrast, Freud's focus is on unconscious motivation.
Taking Dilthey's hermeneutics as his focus, and viewing it 
as the study of subjective consciousness, it is easy for 
Habermas to argue that Freud's psychoanalytic model enables 
us to go beyond traditional hermeneutics. Given that 
Habermas begins with Dilthey’s methodological view of 
hermeneutics, he appears correct in claiming that 
hermeneutical reflection is by itself incapable of 
interpreting that which psychoanalysis is capable of 
interpreting. The problem here, however, is that this 
argument against the universality of hermeneutics assumes a 
methodological view of hermeneutics in the first instance. 
The question for Habermas is this: when his analysis of
hermeneutics instead bases itself upon Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, what are the consequences for his critique of 
the universality of hermeneutics? Unlike Dilthey, Gadamer 
does not view hermeneutics as a method, nor does he limit 
the focus of hermeneutics to the questioning of subjective 
consciousness.
In his essay "The hermeneutic claim to universality” 
Habermas draws a distinction between traditional and
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philosophical hermeneutics and explicitly calls into 
question Gadamer's claim regarding the universality of 
hermeneutics. While in this case Habermas' focus falls on 
Gadamer's hermeneutics, his psychoanalytic argument is 
essentially the same: systematically distorted 
communications (neuroses) are impervious to hermeneutical 
reflection, as Gadamer has defined it. However, if we view
hermeneutics as a concern over the hermeneutical nature of
experience itself, as Gadamer does, then it follows that 
psychoanalysis is not at all a limiting case of
hermeneutics. This is in fact the main point of Gadamer's
response to Habermas' criticism regarding the universality 
of hermeneutics. As Gadamer points out, even during the 
process of psychoanalysis language is spoken, and 
interpreted, and in this sense, psychoanalysis is a 
derivative or thematized variation of hermeneutical 
experience.61 As such, the notion that neuroses apparently 
require an elaborate process of analysis does not at all 
undermine hermeneutics' claim to universality. Again, it is 
as if Habermas (not unlike Giddens) believes that the notion 
of the universality of hermeneutics is a claim to some
61 Gadamer also attacks Habermas for attempting to 
raise to an authoritative or judgmental level a model of 
interpretation which is scientific in nature. In addition, 
he attacks the specific features of the structure of the 
psychoanalytic doctor-patient relationship, such as the 
fact that the relationship has an economic dimension, and 
the "interpretation" provided by the doctor is legally 
defined as a service. See Gadamer, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics. 1977, pp. 29-42.
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superordinate power which aims to subsume all other 
disciplines under its jurisdiction. On the contrary, the 
universality of hermeneutics simply refers to the fact that 
experience itself is hermeneutical.62
Despite our many criticisms of Habermas in this chapter 
one should not get the impression that Habermas is totally 
off base in his interpretation of Gadamer. As we mentioned, 
in the essay "The hermeneutic claim to universality”
Habermas draws a distinction between traditional and 
philosophical hermeneutics, and correctly notes the post- 
methodological nature of Gadamer's hermeneutics. And while 
Habermas fails to grasp several of Gadamer's key notions 
(such as the universality of hermeneutics), it is also true 
that he correctly grasps other aspects, such as the notion 
that understanding is self-understanding.63 The problem, 
however, is that Habermas fails to see the sociological 
importance of various Gadamerian insights. For example, 
rather than pursue the social and sociological significance 
of hermeneutical reflection Habermas is instead drawn to 
explain the nature of communicative competence. As compared
62 Habermas' strictly methodological view of 
hermeneutics ignores the accomplishments of Heidegger and 
Gadamer and lapses into the pre-modern view of 
hermeneutics.
63 Habermas writes, "I find Gadamer's real achievement 
in the demonstration that hermeneutic understanding is 
linked with transcendental necessity to the articulation of 
an action-orienting self-understanding," in "A review of 
Gadamer's Truth and Method, 1977, p. 351.
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with hermeneutical reflection,
the rational reconstruction of a system of linguistic 
rules ...is undertaken with the aim of explaining 
linguistic competence. It makes explicit those rules 
which a native speaker has an implicit command of; but 
it does not as such make the subject conscious of 
suppositions he is not aware of. The speaker's 
subjectivity, constituting the horizon within which 
reflexive experience can be gained, remains excluded 
in principle. One could say that a successful 
linguistic reconstruction makes us conscious of the 
apparatus of language that is functioning without our 
being aware of it.64
Habermas continues by pointing out that, from a Gadamerian
standpoint, such an analysis would constitute an inauthentic
use of language, and would therefore be rejected in
principle. In light of this Habermas then asks, given
philosophical hermeneutics' lack of concern over
linguistics, what is its relevance? Habermas is partially
justified for asking this question, for while Gadamer has
emphasized the practical importance of hermeneutics, he has
provided very little direction regarding the practical
implications of his work for the social sciences.68 The
question for Habermas, however, is: what is the relevance
of studying linguistic competence, given the fact that it is
a pan-cultural universal? While this may be worthwhile in
so far as it may give rise to contributions to basic
64 Habermas, "The hermeneutic claim to universality,”
1980, p. 186.
60 As we mentioned earlier, Gadamer has suggested that
his work may open new lines of questioning in the sciences;
but Habermas appears to be shopping for answers, not 
questions, and appears impatient with the subtlety of 
Gadamer's suggestion.
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research in linguistics, its significance pales in 
comparison with the thought of revealing the extent to which 
people experience the opportunity, or are prohibited from 
experiencing the opportunity, of actually calling into 
question the prejudices which constitute their experience. 
Habermas knows that hermeneutics concerns this experience, 
but fails to see the importance of studying it as a 
sociological topic. It is as if he is preoccupied with 
studying the ideas of his peers rather than those of the 
public. When he does mention the public, his focus is on 
rules and formal structures, not people and their prejudiced 
interpretive condition. His proposal is little more than a 
structural-functional analysis of linguistical competence. 
From a Gadamerian view, such a proposal can amount to little 
more than a politically impotent and socially alienated 
methodological exercise. A truly committed social theorist 
would be concerned not with helping society become aware of 
a functional apparatus which is taken for granted, but the 
determinate and coercive effect of concrete linguistical 
concepts, prejudices, which structure the individual 
experience of society.
Given philosophical hermeneutics' inability to provide 
Habermas with direction to his project, Habermas has no use 
for it. He does, however, see four important points to 
Gadamer's hermeneutics, all of which pertain to 
methodological issues.
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1) Hermeneutic consciousness destroys the objectivist 
self-understanding of the traditional 
Geisteswissenschaften.
2) Hermeneutic consciousness ... reminds the social
sciences of problems which arise from the symbolic
pre-structuring of their object.
3) Hermeneutic consciousness ... affects the
scientistic self-understanding of the natural
sciences.
4) Hermeneutic consciousness is (responsible for)
.... the translation of important scientific 
information into the language of the social 
life-world.6 6
With these concerns Habermas has, for his own purposes, 
exhausted Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
In our view the real disappointment regarding Habermas' 
encounter with Gadamer is not so much that he fails to 
understand several of his key points, but rather that he 
fails to explore the sociological significance of those 
points which he properly grasps. Missing from Habermas' 
list of situations within which hermeneutics might find 
application is the common situation of conversation and 
interpretation. As demonstrated in chapter three, the 
hermeneutical problem is universal in the sense that 
hermeneutical reflection is relevant to all instances of 
interpretation, even those that might appear mundane or 
obvious, and most importantly in situations where meaning is 
being taken for granted. What is clear from this work is the 
fact that Habermas has failed to see the possibilities
66 Habermas, "The hermeneutic claim to universality," 
1980, pp. 186-187.
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regarding the analysis of hermeneutical reflection as a 
topic in its own right. Rather than studying the phenomenon 
of reflection in its most basic and elementary forms, 
Habermas instead prefers to study it in abstract terms.
There remains in Habermas’ work an implicit value judgment 
regarding the knowledgeability of the public. He shares 
with Marx an elitist view of the status of the 
intelligensia, whose obligation it is to steer the line of 
march toward emancipation. There is no question that the 
efforts of Habermas are well intended. The question remains 
whether or not it is acceptable to believe that emancipation 
can be attained methodologically, in the scientific sense of 
the word. Habermas wants the same thing Gadamer wants, 
social emancipation. The difference lies in their 
strategies for its attainment. In Gadamer's view the best 
we can do, in our position as professional researchers, is 
to facilitate a discourse that will help people experience 
the historicity of their life with the hope that society in 
general will be able to develop an effective-historical 
consciousness. To think that this could be effected through 
creating a model of ideal discourse, and indoctrinating 
people into its methodology, is simply to mistake the 
experience of understanding from the ground up. While 
Habermas must be credited for introducing many of us to 
Gadamer, and also, for having forced Gadamer to explicate 
the implicitly critical dimensions of his hermeneutics, his
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contributions toward establishing the social and 




HERMENEUTICS AND INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
It is somewhat ironic that within interpretive sociology 
one cannot find a comprehensive theory of the nature of 
interpretation. What we find instead are social- 
psychological explanations of interaction (Mead), 
programmatic statements regarding the methodological 
requisites for an "interpretive" sociology (Weber), abstract 
generalizations regarding interpretive procedures (Schutz), 
and empirical studies showing the conventional construction 
of social reality (Garfinkel). The guiding question for our 
immediate discussion is the following. To what extent might 
these various efforts inform and guide our effort to 
establish the sociological significance of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics?1
The term "interpretive sociology" is being used to refer 
to two distinct developments within American sociology; one 
having its roots in the German phenomenological tradition, 
the other in American pragmatism. What distinguishes these
1 This is not an arbitrary question. We could quite 
easily focus instead on the importance of Gadamer's 
hermenutics for interpretive sociology. However, given the 
central aim of this work, which is to establish the 
significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics for sociology in 
general. our focus is appropriate. It is also worth noting 
that we cannot study the interpretive-sociological reaction 
to Gadamer's hermeneutics because his work has yet to be 
discussed by interpretive sociologists.
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two strains of interpretive sociology from other varients of 
sociology is their common concern over the intersubjective 
dimensions of social action. That is, a concern over the 
extent to which social action may be considered a product of 
the interpretation of one’s relationship to others and the 
world in general. Our discussion of interpretive sociology 
begins with a detailed analysis of Max Weber's 
methodological writings.
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Max Weber and Interpretive Sociology
It is no exaggeration to say that interpretive sociology 
begins with Max Weber. It was Weber who, in opposition to 
the positivist tradition running from Saint-Simon to Comte 
to Durkheim, and the economic-positivism of the later Marx, 
first argued for the sociological study of meaningful social 
action. However, while many American sociologists are 
familiar with Weber's project in general terms, its specific 
meaning and content have been clouded by misrepresentation 
and misinterpretation. In light of this, it is necessary to 
discuss the nature of Weber's conceptualization of 
interpretive sociology prior to exploring its import for the 
sociological application of Gadamer's hermeneutics. Our 
discussion will be guided by two basic questions:
1) what does Max Weber mean by interpretive sociology?
2) what does Weber mean by Verstehen. the often 
mentioned but rarely correctly understood method of 
interpretive sociology?
In order to answer these questions we must first deconstruct
the myths surrounding Weber's methodology resulting from
misinterpretation and the inaccuracies of translation. One
of these myths concerns the subject matter of interpretive
sociology. As we shall see, the original, authoritative,
English interpretations of Weber's conceptualization of
interpretive sociology imply that the subject matter of
interpretive sociology is the subjective, or psychological
motivation underlying individual action. Related to this
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myth is a second one which portrays the method of 
interpretive sociology (Verstehen) as one of psychological, 
empathetic introspection. We will organize our discussion 
of Weber around these two issues and conclude by summarizing 
those aspects of his project which bear on the importance of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics for sociology.
The problems regarding the provincialism of American 
sociology, some of which were discussed in chapter one, are 
very apparent in the case of the American reception and 
interpretation of the work of Max Weber. It is only 
relatively recently that critics have begun to re-examine 
the early and influential English translations of Weber's 
writings. What they have uncovered evidences that several 
aspects of Weber’s work have been seriously misrepresented, 
and with it the nature and method of interpretive 
sociology.2 Perhaps the most influential interpretation of 
Weber's conceptualization of interpretive sociology has been 
that provided by Talcott Parsons in The Structure of Social 
Action.3 Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope contend, however, that 
Parsons' interpretation of Weber is "erroneous both in many 
of its particulars and in the general cast that it gives to
2 Given that in Weber's work sociology comes closest to 
the hermeneutical tradition, it is reasonable to think that 
the misunderstanding regarding Weber's conceptualization of 
interpretive sociology is associated with Anglo-American 
sociology's misunderstanding of the nature and scope of 
hermeneutics in general.
3 Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949).
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Weber's theoretical product."4 This is ironic in that while 
we are indebted to Parsons for deparochializing Weber by 
importing his work into American sociology, the very success 
of his effort has "magnified a negative effect, namely, the 
distortion of Weber that is implicit in (his) 
interpretation."D
Cohen, et al. contend that Parsons mistakenly 
exaggerates the normative aspects of Weber's conception of 
social action. While Parsons argues correctly that Weber 
had an interest in the normative aspects of social action, 
Cohen, et al. contend that he exaggerated the importance of 
norms by asserting that they are "central to Weber's 
conception of social action."6 It is very possible that 
Parsons' own preoccupation with the normative aspects of 
social action skewed his interpretation of Weber. Indeed, 
as Cohen, et al. point out, in The Structure of Social 
Action Parsons concludes that "there is no such thing as 
action except as effort to conform with norms."7
Of the four categories of social action outlined by 
Weber (traditional, instrumental-rational, value-rational
4 Jere Cohen, Lawrence E. Hazelrigg and Whitney Pope, 
"De-Parsonizing Weber: A critique of Parsons' interpretation 
of Weber's sociology." American Sociological Review, Vol. 
40, 1975, p. 229.
8 Ibid., p. 229.
6 Ibid., p. 231.
7 Ibid., p. 231. The quote may be found in Parsons,
The Structure of Social Action. 1949, pp. 76-77.
206
and affectual), it is only with regard to affectual action
(which Parsons views as a residual category) that Parsons
forgoes "any attempt to demonstrate the centrality of
norms."8 Based on a detailed analysis of Weber's
description of social action, Cohen, et al., conclude that
a category-by-category analysis shows that 
traditional behavior, usages and customs are 
primary habitual, while instrumentally rational 
behavior and complexes of interests are largely 
oriented to expediency rather than to norms.
Only value-rational behavior is primarily 
normative in any of the senses intended by 
Parsons.9
The consequence of Parsons’ exaggeration of the 
"normative" within Weber's conception of social action is 
that it obscures the importance which Weber attributes to 
domination. As Weber himself states, "every sphere of 
social action is profoundly influenced by structures of 
dominancy,1,10 However, unlike Bendix, who translates 
Herrschaft as "domination," Parsons translates the term to 
mean "leadership," and this redefinition is crucially 
important.11 Because Weber defines power (Macht) as the
8 Ibid., p. 231.
9 Ibid., p. 231.
10 Ibid., p. 237. The quote may be found in Max Weber, 
Economy and Society, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich eds. 
(New York: Bedminster, 1968), p. 941.
11 Ibid., p. 237.
207
imposition of one's will upon another,12 and views power as 
the "general sense" of Herrschaft. Parsons in effect removes 
the conflictual dimensions of Weber's theory and 
misrepresents it as akin to his own consensus theory of 
social action.13 Given the fact that the first edition of 
Parson's The Structure of Social Action was for many 
American sociologists their first introduction to Weber, 
Parsons may be held responsible for the generally 
conservative impression of Weber which many sociologists 
came to attain.14
12 Weber's precise definition of power (Macht) is "the 
capacity of an individual to realize his will, even against 
the opposition of others." Max Weber, Economy and Society, 
1968, p. 224.
13 Randall Collins also emphasizes the conflictual 
dimensions of Weber's sociology and places him within the 
conflict tradition of social theory, along with Marx, in his 
Three Sociological Traditions (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985).
14 In Parsons' reply to Cohen, et al.'s paper he writes
"the authors have repeatedly accused me of distorting 
Weber's meaning. I'm afraid I must come back with the claim 
that, however that may be, they have distorted my meaning." 
Talcott Parsons "Comments: Reply to Cohen, Hazelrigg and 
Pope." American Sociological Review Vol. 41, 1976, pp. 361- 
365. On page 361 Parsons points out that his critics "rely 
heavily on The Structure of Social Action ... and play down 
later writings on Weber." He then makes the point that his 
treatment of Weber in Structure was admittedly limited and 
did not pretend to be definitive. In addition, he makes the 
point that his views of Weber have developed and changed 
over time. This, however, merely confirms the significance 
of Cohen et al.'s paper. The interpretation of Weber in the 
Structure was considered definitive for many years and was 
of seminal importance, and despite Parsons' re­
interpretations of Weber over time, his initial 
misinterpretations have had serious consequences for the 




Rendering of Interpretive Sociology 
Parsons' misrepresentation of Weber is not limited to 
his somewhat self-serving interpretation of Weber's theory 
of social action, but extends also to Weber’s conception of 
interpretive sociology. Given the canonical importance of 
his 1947 co-authored translation of the first section of 
Wirtschaft und Gesselschaft (Economy and Society), which 
contains the basic concepts of interpretive sociology, 
Parsons may be held partly responsible for the 
misunderstanding regarding Weber's conception of the nature 
and method of interpretive sociology.10 This work has, "for 
almost a generation ... been the main source for most 
American sociologists of Weber's basic concepts."16 
However, according to Munch, "this translation has given a 
definite psychological twist to Weber's concept of social 
action, particularly in terms of the 'imputation of motive' 
in a psychological sense."17 Given the specificity and 
succinctness of Munch's explanation of the main problem 
underlying Parsons' misinterpretation, we will provide 
Munch's explanation in its entirety.
16 A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Max Weber. The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1947).
16 Peter A. Munch, "'Sense' and 'intention' in Max 
Weber's theory of social action." Sociological Inquiry,
Vol. 45 No. 4, 1975, p. 61.
17 Ibid., p . 61.
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The difficulty seems to lie particularly with the word 
Sinn. Its closest equivalent in English is "sense." 
Henderson and Parsons, however, choose to translate it 
as "meaning," which has a 3trong connotation of 
"intended purpose." Thus, in translating 
qemeinter Sinn as "intended meaning," they reinforce 
the false connotation that Weber explicitly tried to 
guard against. Furthermore, in his comments to the 
translation. Parsons gives strong support to this 
purposive connotation and practically reduces 
soziales Handeln and Sinn, as well as Verstehen. to 
purely psychological concepts purportedly referring 
to a "state of mind" (Parsons' words) of the actor.18
According to Munch's reading of Weber, the "sense" of an
action is "inherent in the structure of the action itself,
regardless of the mental state of the actor, and is directly
comprehensible to the recipient as well as to the observer
in terms of established expectations based on verified
experience."19 This means that in Weber's view interpretive
sociology is concerned with "the kind of human behavior that
is 'sensible,' 'meaningful,' and 'comprehensible* in terms
of established expectations, that is, in terms of norms and
standards for 'reasonable' conduct and behavior shared by
the actor and the actor's audience."20 In light of this.
Munch contends that "motive" should not be construed as a
"state of mind" of the individual actor.
Munch's translation of Sinn as "sense," and his
rendering of Weber's intended meaning, are both supported by
Reinhard Bendix. Bendix points out in a footnote that the
18 Ibid., p. 61.
19 Ibid., p. 62.
20 Ibid., p. 62, (author's emphasis).
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"meaningful" in Weber's view of social action is not at all
psychological but social.
Weber recognized that much behavior is meaningful and 
and yet not the result of conscious deliberation. The 
conventional behavior that men in society take for 
granted is very often meaningful; it makes sense to 
them. "Making sense" is actually a better translation 
of the German Sinn than the term "meaning," which tends 
to have a poetic or philosophical connotation.21
In light of this observation we may recall Weber's
definition that social action is meaningful in that it takes
into account the expectations of others. It follows from
the interpretations of Munch and Bendix that the process of
taking behavioral expectations into account is based not on
a psychological or exclusively conscious deliberation, but
rather, on a general sense of understanding similar to that
which is described by Heidegger: the meaning of social
action stems from the fact that we are related to others and
act according to these relations. We grasp the meaning
which guides our social interactions on the basis of our
experience of social interaction; not necessarily because we
deliberate consciously on what we suspect is the ultimate
"meaning" of the actions of another.
In all fairness it should be pointed out that Parsons is
21 Reindhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual 
Portrait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 
first published in 1960) p. 474. Munch does not cite Bendix 
in his essay. He does, however, state that in interpreting 
Sinn as "sense" he is following a suggestion by C. 
Prendergast, "Phenomenology and sociology: A review of 
Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz." Unpublished seminar 
paper, Department of Sociology, Southern Illinois 
University.
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not completely responsible for his psychological- 
misinterpretation of Weber. As Hunch concedes, some of the 
blame for the present confusion surounding Weber's 
interpretive sociology must go to Weber himself.22 This is 
because Weber was not clear regarding the "intersubjective" 
nature of social action in his later works. According to 
Munch, Weber gave greater emphasis to the "subjective" 
aspects of social action in his later works in an effort to 
counter Simmel's argument, which favored a meta-physical and 
absolute conception of meaning. It is Munch’s contention, 
however, that Weber’s later emphasis on the subjective 
amounted to no more than a shift in emphasis and should not 
be read as change in the content of his theory. What is 
unfortunate, however, is that it is Weber's later writings 
which were the first to be translated. Weber’s position 
regarding the subjectivity of social action thus came to be 
emphasized, and with this emphasis came the
misinterpretation regarding the alleged psychological nature 
of Weber's conception of social action and its interpretive 
analysis.
In his relatively early writings, which Parsons 
neglected,23 Weber explicitly distinguishes interpretive
22 Munch, "'Sense' and 'intention' in Max Weber's 
theory of social action," 1975, p. 60.
23 Parsons' analysis of Weber's methodological 
concepts, as presented in The Structure of Social Action, 
is based on his reading of Chapter one of Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft. which he would later co-translate, and his
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sociology from psychology. The most important amongst these
works, "Some categories of interpretive sociology," has only
recently been translated into English.24 In this essay
Weber writes that the "specific focus" of interpretive
sociology "... is not simply any kind of "inner state" or
outer behavior whatever, but rather action." Following this
passage Weber specifically defines what he means by "action"
in the context of interpretive sociology.
Action, specifically significant for interpretive 
sociology is, in particular, behavior that:
(1) in terms of the subjectively intended meaning 
of the actor, is related to the behavior of others.
(2) is codetermined in its course through this 
relatedness, and thus (3) can be intelligibly 
explained in terms of this (subjectively) 
intended meaning, (original emphasis)29
According to Weber, then, the subject matter of interpretive
sociology is social action, action based on the
interpretation of shared meaning. In Weber's words,
interpretive sociology concerns itself with "the typical
meaning-relationships of action."26
Later in this essay Weber states explicitly that
reading of Alexander von Schelting's Max Weber's 
Wissenschaftslehre (Tubingen: J. B. C. Mohr, 1934) . Parsons
describes chapter one of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft as the
"most important" explication of Weber's methodological 
position. See The Structure of Social Action. 1949, p. 579.
24 Max Weber, "Some categories of interpretive
sociology." Translated and edited by Edith Graber.
Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 22, 1981, pp. 151-180.
20 Ibid., p. 152, (original emphasis).
26 Ibid., p. 152.
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"interpretive sociology ... is not part of a
'psychology'."2 7 What distinguishes the two is the
respective focus of each. While there are intentional or
motivational aspects of social action which may be
psychological in nature, the analysis of these aspects does
not fall within the bounds of sociology. In summarizing
Weber's position, Graber writes, "... it is not necessary to
understand the psychological motivations of individuals in
order to undertake a sociological analysis of action."28
If one were to designate the (subjectively 
intended) meaning of the action relationship as 
the "inner side" of human behavior- a questionable 
figure of speech- only then would one be able 
to say that interpretive sociology considers 
each phenomenon exclusively "from the inside out;" 
this however, does not require enumerating its 
physical or psvchic phenomena.29
It is safe to say that, had Parsons examined this essay, he
might have interpreted Weber's position regarding the
subject matter of interpretive sociology more clearly, and
its image might have been more accurate today. For as we
have seen, the "subjective meaning" that Weber designates as
an essential aspect of social action is actually a shared
sense or product of intersubjectivity. It is meaning which
is socially constructed.
27 Ibid., p. 154, (emphasis added).
28 Edith Graber, "Interpretive sociology is not part of 
psychology." Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 45, 1975, p. 67.
29 Max Weber, "Some categories of interpretive 
sociology," 1981, p.153.
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The Experience Called Verstehen 
Given Weber’s explicit distinction between psychology 
and interpretive sociology, it should be clear that the 
method of interpretive sociology, Verstehen. is not at all a. 
psychological method. Nevertheless, to simply say that 
Verstehen is not a psychological method leaves much to the 
imagination regarding its nature and status. The classic 
essay on Verstehen. and the one responsible for the meaning 
which the term denotes in the minds of most social 
scientists, was written by Theodore Abel. Ironically, 
despite the fact that Abel's classic piece has exerted great 
influence on the meaning of Verstehen within sociology, it 
does not at all focus its attention on the concept of 
Verstehen as formulated by Max Weber. Abel mentions Weber 
only once in the essay, making only a passing reference to 
him. As a result, even if Abel's rendering of the meaning 
of Verstehen had been accurate, his interpretation could not 
be taken to be representative of the concept as it is 
formulated by Weber. As for his general interpretation of 
the term, it is now widely agreed that Abel seriously 
misinterpreted the meaning of Verstehen by construing it as 
a social-scientific method concerned with motivational 
analysis. As Munch points out, this rendering of Verstehen 
has made it "an easy target for a killing argument in the
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name of "science" (in the neo-positivist sense)."30
In order to understand Weber's conception of Verstehen 
one must take into account the intellectual climate of his 
day. Weber matured intellectually during a time of great 
methodological debate in German social science and the 
methodological position he was to develop was greatly 
influenced by the controversy. This debate, known as the 
Methodenstreit (methodological controversy) was a 
politically charged debate between the theoretical and 
historical economists.31 While the debate was undoubtedly 
most heated within economic science, the Methodenstreit was 
actually part of a much larger debate which encompassed all 
of the social scientific disciplines in the late part of the 
nineteenth century. The "bone of contention" at the center 
of the more general debate concerned the relationship 
between the human or social sciences and the natural or
30 Peter Munch, "'Sense' and 'intention' in Max Weber's 
theory of social action," 1975, p. 59.
31 For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the 
views of those involved in the Methodenstreit see Mark 
Joseph Goodman, "Type methodology and type myth: Some 
antecedents of Max Weber's approach." Sociological Inquiry,
Vol. 45, 1975, pp. 45-58. For a less laborious reading of 
the controversy and its relevance to Weber see Thomas 
Burger, Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History.
Laws. and Ideal Types (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1976), pp. 140-150. Weber's own position regarding the 
issues of the debate are presented in Roscher and Knies: The 
Logical Problems of Historical Economics. Translated and 
edited by G. Oakes. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1975).
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physical sciences.32 In more common sociological parlance, 
the debate was between historicism and positivism.
The position of the historical school, represented in 
the middle of the nineteenth century by Wilhelm Roscher and 
Karl Knies, and later by Gustav Schmoller, may be summarized 
as follows.33 1) The historical economists argued for an 
inductive, idiographic method, which aimed to explain 
economic behavior by way of detailed ethnographic studies.
2) The historians also believed that there are no universal 
laws of economic behavior, but held that economic 
development occurs in evolutionary stages. 3) They also 
emphasized that not all economic behavior is rational, and 
that its explanation should therefore include data from all 
aspects of human life. 4) Finally, the economic historians 
viewed economics as an ethical discipline, and their 
research was often intended to effect political change.
The position of the theoretical economists, the most 
famous figure of which was Karl Menger,34 contrasts with 
that of the historical school thusly. 1) The theoretical 
economists followed a deductive, nomothetic method of theory
32 Julian Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber.
Translated and by M. Ilford. (New York: Vintage, 1969), 
p. 37.
3 3 The organization of this description follows that of 
J. Turner and L. Beeghley The Emergence of Sociological 
Theory (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1981) pp. 197-201.
34 Karl Menger is credited with discovering economic 
marginal utility theory.
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building. 2) While they conceded that economic theory 
cannot explain every aspect of social action, they argued 
that it can explain general behavioral patterns common to 
all societies, and its aim therefore remained the 
formulation of general economic laws. 3) While they agreed 
with the historians that human life is extremely detailed 
and complex, they responded simply by delineating the scope 
of economic theory narrowly to include only economic 
behavior, which they viewed as behavior oriented toward the 
satisfaction of material needs. 4) And finally, they argued 
that the method of economic analysis must be separated from 
the political intentions of the researcher; that is, the 
researcher must refrain from doing research the purpose of 
which is to support a personal political position.
As Robert John writes, "to the extent that Weber had a 
methodological 'project' it was to winnow out what was 
epistemologically valid from each of these positions."30 
Indeed, Weber's response to the Methodenstreit was 
essentially a selective synthesis of the two competing 
positions. He agreed that, given the complexity and 
variations of human history, social scientists cannot rely 
on their theoretical deduction of general laws, but should 
instead conceptualize their theoretical propositions from
35 Robert John, "Max Weber's epistemology of the 
cultural sciences: Presupposition of 'interpretive 
sociology." The Social Science Journal, Vol. 21 No. 3, 
July, 1984, p. 91.
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descriptive analyses of historical events.36 This means 
that unlike his contemporary Simmel, and Schutz who 
followed, Weber rejects a formal approach to sociology. 
Regarding the "rationality" of human behavior, Weber 
conceptualized social action in broad terms, covering both 
the "rationalist" concerns of the theoretical school, and 
the "non-rational" concerns of the historical school.
Weber's conception of social action took the form of a four­
fold typology which spanned from strictly rational 
(instrumental-rational) action, to non-rational (affectual) 
action. Regarding the relationship between political values 
and social research, Weber sided with Menger and the 
theoretical economists in arguing for a value-free social 
science,3 7
These conclusions of Weber's and other aspects of his 
methodological stance may be viewed as the result of the
36 Weber rejected the historians' view of history as a 
sequence of evolutionary stages.
37 Weber's view of value-free social science, however, 
has been distorted and deserves careful analysis. 
Unfortunately, the value-free question lies beyond the scope 
of this study. We may at least emphasize that it was in 
response to science's inherent limitations regarding 
questions of value that Weber believed that scientists 
should not issue pronouncements of value. While construed 
by some as indicating a commitment to a cold and detached, 
positivistic view of research, Weber's position actually 
reflects a fundamental critique of scientific method's 
inherent limitations. In his lecture "Science as a 
Vocation" Weber quotes Tolstoi in an effort to emphasize 
science’s limitations. See Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 
eds., From Max Weber (New York: Oxford Universiy Press,
1958) pp. 129-156.
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influence exerted on him by Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich
Rickert. We will discuss Dilthey's influence on Weber since
it represents the closest interpretive sociology has come to
direct contact with the hermeneutical tradition.
One of the more direct statements in English regarding
Dilthey*s influence on Weber appears in H. Stuart Hughes'
Consciousness and Society.38
... one of the perplexing things about Weber's 
methodological essays is the absence of any 
sustained analysis of Dilthey's teaching, although 
the references suggest familiarity with it.39
In his long essay on Roscher and Knies, Weber cites Dilthey
extensively, referring the reader to numerous works of his,
including Dilthey*s essay "On the origins of hermeneutics."
However, while Weber never wrote a specific commentary on
Dilthey, it is clear from these notes that Weber had read
his work closely. It should be noted, however, that Weber
does not explicitly acknowledge Dilthey's influence on him
regarding the method of Verstehen. It may very well be the
case that this is because Verstehen. as a methodological
concept, pre-dated Dilthey and was used by other
contemporaries of Weber, such as Simmel and Droysen.
As we discussed in chapter three, Dilthey believed that
the human and natural sciences could be distinguished on the
grounds that their respective subject matter were
38 H. Stuart Hughes Consciousness and Society (New 
York: Knopf, 1958) pp. 309-311.
39 Ibid., p. 309.
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fundamentally different. Owing to this difference, Dilthey 
argued that the human and natural sciences each require 
separate and distinct methodologies. Because the subject 
matter of the natural sciences is factual, its method is one 
of factual explanation. Because the subject matter of the 
human sciences is life itself, which is meaningful, its 
method is one of interpretive-understanding (Verstehen).
This view, however, contrasted sharply with that of 
Windelband and Rickert.40 Unlike Dilthey, Rickert did not 
distinguish human science from natural science on the basis 
of their respective subject matter. Instead, Rickert "... 
viewed science as science, whether it it deals with mental, 
social, or physical phenomena."41 According to Rickert, the 
difference between the two pertained not to a difference of 
subject matter, but rather, to the method they pursued.42
Following Dilthey, Weber acknowledges the subjective 
dimensions of social action and therefore places the
40 Where Dilthey may be considered a neo-idealist, in a 
Hegelian sense, Rickert and Windelband were neo-Kantians. 
Rickert was Weber's mentor at Heidelberg.
41 Don Martindale The Nature and Types of Sociological 
Theory. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960) p. 381.
4 2 Describing Rickert's position Goodman writes, 
"scientific differences were analytic, depending on the 
criteria which disciplines employed in organizing concepts 
from primary data." See Goodman "Type methodology and type 
myth: Some antecedents of Max Weber's approach," 1975, p.
53. A less cryptic statement of Rickert's position is 
Martindale's: "Nature is all of one piece, but nature may be 
studied as science or as history, requiring a different 
formation of concepts in each case.” The Nature and Types of 
Sociological Theory. 1960, p. 379.
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importance of meaning at the center of his interpretive 
sociology. Weber, however, rejects Dilthey's distinction 
between the human and natural sciences, and like Rickert, 
views the difference between the two as one of method or 
concept formation. In defining meaningful social action as 
interpretive sociology's unit of analysis, Weber was faced 
with conceptualizing a method capable of grasping the 
interpretive dimensions of social action. It should be 
clear, then, that Weber’s conceptualization of Verstehen was 
the result of his critical encounter with the issues of the 
Methodenstreit. and the related debate between Dilthey and 
Rickert. By working through these complex and competing 
positions Weber arrived at a comprehensive, post­
positivist, conception of sociology.
In his essay on Roscher and Knies, Weber comments 
extensively on the concept of Verstehen. In light of our 
earlier discussion of Heidegger's and Gadamer's radical 
break from traditional hermeneutics, these comments are 
remarkable in that they suggest that Weber had himself 
viewed understanding first as our primary way of relating to 
the world, and only secondarily as a social scientific 
method.
In the section of the work entitled "'Understanding' and 
'Interpretation' in the Work of Simmel," Weber criticizes 
Simmel's position on Verstehen and expresses a view 
compatible with that of Heidegger and Gadamer.
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In Simmel's view, the first form of "understanding" 
appears only when the issue concerns theoretical 
knowledge. the presentation of substantive matters 
in a logical form. Because it is knowledge, it could 
be verified in exactly the same sense in which it 
was discovered. This is not quite right. In some 
cases, the purpose of understanding speech is not 
to produce a theoretical interpretation, but rather 
to produce feelings and actions which prove to be 
immediately "practical."43
Weber provides three examples of instances when the purpose
of understanding speech is not to produce a theoretical
interpretation: ”... receipt of and compliance with an
order, an appeal to conscience, or an appeal to the value
feelings and value judgments of the listener.”44
These are normal events typical of the "subject of real life
who desires and evaluates." Weber writes, "'interpretation'
in this sense is a thoroughly secondary category, indigenous
to the artifical world of science."
In any case .... the following view seems to me to be 
erroneous: that this sort of "understanding" is found 
only in the domain of "objective knowledge." The 
decisive point is as follows: these cases of 
"understanding"- the understanding of an order, a 
question, a claim, an appeal to sympathy, patriotism, 
etc.- are concerned with a process which takes place 
within the sphere of the "commitments of everyday 
life"- if I may employ Munsterberg's terminology, which 
is quite useful in this context.40
It is clear, then, that Weber has an ontological view of
quotidian understanding; that is, he views understanding as
a practical relation which is pre-theroatic and pre-
43 Max Weber, Roscher and Knies. 1975, p. 152.
44 Ibid., p. 152.
43 Ibid., p. 153.
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methodological. Weber does, however, go on to draw a 
distinction between ontological understanding, and 
methodological interpretation, which he views as the method 
of the sociologist; for Weber writes, "'interpretation' in 
the sense in which we are concerned with it has nothing to 
do with this 'quotidian' understanding."46 Weber thus 
introduces a categorical distinction between quotidian 
understanding and sociological interpretation, taking 
Verstehen to refer to the latter, which he defines as a 
method comprising both understanding and interpretation. 
Weber's conception of Verstehen is therefore actually a 
twofold concept. In specifying this distinction he 
contrasts erklarendes Verstehen with actuelles Verstehen. 
which is actually a distinction between explanation and 
understanding. Actuelles Verstehen. or understanding, 
refers to the common understanding (quotidian) we all have 
simply by virtue of our position within a historical- 
linguistical tradition. This aspect of Verstehen is the 
primary mode of understanding from which theoretical 
knowledge is derived. It is that which Weber distinguishes 
from 'interpretation" in the excerpt from his essay on 
Roscher and Knies, which we have just discussed. In 
actuelles Verstehen or common understanding, "meaning is
46 Ibid., pp. 153-154.
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immediately apparent;"47 it therefore does not require any 
theoretical or thematic modification. But as Weber states 
throughout his methodological writings, while this type of 
understanding is necessary, it is not sufficient for the 
task of sociology. In addition to simply describing what is 
readily apparent through understanding the interpretive 
sociologist aims to explain why a particular behavior came 
about. In order to do this, one must construct analytical 
concepts and explore their inter-relationships. Strictly 
speaking, actuelles Verstehen "is concerned with 
understanding the meaning of a given act."48 Its goal is to 
understand what a social actor is doing. By contrast, 
erklarendes Verstehen is concerned with the reasons behind 
social action, its "motivation."49 Its goal is to explain 
why a social actor has done what he or she has done.
Weber's conception of Verstehen is therefore a 
methodological activity which aims to grasp the what and why 
of social action and human history.
It is clear, then, that while Weber acknowledges the 
validity and importance of quotidian understanding, his view 
of Verstehen is one of a conceptual method which is to be
47 This is the description provided by Dallmayr and 
McCarthy in the introduction to their discussion of Weber in 
Understanding and Human Inquiry. 1977, pp. 20-21.
48 Diana Leat, "Misunderstanding Verstehen." 
Sociological Review, Vol. 20, 1972 p. 33.
49 Dallmayr and McCarthy, Understanding and Human 
Inquiry. 1977, p. 21.
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applied to study social action. It is nevertheless the case 
that Weber shares Heidegger's and Gadamer's view of 
theoretical knowledge as derivative of understanding, 
viewing it as something to be used within the "artificial 
world of science." That this is the case may be further 
supported by examining Weber's view of concept formation. 
According to Weber, since reality is manifold and cannot be 
completely grasped, conceptualization invariably involves 
the selection of various aspects of reality. Concept 
formation therefore involves selective choice, and selective 
choice invariably is influenced according to one's personal 
values. This means that quotidian understanding is always 
part of thematized or conceptual understanding.
When Weber's conception is broken down into its 
constituent parts we must ask, however, in what sense is 
explanation different from understanding? It is absurd to 
think that in the realm of everyday life social actors are 
at a loss when it comes to explaining why someone has done 
this or that. While it is true that quotidian explanations 
are often erroneous, this does not warrant their analytical 
separation from understanding. We will recall that 
Gadamer's view of the ontological status of understanding 
involves practical application, that is, the notion that 
understanding enables us to make practical decisions in 
everyday life. While Weber must be commended for grasping 
the constitutive significance of quotidian understanding for
2 2 6
topic selection and concept formation, he errs in his
support of the abstract distinction between understanding
and explanation.
The main injustice done to Weber's conception of
Verstehen stems from the exaggerated emphasis which Parsons
and Abel place on erklarendes Verstehen. which is, as we
have demonstrated, only one part of Verstehen.
The conclusion reached by Abel concerning the role of 
Verstehen in sociological investigation and explanation 
is based upon an inadequate conception of the notion of 
Verstehen. Abel conceives of it solely in terms of 
imputing motivational sequences to actors in given 
situations. He deals only with what Weber terms 
erklarendes Verstehen.00
As a result of Abel's onesided interpretation of Verstehen.
its meaning within sociology has been confused and
distorted. The "ruling orthodoxy" regarding the meaning of
Verstehen is one which takes it to be a process of
empathetic introspection. This view is described by
McCarthy as follows.
Verstehen .... amounts to the heuristic employment 
of sympathetic imagination in the attempt to 
interpolate motives into observed behavior sequences.
It is not itself a mode of knowledge of social 
phenomena, nor is it a method of verification. As 
a heuristic device its functions are to suggest 
hypotheses and to relieve apprehension in the face 
of the unfamiliar.81
Interestingly, in Abel's most recent reply to his
00 Leat, "Misunderstanding Verstehen," 1972, p. 32.
51 Thomas McCarthy, "On misunderstanding 
'understanding'." Theory and Decision 3, 1973, pp. 353-354.
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critics,02 he acknowledges the fact that his classic
critique of the concept of Verstehen had focused on only one
of its aspects. He then argues, however, that it was not
his intention to write about the "interpretation of
meaning," but only, "motivational understanding." He then
proposes the following distinction.
I propose that we draw a distinction between the 
two major areas covered by the German meaning of the 
term Verstehen as follows: We designate motivational 
understanding as Verstehen I . and the interpretation 
of meaning as Verstehen II. It is then immediately 
clear ... that I deal with Verstehen I, while Winch 
and Gadamer deal with Verstehen II.03
Abel goes on to claim that what Winch and Gadamer say about
Verstehen II "does not contradict what I have said about
Verstehen I: and that, furthermore, my commitment to the
points I made about Verstehen I does not prevent me from
acknowledging the validity and importance of the points they
make about Verstehen II.34
However, while it is encouraging that Abel acknowledges
that "Verstehen I ... would not bi possible without
Verstehen II."08 he is incorrect in assuming that this does
not contradict his present view of Verstehen I. for the very
fact that he dichotomizes Verstehen along the lines of the
32 Theodor Abel "Verstehen I and Vertsehen II." Theory 
and Decision, Vol. 6, 1975, pp. 99-102.
03 Ibid., p. 99.
04 Ibid., p. 99.
33 Ibid., p. 100.
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traditional distinction between understanding and 
explanation indicates that he continues to misunderstand the 
nature of understanding and interpretation. In light of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics it makes little sense to draw a 
distinction between two parts of what is esssentially the 
same process. Even to suggest discussing one as separate 
from the other is therefore problematic, regardless of the 
words one weaves about the function and purpose of each. In 
addition, by overlooking Weber's comprehensive conception of 
Verstehen Abel fails to grasp that Verstehen is not a 
psychological process involving empathy. Moreover, where 
Gadamer, and also Weber, view personal experience as the 
condition of the "operation," Abel mistakenly construes it 
as an obstacle to scientific understanding. In Weber's 
view, the "scientific" implications of the constitutive 
significance of personal experience for concept formation 
simply mean that the process itself is value-laden. Abel 
makes the traditional mistake of viewing personal experience 
as having a "contaminating" effect on the "objective" status 
of the scientist. More importantly, however, is Abel’s 
blindness regarding the relationship between what he terms 
Verstehen I and Verstehen II. which are not at all separate 
and distinct phenomena but instead are part of human 
experience itself. The operation called Verstehen is not an 
operation at all, but an experience.
We may now summarize Weber's view of interpretive
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sociology and compare it to Gadamer's hermeneutics.
According to Heber, the aim of interpretive sociology is to 
understand and explain the meaning of social action. Social 
action is meaningful, not in a psychological sense, but in 
the sense that it takes place within a social context which 
is itself meaningful. What makes the social context or 
world meaningful is that within it we are related to other 
human beings and our action takes into account their 
behavioral expectations. This "taking into account" is not 
a psychological operation, but the general sense provided by 
our experience of social relations. Social reality is 
therefore constituted through interpretive social action; 
and this means that the role played by understanding and 
interpretation is of central importance to sociology. It 
also means that Gadamer1s analysis of the nature of 
interpretation may be pursued for the light it may be able 
to shed on the constitution of social reality.
While Weber conceives Verstehen as a methodological 
operation, a close examination®6 reveals that he views the 
method of Verstehen as a derivative of a more primary mode 
of understanding which is part of our common experience.
That this is the case can be further supported through 
reference to Weber's "value-relation" notion. It is because 
methodological explanation always involves understanding
36 The "close examination" to which I refer is our 
discussion of his comments presented in his work on Roscher 
and Knies.
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that values are acknowledged by Weber to be implicit in the 
act of concept building. During the process of constructing 
ideal-types for purposes of explanation, the researcher must 
select certain characteristics of phenomena and ignore 
others. The criteria guiding such decisions are not 
scientific but instead result from one's own common sense 
and value-orientation. The value-ladenness of concept 
formation is therefore inescapable, just as interpretation 
is always laden by prejudices. The fundamental difference 
between Weber and Gadamer is that Weber views prejudices as 
limiting while Gadamer views them as enabling.
Weber wanted to study social action, and he viewed this 
as a scientific endeavor. He did not study the nature of 
interpretation, but, following Dilthey, identified 
interpretation as an essential part of social action. That 
his emphasis regarding the nature of interpretation fell 
largely on its importance for matters methodological is 
understandable in light of the intellectual climate of his 
day. Our study of Weber's conception of interpretation does 
not support the view that Weber required of sociologists a 
"controlled distanciation,” as it is sometimes called; the 
belief that we can suspend our quotidian biases a la 
Descartes. This is as much an impossibility in the work of 
Weber as it is in the work of Gadamer. Nevertheless, it is 
true that Weber had a strictly methodological view of 
hermeneutics owing to his rationalist view of the
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constitutive effect of one's values or prejudices, and this 
sets him apart fundamentally from Gadamer. In addition, it 
is interesting that in spite of the importance which Weber 
attributes to quotidian understanding, both in the context 
of the construction of social action and the process of 
concept formation, Weber does not concentrate on studying 
the interpretive dimensions of social action so much as he 
concentrates on the interpretive dimensions of doing 
sociology. Moreover, he never took upon himself the task of 
studying the nature of interpretation itself. As we will 
now see, this task became the central concern of Alfred 
Schutz.
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Alfred Schutz and the 
Phenomenology of the Social World 
Weber's project of developing an interpretive sociology 
was taken up and further developed by Alfred Schutz. It is 
Schutz's contention that while Weber correctly identified 
the subject matter of interpretive sociology, he failed to 
rigorously ground such key concepts as "meaning" and 
"action." Schutz's project therefore takes as its task the 
philosophical grounding of interpretive sociology. To do 
this, he draws heavily on the phenomenological writings of 
Edmund Husserl. However, as we shall see, his decision to 
ground interpretive sociology in strict phenomenology is 
problematic, for it leads him to a reductionist 
(subjectivist) conception of interpretive experience.
In the most systematic statement of his project07 Schutz 
states that his study is the result of "an intensive concern 
of many years' duration with the theoretical writings of Max 
Weber."08 Schutz's point of departure is the notion that
07 Alfred Schutz's most comprehensive statement of his 
work is found in The Phenomenology of the Social World, 
translated by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press, 1967, originally published in 
German in 1932).
00 Ibid., p. xxxi. It should be noted, however, that 
while Schutz describes his familiarity with Weber as an 
"intensive concern," he bases his assessment of Weber's 
position exclusively on Economy and Society, ignoring the 
early essays which have already been demonstrated to be of 
crucial importance. Nevertheless, in so far as Schutz's 
critique of Weber focuses for the most part on what Weber 
did not concern himself with, this shortcoming does not 
appear to have serious consequences for Schutz's study.
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Weber's conception of subjective meaning calls for
theoretical scrutiny, for as Weber left the concept, "it was
little more than a heading for a number of important
problems which he did not examine in detail, even though
they were hardly foreign to him."09 Schutz points out that
while Weber is correct in identifying the subject matter of
sociology as meaningful social action, he fails to study
precisely what meaningful social action is.
It is at this point that the theoretical limitations of
Weber become evident. He breaks off his analysis of 
the social world when he arrives at what he assumes to 
be the basic and irreducible elements of social 
phenomena. But he is wrong in his assumption. His 
concept of the meaningful act of the individual- the 
key idea of interpretive sociology- by no means defines 
a primitive, as he thinks it does. It is, on the 
contrary, a mere label for a highly complex and 
ramified area that calls for much further study.60
There is no question that Schutz is correct in this point
regarding the limitations of Weber's conception of
meaningful social action. While Weber distinguishes
"intended meaning" from "objectively knowable meaning"
he fails to explain 1) the constitution of meaning in the
individual, 2) and the modification of meaning by social
actors.61 In essence, Weber fails to examine the nature of
interpretation itself. It is revealing of Schutz's
09 Ibid., p. xxxi.
60 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
61 What Weber does not do with respect to the process
of interpretation is listed rather lengthily by Schutz on
page 8 of The Phenomenology of the Social World. We will
discuss only the most important of these in our discussion.
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intentions that he accuses Weber of "naively" taking for 
granted the "meaningful phenomena of the social world as a 
matter of intersubiective agreement in precisely the same 
way as we all in daily life assume the existence of a lawful 
external world conforming to the concepts of our 
understanding."62 Through this observation Schutz stumbles 
upon an aspect of social action that had thus far eluded 
sociological scrutiny. This aspect is the taken-for-granted 
nature of knowledge in everyday life.
Schutz points out that Weber's oversight of the 
importance of the nature of interpretation and meaning is 
understandable because such concerns are typically taken for 
granted by all of us. However, when such assumptions are 
taken-for-granted by the social scientist they have a way of 
"taking their revenge." It is imperative, therefore, that 
the social scientist inquire into such matters. This leads 
Schutz to a more primary point, however, for if social 
phenomena are constituted in part by commen-sense concepts, 
it is clear that it will not do for sociology to abstain 
from a scientific examination of these "self-evident" 
ideas.63 This point is crucial, for it means that not only 
must sociologists study their own taken for granted 
assumptions but they must study the taken-for-granted 
assumptions that constitute meaning in social action itself.
62 Ibid., p. 9.
63 Ibid., p. 9.
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This is to be done by studying the nature of the
interpretive procedures constitutive of understanding.
This is truly Schutz*s most important contribution to
interpretive sociology, for it shifts its focus from
meaningful social action to interpretation itself. The
significance of this should not be taken lightly.
Summarizing Schutz*s move, Bauman states
it is our interpretive activity which gives us the 
real understanding of whatever we experience. Hence 
the proper subject-matter of an 'understanding' 
sociology ... is the study of interpretive procedures 
in which meanings are being established in the world of 
everyday life. This is a statement of truly 
revolutionary consequences ... They mean nothing less 
than a radical redistribution of roles assigned to the 
various units constituting a sociological discourse.64
Instead of attempting to discover the meaning in social
behavior, Schutz directs us instead to focus on the
interpretive construction of meaning. While in defining
meaningful social action as interpretive sociology's unit of
analysis, Weber acknowledges the importance of
interpretation. His examination of interpretation is
generally limited to the interpretive-methodological
concerns of the sociologist. Schutz re-directs the
attention of interpretive sociology away from its own
methodological preoccupations toward the study of
interpretation in society at large. This move is supported
64 Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science. 1978, p. 
180. Bauman also draws a parallel between Heidegger’s and 
Schutz's respective views of the constitutive importance of 
understanding for experience.
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by the argument that the reality constructed on the basis of 
the interpretations of social actors is more important than 
the interpretation of that reality within sociology. After 
all, argues Schutz, the structuring of society is more 
primarily related to the social construction of reality, not 
to the sociological construction of what has already been 
constructed. This is, perhaps, the most important aspect of 
Schutz's work for our purposes, for it helps clear the way 
for establishing the sociological study of prejudices and 
hermeneutical reflection throughout society itself.
In the course of his analysis Schutz concludes that 
interpretation has a taken-for-granted nature. That is, we 
live in a routinized world and, in the words of Bauman, 
"routine does not occasion analysis."68 We expect things to 
conform to our expectations of them and they usually do. We 
typically have no reason to question reality and our 
interpretation of it, so both are typically left 
unquestioned. This view parallels Mead's thoughts on 
reflectivity, which we discussed in chapter two. It is only 
when we have a reason to question our assumptions of reality 
that we actually do so. In Mead, such reasons are 
exclusively pragmatic: we reflect in order to conceptualize 
an alternative course of behavior in an effort to overcome 
obstacles blocking the attainment of a particular goal.
With regard to the requisites for questioning our
68 Ibid., p. 177.
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assumptions of reality Schutz's view is funadamentally the
same as Mead's.
The taken-for-granted (das Fraqlos-qeaeben) is always 
that particular level of experience which presents 
itself as not in need of further analysis. Whether 
a level of experience is thus taken for granted depends 
on the pragmatic interest of the reflective glance 
which is directed upon it.66
The taken-for-granted nature of interpretive experience
suggests that social reality is constructed conventionally,
that is, constructed according to how it has been
constructed in the absence of any pragmatic reason to
construct it otherwise. This theoretical insight has found
empirical support through the efforts of ethnomethodology.67
While Schutz*s work is exclusively philosophical, in
Garfinkel we find a commitment to the empirical study of the
interpretive practices which Schutz formally identifies.
The importance of ethnomethodology, for our purposes, is
simply that it provides empirical evidence for the
theoretical insight that social action is typically guided
by tacit meanings, interpretive assumptions generally
unchallenged in daily life, and the fact that the
66 Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World. 1967, 
p. 74.
67 Following Schutz's emigration to the United States 
his ideas began to influence American sociologists, the most 
famous being a student of Talcott Parsons named Harold 
Garfinkel. Garfinkel drew from Schutz, and later from the 
natural language philosophers, to pioneer the movement known 
as ethnomethodology. While ethnomethodology was developed 
by an American and has been influenced by the analytic 
philosophy, its roots lie principally within the German 
tradition.
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interruption of routine is met by a determined effort to re­
establish a sense of conventionality or normalcy. This 
insight is particularly significant when considered in light 
of Gadamer's notion of the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation. For if our interpretations are typically 
taken-for-granted and assumed to be true barring any 
"pragmatic interest" or practical reason to view them 
otherwise, then the prejudices constitutive of experience 
are likely to be left alone and unquestioned. This means 
that social reality is likely to be constituted by a 
considerable amount of false prejudices that are typically 
left unchallenged. We will explore the significance of this 
in our final chapter and more closely contrast Garfinkel's 
project with that of Gadamer's hermeneutics.
So far we have focused on the accomplishments of 
Schutz's work for the forwarding of interpretive sociology. 
These accomplishments, however, are tainted by a number of 
theoretical shortcomings. While these shortcomings do not 
undermine the Schutzian insights we have already discussed, 
they do severely limit the application of his more general 
theory to the study of interpretation within sociology. We 
will begin our discussion of Schutz's theoretical 
deficiencies by discussing his point of departure and the 
grounding of his theory in the work of Edmund Husserl.
In order to clear the way for interpretive sociology's 
new task Schutz believes he must first examine the nature of
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interpretation through rigorous philosophical analysis. In 
Schutz' work, this analysis takes the form of 
phenomenological analysis in a strict Husserlian sense. As 
we shall see, Schutz's move to follow Husserl leads him into 
an analysis of interpretation which is subjective and 
solipistic; and this proves devastating for his project as a 
whole.
As Zeitlin points out, the meaning of the term 
"phenomenology" is ambiguous and unclear within sociology.68 
Let us therefore begin by attempting to de-mystify the term. 
Husserl used the term to denote a rigorous method of 
analysis which he believes could provide an ultimate 
foundation for both science and philosophy. He realized, 
like Descartes before him, that our consciousness contains 
many ideas which are uninvited; ideas resulting from common 
experience, enculturation, and the like. Husserl believed 
that through radical reflection we can put aside or 
"bracket" such ideas, thereby enabling us to see the essence 
of things themselves aside from their immediate appearance.
The term phenomenology as it is typically used nowadays 
does not refer to this strict Husserlian formulation, and 
the notion of "bracketing" our historicity is generally 
written off as an absurdity. Phenomenology instead refers 
to a general method whereby the researcher seeks to move
60 See Irving Zeitlin's chapter on phenomenology in
Rethinking Sociology: A Critique of Contemporary Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
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beyond the immediate appearance of things by describing 
their underlying history. Gadamer's approach in Truth and 
Method may be termed "phenomenological" in so far as he 
inquires into the meaning of linguistical concepts by 
describing the historical conditions underlying their 
development.69 In this manner he is able to go beyond, or 
"transcend" the immediate appearance of such concepts as 
"prejudice” and "authority." This is the general sense in 
which the term phenomenology is now typically used.
In Husserl's later work the common world of appearances 
within which we all reside is termed the Lebenswelt. or 
life-world. The life-world is that which constitutes our 
natural attitude or world-view. In order to do "science" 
Husserl believed that the life-world must be bracketed, for 
he believed that the ideas and notions it contains would 
contaminate the objective discernment of reality which is 
science's aim. Schutz, however, reverses this formula. 
Sociologists, rather than "bracketing" the life-world, must 
instead take it as their object of study, for the content of 
life-worlds are constitutive of social action. In 
summarizing Schutz's conception of the life-world, Bauman 
writes, "the life-world ... includes everything which is 
taken-for-granted, and normally not reflected upon, in the
69 Gadamer, in fact, describes his approach as 
phenomenological in the preface to Truth and Method.
241
attitude of common sense."70 Brockelman describes the 
life-world as the "unquestioned, unformulated, preconceptual 
and naively-accepted context (which exists) behind and 
before any and all discursive or symbolic representations of 
it."71 The life-world, which for Husserl is an "obstacle' 
to scientific research, becomes in Schutz the central focus 
of sociological analysis.
It should be clear, then, why Schutz terms his 
interpretive sociology "phenomenological," for he views its 
aim as the description of the interpretive procedures which 
provide us with our life-world, which consists of the taken- 
for-granted knowledge of everyday life. Phenomeno­
logical sociology therefore involves the descriptive 
illumination of the structure of our interpretation of 
reality. It should be emphasized that Schutz is not 
concerned with the meaning-content of these interpretive 
procedures, but rather, with the structural or formal 
procedures themselves. His concern is thus a formal and 
abstract one, incapable of providing insight into the nature 
and truth status of prejudices. We will come back to this 
point later in our discussion.
That Schutz is on target in his general intentions
70 Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science. 1978, p.
175.
71 Paul T. Brockelman, Existential Phenomenology and 
the World of Ordinary Experience: An Introduction. 1980, p. 
47.
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regarding Husserl is generally agreed. By inverting
Husserl’s position regarding the life-world Schutz succeeds
in establishing the central importance of common-knowledge
for interpretive sociology. However, while Schutz rejects
Husserl's pejorative view of the life-world, he nevertheless
follows Husserl's conceptualization regarding its
transcendental constitution, and this is crucial.
In Husserl's view, the life-world is transcendentally
constituted in internal time consciousness. What does this
mean? According to Husserl, because we exist in time we can
only consciously perceive the meaning of an experience by
looking back, if you will, toward the stream and flow of
experiences. In Schutz's words, we exist in a "flow of
duration" during which time "we encounter only
undifferentiated experiences that melt into one another in a
flowing continuum."72 Through reflection, however, we are
able to distinguish among experiences and perceive elapsed
experiences as objects of attention. But this means that we
do not actually perceive the present as meaningful; only
that which has already passed. In Schutz's words,
only the already experienced is meaningful, not that 
which is being experienced. For meaning is merely an 
operation of intentionality, which, however, only 
becomes visible to the reflective glance.73
72 Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World. 1967, 
p. 51. Schutz's notion of duration is taken over from 
Bergson.
73 Ibid., p. 52.
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How, then, does the elapsed experience that escapes the 
light of reflection come to be part of our biography, part 
of our life-world? According to Husserl, our actual 
behavior, as it is taking place, is perceived by us as 
"prephenomenal117 4 experience and this perception is provided 
by what Husserl terms "internal time-consciousness."
Internal time-consciousness thus refers to the subjective 
and transcendental constitution of prephenomenal experience, 
our ability to perceive experience as it occurs prior to 
consciously reflecting upon it. This means that the 
perception of reality as a tangible flow, rather than a 
maddening barrage of stimuli, is provided by our internal 
time-consciousness. Internal time-consciousness is 
therefore responsible for constituting, pre-refectively or 
pre-consciously, the life-world and the identity of the 
individual. This means that the life-world and the identity 
of the individual are both subjectively constituted. This 
is why, in Schutz' view, each of us has his/her own life- 
world. Society is therefore a plurality of life-worlds, 
plural, and reality the sum of prephenomenal perception and 
its conscious appropriation.
In light of Gadamer's hermeneutics, Schutz's adoption of 
Husserl's view of the subjective and transcendental 
constitution of experience is extremely problematic. First, 
by following Husserl in viewing life-worlds as subjectively
74 Ibid., p. 56.
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constituted, Schutz in effect purges interpretation of its
inherently social. linauistical. and historical dimensions.
This has devastating consequences for his more general view
of interpretive sociology. His failure to account for the
inherently social nature of interpretation leaves his
notions of "typifications" and "stocks of knowledge" as
little more than abstract, disembodied concepts. When one
constitutes one's own world of meaning then we have to
wonder what becomes of intersubjectivity and society in
general. The nature of intersubjectivity is a question
which Schutz cannot adequately answer.
This shortcoming has been emphasized by a number of
thinkers and has often been viewed as sufficient cause for
rejecting other aspects of Schutz's approach to interpretive
sociology. Perinbanayagam, for example, sets out to
discover the "other" in Schutz's work, but comes up empty.
The other is perceived as an entity but it does not 
seem to want to participate in any joint action, in the 
creation of the social act, in the arrival at a common 
definition of selves and situations. In fact, the 
nature of the entity doing the perceiving of the 
other's activities is left a total mystery: it is said 
to be constituting the other as well as the world, but 
who and how it was constituted and sustained is never 
made clear. It appears to be a Schutzian a priori, 
thus denying the validity of the processes of 
socialization and the self as a social and 
interpersonal emergent.75
Perinbanayagam echoes here a common criticism of Schutz,
one which attacks him for viewing the subject as an isolated
75 Robert S. Perinbanayagam, Signifying Acts. 1985, p.
139.
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ego; an ego which does not co-exist in a social situation so
much as it exists in a state of detached co-presence.
Perinbanayagam sums up his criticism of Schutz as follows.
The monads in Schutz’s world indeed have windows, but 
they are equipped with one-way mirrors that let them 
look out but do not let any light in.76
Giddens' criticism of Schutz is not much more sympathetic.
Giddens writes that Schutz's work
retains the umbilical tie to the subjectivity of the 
ego .... and makes no attempt at all to confront the 
residual problem of intersubjectivity in his exegesis 
of Husserl's writings.77
Moreover, Giddens criticizes Schutz for dwelling on the
"conditions" of action while ignoring the "consequences" of
action. Giddens attributes this to Schutz's overly abstract
and formalistic approach. Schutz's descriptions are
generally theoretical deductions derived from Husserl’s
philosophy. As such they are formal constructs which
contain only a distant echo of the ontological and
historical facticity of social action. In Bauman's view
Schutz's sociology takes the same stance toward 
social world as Kant took toward knowledge in 
general: it wants to cogitate the conditions under 
which any object may acquire its 'whatness,' or any 
cultural fact may attain its individuality.70
This means that Schutz is not at all concerned with specific
70 Ibid., p. 143.
77 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. 1976, p.
31.
78 Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science. 1978, p.
187.
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historical and social events or meanings. It is a strictly
formal approach to the structure of interpretation. Being
formalistic, Schutz's concepts are incapable of supporting
analyses into the meaning of power and domination. The fate
of his sociology is therefore one of sterility and political
impotence. In The Phenomenology of the Social World Schutz
re-affirms the importance of Weber's call for a value-free
sociology, but apparently mistakes Weber's position to mean
that one should not study matters of real importance. In
going beyond Weber to provide a philosophical foundation for
interpretive sociology, Schutz never returns, remaining
instead within a Husserlian world of abstract ideas.
Not all theorists, however, believe that Schutz's
following of Husserl is problematic. Martindale, for
example, sees no problem with Schutz's adoption of Husserl's
transcendental ego, and in fact, claims that Schutz actually
escapes the solipism of Husserl. While it may be true that,
on a technical-philosophical level Schutz has failed to
account for the inherently social nature of interpretive
experience, Martindale is willing to excuse Schutz's failure
on the grounds that what Schutz has left out needs no
accounting for.
In following Weber's lead, Schutz avoided Husserl’s 
problem of solipsism. If we retain the natural 
attitude as people among people, the existence of 
others is no more questionable to us than the existence
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of an outer world.79 
Martindale thus suggests that, given the fact that that 
which is in question, our inherent sociality, is obvious to 
all, the critique of Schutz which we have discussed is an 
exaggeration. But what is at issue here is not whether one 
tends to question the existence of the other, but rather, 
the question of the constitutive importance of one for the 
understanding of another. In Schutz the presence of the 
other has only minimal importance. Given the formal nature 
of his view of individual consciousness, Schutz describes 
intersubjectivity as a state of parallel consciences, all of 
which assume the others to have the same basic mechanism 
with which to view reality. This is contrasted with the 
work of Mead, whom we will discuss shortly, who views the 
presence of the other as necessary to the formation of the 
self and its interpretation. In Gadamer, our understanding 
is defined in terms of our practical social relations and 
participation in a linguistic tradition. Gadamer, 
therefore, like Mead, views history as constitutive of 
biography; society as constitutive of personality.
In our view Schutz's failure to account for the inherent 
sociality of individuals is problematic not because it 
suggests poor scholarship or a lack of creativity, but 
because it is incapable of furthering our goal of
7 9 Don Martindale, The Mature and Types of Sociological 
Method (New York: Harper and Row, 1988) p. 584.
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establishing the practical implications of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. We exist in a world of incredible cultural 
and social diversity. In such a world it is the semantical 
and experiential differences and similarities that matter; 
not the fact that we all begin and end our existence, for 
all intents and purposes, with the same cognitive mechanism. 
But it is with a cognitive mechanism that Schutz's concerns 
lie. Such concerns are for psychologists and biologists.
The same criticism pertains to Habermas, who prefers to 
ponder the "apparatus" and formal structure of language 
rather than study its content and the prejudices which it 
carries. However, it is our bias that sociologists must 
concern themselves with the differences that make a 
difference, such as the social distribution of true and 
false prejudices, and the social stratification of 
opportunities to reflect hermeneutically. Schutz's 
formalistic descriptions of the function of schematized 
knowledge, and Habermas' concern over communicative 
competence therefore offer us precious little. The same is 
true of ethnomethodology, which may be described as a 
radical empirical project based on Schutz's sociology of 
knowledge. Ethnomethodology is equally formalistic, vacuous 
and politically impotent.80 In the words of Bauman,
8 0 See Giddens' discussion of ethnomethodology in New 
Rules of Sociological Method, 1976. See also Bauman's 
discussion of the development of ethnomethodology in 
Hermeneutics and Social Science. 1978.
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people begin to feel the need to understand when their 
intentions are defied and hopes dashed. The demand to 
understand arises from the hopelessness experienced 
when the meaning of human plight is opaque and the 
reason for suffering impenetrable. Schutz’s detailed 
explanation why such an opacity is a transcendental 
condition of the life-world helps as much as a 
painstaking description of the technology of making 
nooses helps the convict overcome his fear of the 
gallows.8 1
81 Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science. 1978, 
p. 193.
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Interactionism and George Herbert Mead
The American strain of interpretive sociology is an 
outgrowth of a social-philosophical movement known as 
interactionism. This movement paralleled the growth of 
pragmatism and emerged from the work of William James, John 
Dewey, James Baldwin, W. I. Thomas and others. Among this 
group, however, the most influential thinker for American 
interpretive sociology is George Herbert Mead. His primary 
influence is attributed to the fact that 1) many of his 
students at the University of Chicago later became 
successful and influential sociologists and 2) his teachings 
and unpublished writings were put together in book form at a 
time when much of interactionism was still very much an oral 
tradition.8 2
George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) was one of four primary
figures of the American philosophical movement known as
"pragmatism." The term "pragmatism" was coined by Charles 
Sanders Peirce to denote a practical approach to questions 
of truth and mind. Like his fellow pragmatists, Mead viewed 
mind not as an entity or object, but as a process. In this 
sense Mead is similar to Hegel. Mead's approach was in fact 
a synthesis of Hegelian and Darwinian ideas, and he
ultimately came to view the emergence of mind or
8 2 This second point is made by Manford Kuhn in his
essay "Major trends in symbolic interaction in the past
twenty-five years." Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 5, 1964,
pp. 61-84.
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consciousness as an adaptive response to a difficult natural 
environment. In Mead's view, mind provides humans with an 
advantage in that it enables us to manipulate our 
environment in abstract and complex ways. To Mead, then, 
mind is an extremely important process which enables us to 
change and shape the world we live in by enabling us to make 
decisions regarding behavioral choices.
Although Mead was first and foremost a philosopher, his 
work has had a great impact on sociology. Mead taught a 
seminar in social-psychology at the University of Chicago at 
a time when American sociology was becoming an important and 
popular field of study (approximately 1905-1930), and many 
graduate students of sociology attended his seminar, which 
over the years had become famous. His teachings thus proved 
seminal for the development of American sociology as many of 
his students went on to become influential sociologists.
Mead never published a book. However, following his 
death a number of his graduate students put together 
collections of his lecture notes and, with the help of the 
University of Chicago, published four volumes of his ideas 
and theoretical contributions.83 Among these works, the 
most widely read by far has been Mind. Self and Society.
83 In addition to Mind. Self and Society and The 
Philosophy of the Act, see The Philosophy of the Present, 
ed. Arthur E. Murphy (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 
1932); and Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 
ed. Merritt H. Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1936).
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This work contains Mead's classic theoretical contribution 
to sociology. This contribution pertains to sociology's 
central question: how are we to conceptualize the 
relationship between the individual and society? That is, 
how can we understand the relationship between our personal 
lives and action, and the larger historical or social forces 
which affect them? In order to answer this question Mead 
would have to explain the nature of mind and its 
relationship to social behavior.
In Mead's day the analysis of mind fell within the 
province of psychology, which was dominated at that time by 
behaviorism. Mead's task thus took the form of social- 
psychology; his point of departure being the work of Watson. 
The behaviorists viewed the mind as a black box, as a 
mystery the contents of which could not be studied 
scientifically. Owing to this view of mind behaviorists 
sought to explain psychological processes in terms of 
stimulus and response. To Mead, however, this view was 
unacceptable. He sought to explain the function of mind in 
terms of its ability to help us overcome problems 
experienced in everyday life. But before Mead could explore 
the function of mind, he would first have to explain its 
emergence. Mead accomplished this by drawing a connection 
between mind and language. According to Mead, language and 
mind are synonomous. With the emergence of language comes 
the ability to think, to manipulate conscious objects. In
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Meadian terms, language is a system of shared "significant 
symbols." Words are significant symbols in that they "call 
out in the other the same response that they call out in 
me." That is, what makes language possible is the fact that 
words are significations of meanings which are shared.
How does Mead know this? According to Mead, when we 
speak we are not merely a speaker, but at the same time, 
also a listener. As a listener we monitor and edit our 
expressions according to the expectations of the other 
person. It is not necessarily the case that we say what the 
listener wants to hear, but say what we want the listener to 
hear in a way we assume will be understandable, based on our 
own expectations of understanding. Speaking, therefore, 
invariably includes implicitly-shared assumptions about the 
expectations of others. We may say, then, that in Mead's 
view the existence of language is itself proof of the 
inherently social nature of individual selves. Because we 
express ourselves in terms of the expectations of others, 
our experience is constituted socially, if for no other 
reason than the fact that we have already considered our 
relations to others before we act. It should be clear that 
where Schutz fails owing to his Husserlian view of the 
subject, Mead succeeds fabulously by viewing linguistic 
intersubjectivity as the very condition of consciousness.
Mead's formula is not all that different from Durkheim's 
notion of how social facts are constitutive of social
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solidarity. Unlike Durkheim, however. Mead does not view 
communicative conformity to the symbolic representations of 
the group as the result of external coercion. Mead instead 
views symbolic interaction as a creative process of 
negotiation; a process during which time the expectations 
themselves exist in a state of flux, ready to be mediated 
through the creative manipulation of individuals. In 
comparison to Weber, in Mead's view it is not only that we 
take into account the behavior of others and orient our 
action accordingly, but that the other and society at large 
has already structured our experience preconsciously in 
terms of the linguistical concepts which we use. Another 
way of saying this that social structure is within all of us 
in the form of language.
This interpretation of Mead focuses on an aspect of his 
work which has not received a tremendous amount of 
attention. Generally, when commentators explain Mead's 
theory of sociality, his notion that our conscious 
experience is socially constituted, they typically do so by 
referring to Mead's thoughts on play and social learning.
In Mind. Self and Society Mead discusses the importance of 
the function of play, and uses the play metaphor to explain 
his celebrated notion of "taking the role of the other." In 
his learning model of socialization, children through 
imaginary and real play learn to assume different social and 
„occupational roles. By assuming these roles they thus
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internalize the normative expectations of society. As 
adults, people thus are able to, unreflectively and 
habitually, take the role of the "generalized other"; the 
"generalized other" being a broad term used by Mead to 
denote the general norms which people implicitly refer to 
when they construct their acts. It follows from these ideas 
that we become social creatures through socialization, a 
rather reasonable argument. It is our view that the former 
explanation of sociality, an explanation which must be 
teased out of Mead's wider discussion of language, is 
superior to the latter because it focuses its attention at a 
more primary level of analysis.
While Mead constructs an impressive theory of the 
emergence of mind, and provides us with an explanation of 
the inherent sociality of human existence, he does not, 
however, focus his attention specifically on the 
interpretive process. In The Philosophy of the Act Mead 
comes closest to discussing interpretive experience by 
constructing a theory of the "act." The focus of Mead’s 
discussion falls on the importance of "reflectivity" for the 
construction and modification of behavior. We outlined the 
important points of Mead's theory in chapter two, and will 
therefore proceed with only a brief description of Mead's 
view of reflectivity.
As we have seen, Mead views reflection as a response to 
problematic situations, a problematic situation being one in
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which an impulse has been frustrated. It was our contention 
that this is an unacceptable rendering of the condition 
necessary for reflection, for it reduces reflection to an 
instrumental process. The impulse which gives rise to 
reflectivity stems from an experience of frustration 
resulting from the inability to realize a particular goal.
In Mead's view reflection, therefore, serves an exclusively 
pragmatic function. By contrast, the impetus to 
hermeneutical reflection, in Gadamer's view, stems from a 
frustrated understanding, a feeling of incompleteness 
regarding the meaning of something experienced. Unless it 
is one's conscious intention to achieve a certain quality of 
understanding in a given situation, Mead's view of 
reflection is incapable of explaining the experience of 
hermeneutical reflection. Hence, it breaks down when faced 
with answering questions regarding the interpretation of 
meaning and value. Again, as we stated earlier, this does 
not undermine Mead's philosophy of the act but simply 
identifies its definite limitations regarding questions of 
meaning, understanding and interpretation. It is 
understandable, given Mead's concerns and the intellectual 
climate of his day, that he would develop a social- 
behaviorist view of reflection which has functionalist 
overtones.8 4
84 Andrew J. Reck actually describes Mead’s project as
an "offshoot of functional psychology," Selected Writings
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964) p. xvi.
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It would clearly be problematic to reduce interactionism 
to the work of G. H. Mead, and those who have suggested as 
much have been severely criticized.89 Nevertheless, it is 
fair to say that, beyond the contribution of Mead's theory 
of sociality, the American tradition has little to offer to 
us, given our narrow concern over the nature of 
interpretation. This is partly so because much of the 
American interpretive-sociological tradition has simply 
hashed and rehashed Mead's ideas, rather than applying them 
in new ways to new questions. This is perhaps most true in 
the case of Herbert Blumer, a disciple of Mead who coined 
the term "symbolic interactionism." Blumer has spent much 
effort reiterating Mead's formulations, and defending his 
interpretations when they have been called into question. 
Manford Kuhn, on the other hand, established an empirical 
school of symbolic interactionism at Iowa and spent his 
efforts subjecting Mead's specific theoretical insights to 
empirical tests. Concerned either with expounding (Blumer) 
or testing (Kuhn) Mead's formulations, symbolic 
interactionists and their followers have focused mainly on 
interaction and not interpretation. This is true of others
89 For example, see Berenice M. Fisher and Anselm L. 
Strauss "Interactionism," in Tom Bottomore and Robert 
Nisbet, eds., A History of Sociological Analysis (New York: 
Basic, 1978), pp. 457-498.
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who have been influenced by Mead, such as the
dramaturgists.86 This is not to say that at a later point,
when we have studied the nature of interpretation and find
ourselves in a position to begin applying our findings to
the question of the relationship between interpretation and
social action, we will not be able to benefit greatly from
the American interactionist tradition. The work of Goffman,
for example, would appear to offer us much in the way of
linking interpretation to social action. It is simply that
at this point the question of interaction is of secondary
importance given our central concern over the question of
the nature of interpretation.
Having said this we may cite a contribution of an early
interactionist, W. I. Thomas, which is directly relevant to
our immediate study. This contribution is Thomas' notion of
the "definition of the situation."87 The "definition of the
situation" is used by Thomas to denote the fact that reality
is constructed through the interpretive or definitional
activity of individuals in situations.
Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior 
there is always a ... definition of the situation ...
86 Dramaturgy refers to those who follow the lead of 
Kenneth Burke, who drew upon Mead to conceptualize a theory 
of cultural criticism.
87 As Buckley points out, there exists several 
variations of Thomas' notion, such as Maclver's "dynamic 
assessment" and Znaniecki’s "humanistic coefficient." 
However, Thomas' notion appears superior to these variations 
if only because it is clear and direct. Sociology and 
Modern Systems Theory. 1967, pp. 17-23.
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Gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of 
the individual himself follow from a series of such 
definitions.8 B
This notion enables us to speak in specific terms of the 
myriad interpretive experiences that collectively comprise 
the social construction of reality. The notion that every 
"self-determined" act emerges in terms of an interpretation 
of the meaning of an immediate situation is compatible with 
Gadamer's view that experience itself is interpretive or 
hermeneutical. We must be careful, however, to keep in mind 
that such definitions or interpretations are constituted 
preconsciously in understanding. This is not something 
which is typically taken into account by interactionists, 
who generally tend to exaggerate the reflective autonomy of 
the individual vis-a-vis history and tradition.
We may now summarize our discussion of interpretive 
sociology and its relevance to our task of establishing the 
sociological significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics. From 
our discussion of Mead we have gained the notion that 
individuals are inherently social, owing to the constitutive 
importance of implicitly shared linguistical meanings. This 
is important for it enables us to inpute into Schutz's 
sterile view of interpretive procedures breathing, socially
88 W. I. Thomas, quoted in Martindale, The Nature and 
Types of Sociological Theory. 1988, p. 326. The original 
passage is found in W. I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1923), p. 42. We will make use of 
Thomas' notion of the ’definition of the situation' when we 
specify the theoretical implications of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics in our final chapter.
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constituted, human beings. The life-world thus becomes a 
social-world personal not in the sense that it is self- 
constituted, but individually experienced. The social- 
world, social reality itself, thus becomes the basis of that 
which is taken-for-granted and typically assumed. We have 
also learned from Schutz that it is to the meanings 
constitutive of the social-world that sociologists should 
turn their attention for these meanings play a bigger role 
in the construction of social reality than the 
interpretations of reality provided by sociologists. 
Incorporating Garfinkel's contribution, we may say that 
social reality is conventionally constructed and when the 
conventions of reality are interrupted, the typical reaction 
is to attempt to repair reality and return it to a state of 
normalcy. This means that not only is the social world of 
meaning which constitutes reality taken-for-granted, but 
that we have a vested interest in keeping it this way. In 
other words, we have an aversion to bringing into question 
the prejudices constitutive of interpretive experience.
These insights will guide our effort to establish the 
sociological significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics, which 




SIGNIFICANCE OF GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS
We began our study concerned with the inability of 
sociology to provide the theoretical direction necessary for 
answering questions pertaining to the general phenomenon of 
interpretation. Our point of departure was a case study of 
Milford, New Hampshire. Our question was one which sought 
to understand how it was that a considerable number of 
residents there had come to interpret water healthy and 
safety issues to be no more important than routine-town 
business, after having experienced a local water crisis. 
Prior to being surveyed, Milfordians had lost close to half 
of their water supply due to toxic waste contamination. In 
addition to the inconvenience caused by the contamination, 
Milford residents had also been subjected to health risks 
the significance of which may take years to surface.
We attempted to answer this question by applying G. H. 
Mead’s thoughts on reflective thinking. It was argued that 
within the interpretive-sociological literature, Mead's 
writings on reflection held the most promise for addressing 
the question we had posed. Following Mead, we hypothesized 
that some Milfordians did not come to view water health and 
safety issues as more important than routine-town business
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because they either 1) failed to view the contamination 
episode as a problematic situation in the first place (and 
therefore did not reflect upon its significance) or 2) they 
did view the incident as problematic, but upon reflection 
interpreted the water health and safety issues to be no more 
important than routine-town business. Neither of these 
explanations, however, appeared particularly convincing. He 
concluded that Mead's approach was too limited to explain 
the interpretive differences observed in Milford and set 
ourselves to the task of studying the nature of 
interpretation itself.
Hhat have we learned from our study of Gadamer's 
analysis of interpretation? We have learned, first of all, 
that there exists an alternative approach to the 
conceptualization of interpretation which diverges 
fundamentally from the strictly epistemological view of 
interpretation typical of interpretive sociology and 
traditional hermeneutics. Our discussion of Truth and 
Method has shown that Gadamer's analysis of interpretation 
is more comprehensive than that of any interpretive 
sociologist, including that of Weber, Mead, or Schutz. In 
Gadamer's work interpretation is described as the 
manifestation of understanding in a particular situation, 
and understanding is viewed ontologically as our preconsious 
and practical relationship to the world. This means that 
interpretation may be more accurately understood within
263
sociology as an experience consisting of preconscious as 
well as conscious elements. Gadamer1s work provides a 
theoretical framework capable of guiding the sociological 
analysis of these preconscious dimensions. As such, his 
work may be used to develop a more comprehensive approach to 
the study of the relationship between interpretation and the 
social construction or fabrication of reality.
For example, we may want to use Gadamer's analysis of 
interpretation to help us study the preconscious factors 
underlying the interpretive differences that were observed 
in Milford. Gadamer's hermeneutics defines the preconscious 
dimensions of interpretation in terms of the experience and 
mediation of a linguistical tradition. As Gadamer points 
out, our participation in and mediation of the linguistical 
tradition has the form of a practical relationship. That 
is, it is both constitutive and representative of our way of 
relating to the world. The study of the preconscious 
dimensions of interpretation may therefore focus on 1) the 
linguistical concepts which are employed preconsciously in 
speech and/or 2) the concrete social relations of 
individuals, relationships which constitute their 
understanding. Following Gadamer, we would want to study 
the preconscious linguistical concepts (prejudices) which 
Milfordians associated with such notions as "water 
shortage," "contamination," and "toxic waste." It is 
possible, for example, that the Milfordians who came to give
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priority to water, health, and safety issues following the 
contamination discovery had very different prejudices 
regarding the meaning of these and related terms, terms 
which were used to construct the definition of the meaning 
of the situation. We would also expect the two groups to 
have different understandings, that is, different practical 
relationships to the world and the Milford community in 
particular. To some extent this dimension can be accessed 
through an analysis of socio-demographic variables, for such 
variables describe the biography or personal history of an 
individual and thus represent to some extent one's 
ontological condition and understanding. Professor Hamilton 
focused on such variables in his first analysis, and found 
that youth, gender, and parenthood appeared to be 
characteristic of immediate environmental concern in 
Milford. Following Gadamer we would want to expand the 
analysis to include other aspects of one’s understanding.
For example, an important practical relationship in this 
context would be property ownership. According to Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, the understanding of property owners would be 
constituted differently than that of non-property owners, 
and as a result, this would in part explain interpretive 
differences between owners and non-owners. For example, 
owing to an implicit concern over protecting the value of 
their property, owners might be inclined to underplay the 
importance of the contamination incident since emphasizing
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its importance might translate into bad publicity for 
Milford as a whole and ultimately feed back negatively on 
property values.
Gadamer's hermeneutics also suggests that the approach 
taken in our original analysis of the interpretive 
differences in Milford was mistaken in that it viewed 
interpretation exclusively as a cognitive process.
Gadamer's work suggests that we view interpretation as an 
experience. of which cognition is only one part. In light 
of this our initial approach appears overly abstract, and in 
some sense, fictional. In light of Gadamer's analysis of 
interpretation we might simply say that, owing to 
differences in understanding stemming from different 
practical social relations, some Milfordians experienced the 
meaning of water health and safety issues to be more 
important than routine town business, while others did not. 
It was not that anyone consciously decided that such issues 
were more or less important, but rather that they 
experienced them as such, owing to their understanding.
While this explanation might be too general for many social 
scientists, it nevertheless is a reasonable interpretation 
of the empirical facts. The value of the explanation is 
that it opens up several lines of questioning and inquiry. 
For example, we would want to further examine the actual 
differences in practical social relations, and in this way 
add flesh to the bones of our more general interpretation.
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Having taken as our point of departure in this study the 
research problem posed by our observations in Milford, it 
was only natural that we would begin discussing the 
sociological significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics by 
demonstrating the possibilities and correctives which it 
provides for explaining the interpretive differences 
observed in Milford. However it is not our intention to re­
examine the Milford data in any substantive sense, for to 
apply what we have learned from Gadamer would require an 
entirely new analysis. It is our intention instead to look 
forward and to establish the implications of Gadamer's work 
for sociology in general. We will discuss the significance 
of Gadamer’s work on two distinct analytical levels, the 
theoretical and the practical. While it is not our 
intention to introduce an artificial distinction between 
these mutually inclusive types of experience, it is 
nevertheless fair to say that some of the implications of 
Gadamer’s work pertain more to theoretical issues, while 
others appear more relevant to practical issues, such as 
methodological issues and questions regarding new areas of 
analysis.
The theoretical implications of Gadamer1s work are many, 
and our exploration of them in this chapter does not pretend 
to be definitive or exhaustive. Considering that his work 
has largely been overlooked by social theorists, the aim of 
our discussion is simply to open discussion on the
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theoretical possibilities arising from his insights into the 
nature of interpretation. While we will exploit our 
discussion of the social-theoretical implications of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics later in our discussion of its more 
practical implications, our discussion of its theoretical 
significance is for the most part speculative and 
exploratory. It should be read as suggestive of the 
directions which his work may be taken within social theory.
By contrast, our discussion of the practical 
implications of Gadamer's work aims to be substantive and 
programmatic. Substantive in that it aims to identify 
specific questions arising from Gadamer's hermeneutics that 
deserve to be studied sociologically; and programmatic in 
that it aims to outline how this might be done in an 
empirical sense. Our discussion focuses on outlining the 
requisites for the sociological study of prejudices and 
hermeneutical reflection. This will require us to 1) 
operationally define these two terms and 2) establish 
precisely why they deserve to be studied sociologically.
Before embarking on our discussion of the theoretical 
and practical significance of Gadamer*s hermeneutics it will 
prove worthwhile to summarize its main features.
1) Interpretations are the conscious expressions of 
preconscious experiences of understanding. This 
means that interpretation cannot proceed without a 
preconception of its object. Hence, interpretation 
is, by nature, prejudiced.
2) The preconscious elements of interpretation may be 
referred to as prejudices because they are
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preconscious linguistical concepts the truth status 
of which is assumed during their moment of 
application.1
3) Defined thusly prejudices are not merely 
psychological for they constitute our relationship 
to the world and as such structure experience.2
4) By acknowledging the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation and questioning through critical 
discourse the meaning of prejudices we are able to 
become conscious of what would otherwise be a hidden 
effect of history upon us.
5) Prejudices may be true or false and it is the task 
of hermeneutical reflection to distinguish the 
latter from the former.
6) We must, however, acknowledge the fact that we can 
never become fully aware of the constitutive effect 
of history for this effect is constitutive of 
experience itself, and as such, cannot be isolated 
as an object of consciousness.3
1 That is, prejudices are assumed to be true when they 
are applied in interpretation for they themselves do not 
appear as objects of consciousness but instead constitute 
the experience through which objects are interpreted.
2 Prejudices may be distinguished from subconscious 
motivations in that they may be experienced through 
common dialogue and do not require systematized procedures 
of analysis (such as Freudian psychoanalysis).
3 This is a somewhat difficult yet extremely important 
point which is, in essence, simply another way of expressing 
the notion of the hermeneutic circle. On page 38 of his 
work Gadamer's Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale, 1985), Joel 
Weinsheimer explains the point thusly.
When we hear a bird's song, we hear the song and 
not the hearing; though we are aware of our hearing, 
it is not thematized or objectified: methodization is 
possible, but only subsequent to a nonthematic 
awareness, and then only by means of new intentional 
acts which are not themselves thematized.
In other words, we can never become fully aware of the 
nonthematic or prejudiced aspects of interpretation for our 
questioning of these aspects is itself constituted by 
nonthematic prejudices. It is this insight which the
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Perhaps the most important implication of these points, all 
of which stem from the basic notion that understanding is 
ontological, is that our conscious interpretations are 
always at risk of being unknowingly falsely constituted. In 
other words, owing to the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation, which is an inevitable condition of the 
historical and linguistical situatedness of our existence, 
our conscious interpretations may be unknowingly constituted 
through false prejudices. I am aware of only one attempt to 
establish the significance of this Gadamerian insight for 
sociology. Jurgen Habermas has explored the sociological 
significance of the prejudiced nature of interpretation in 
terms of various methodological issues and questions, 
ultimately applying Gadamer's insight to a critique of 
positivism. Habermas, however, has not pursued the 
importance of the prejudiced nature of interpretation on any 
other level. It is the judgment of the present work that 
the significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics for sociology 
turns on the implications of this one insight not as it 
pertains to a critique of method but as it pertains to a 
critique of the social construction of reality. If we 
accept the essential and constitutive role of interpretation 
for social action and the construction of social reality, it 
follows from Gadamer's analysis that the construction of
concept of the hermeneutical circle aims to convey, as it is 
used by Heidegger and Gadamer.
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social reality roust, to some extent, be falsely constituted. 
In light of Gadamer's hermeneutics the social construction 
of reality may be re-cast as the social fabrication of 
reality, where the term fabrication is used to denote the 
complex weaving of meaning-constitutive prejudices an 
unknown number of which are false. To the extent that the 
actual existence of false prejudices may be considered 
minimal or negligible, their effect on social reality may in 
fact be negligible. On the other hand, it may be the case 
that a significant portion of our prejudices are in fact 
false. In this case, the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation may be responsible for many of the 
problematic aspects of contemporary social reality.4 
Gadamer's identification of hermeneutical reflection, the 
experience through which we find ourselves in a position to 
experience consciously the prejudices that would otherwise 
operate behind our back, thus takes on a significance 
proportional to the extent to which prejudices are in fact 
false. The sociological significance of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics thus turns on its social significance, the 
meaning which it has for revealing the prevalence of false 
prejudices and the distribution of hermeneutical reflection. 
In this chapter we will discuss these two important
4 An interesting question related to our discussion is, 
to what extent might the percentage of false societal- 
prejudices be subject to variation across different 
historical periods and cultures?
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dimensions of social action- the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation, and hermeneutical reflection- and outline an 
approach for their sociological study.
We must be careful at this point to emphasize the fact 
that we can never become fully aware of the effect of 
history, which operates behind our back in the form of 
prejudices; prejudices are constitutive of conscious 
interpretation and are therefore a necessary condition of 
consciousness. This precludes the possibility of attempting 
to enlist sociology in some grand methodological attempt to 
purge society of its false prejudices. Such a task would be 
impossible in another sense, for it would require an 
assumption that we the sociologists are in a privileged 
position when it comes to judging the truth status of 
everyday interpretations, and this runs counter to Gadamer1s 
theory of truth. From a Gadamerian perspective, truth is 
experienced, and this means that one cannot definitively 
judge the truth of another's interpretation. One can only 
help others to become conscious of the prejudices 
constitutive of their interpretation in such a way that they 




We may begin exploring the specifically theoretical 
implications of Gadamer1s hermeneutics by discussing it in 
terms of the longstanding sociological question regarding 
the relationship between individual and social structure.
The term "social structure" is used widely within sociology 
despite the fact that there exits little agreement regarding 
its meaning. Rather than viewing this as cause for alarm, 
some sociologists have interpreted it as an indication of 
sociology's vitality. Merton, for example, emphasizes that 
"complementary views are essential for a thorough 
understanding of social structure and that competing 
theories make vital contributions to the advancement of 
knowledge in a field."5 Leaving aside the question of 
whether the disagreement over the definition of social 
structure is good or bad for sociology, we might ask what is 
it that divides social-structure theorists in the first 
place? The debate over the nature of social structure 
involves two more or less clearly defined camps, one which 
views social structure as external to and distinct from 
individual social action (macro-oriented approaches) and the 
other which views social structure as the fluid and 
transient effect of social interactions and transactions
5 As described by Peter M. Blau, ed.,in Approaches to 
the Study of Social Structure (London: Free Press, 1975), p. 
1 .
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initiated by individuals (micro-oriented approaches).* The 
danger with a macro-oriented approach lies in underplaying 
the creative and mediating effects of individuals on the 
construction or fabrication of social reality. Conversely, 
micro-oriented theorists tend to exaggerate the creative and 
mediating effects of the individual. In response to the 
macro view, we might point out that while it is true that we 
often find ourselves in situations not of our making, and in 
a sense are "determined" by these situations or structures, 
it is also clear that we contribute, in varying degrees, to 
the particular course of action which we will engage in in 
any situation. In response to the micro view, we might say 
that while we contribute to the unfolding of situations 
through deliberate behavior, the deliberation of our 
behavior is itself influenced by factors not of our own 
making. To say then that social reality is in a constant 
state of flux, owing to the reflective definitions of 
situations arrived at by individuals, is an exaggeration.
We may gain insight into this problematic by examining 
the work of Durkheim, who in his effort to establish 
sociology as a distinct and legitimate science, posited a 
view of social structure which has greatly influenced the
6 See Blau's introduction to Approaches to the Study of 
Social Stucture. 1975, for a descriptive overview of the 
leading theoretical positions regarding social structure. 
While it is true that there exists several attempts at what 
might be called "middle-range" approaches to social 
structure, the majority of social-structural theories are 
either micro- or macro-oriented.
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discussion of the individual-social structure relationship.
In The Rules of Sociological Method Durkheim identifies a
universal feature of the human condition that had yet to be
defined and studied as a scientific phenomenon.
In reality there is in every society a certain group 
of phenomena which may be differentiated from those 
studied by the natural sciences. When I fulfil my 
obligations as brother, husband, or citizen, when I 
execute my contracts, I perform duties which are 
defined, externally to myself and my acts, in law 
and in custom.7
One must pay extremely close attention to the words in this 
passage, for much turns on the extent to which Durkheim can 
claim that these phenomena, which he will eventually define 
as "social facts," are actually "external" to individuals.
In the passage above Durkheim states that the behavioral 
expectations experienced by the individual are "defined
externally to myself and my acts." This wording leaves open
the possibility that we may participate in and contribute to
the definitions of situations, although in the last
analysis, for all intents and purposes, the definitions are 
beyond us. However, it soon becomes clear that Durkheim is 
not willing to grant so much to the individual for he 
shortly thereafter comes to define social facts as "existing 
outside the individual consciousness."® According to 
Durkheim, it is not merely that norms are decided
7 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method. 
Translated by Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 1.
® Ibid., p. 2-
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externally, but that they exist external to the
consciousness of the individual. This inference is based on
the observation that social facts, such as the beliefs and
practices of one's religion, are "ready-made at birth."
According to Durkheim "their existence prior to his own
implies their existence outside of himself.”9
Durkheim of course defends the existence of such social
phenomena by pointing out the intimate connection between
external definitions of situations and the sanctions which
their violation invite. Social facts are thus both external
and coercive, and Durkheim appeals to the factual nature of
the latter to prove the existence of the former.
The public conscience exercises a check on every act 
which offends it by means of the surveillance it 
exercises over the conduct of its citizens, and the 
appropriate penalties at its disposal. In many cases 
the constraint is less violent, but nevertheless it 
always exists. If I do not submit to the conventions 
of society, if in my dress I do not conform to the 
customs observed in my country and in my class, the 
ridicule I provoke, the social isolation in which I 
am kept, produce, although in an attentuated form, 
the same effects as a punishment in the strict sense 
of the word.10
The importance of Durkheim for both sociology and 
anthropology stems from his successful distinction of these 
disciplines from psychology. Psychological phenomena, in 
Durkheim's view, exist in the "individual consciousness," 
whereas sociological and anthropological phenomena exist in
9 Ibid., p. 2.
10 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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the "collective" consciousness, as evidenced in common 
practices and the expectations imposed on us. However, in 
viewing social phenomena as social facts in a 
methodologically positivistic sense (as "things" or natural 
objects), Durkheim opens the door to a view of social 
structure which neglects the individual element of social 
phenomena. The contradiction in his view of social facts as 
external to the individual stems from the fact that they 
(social facts, which we may construe as behavioral 
expectations) are shared by individuals. That is, they are 
constituted in social relations. They are the meaningful 
bonds without which social groups would not exist.
While Durkheim provides the methodological and 
theoretical tenets for a macro-view of social structure, Max 
Weber may be credited with providing the micro-view with its 
primary assumptions.11 Like Durkheim, Weber was concerned 
with distinguishing sociology from other fields, 
particularly psychology, and consequently viewed it 
necessary to state the methodological nature of sociology 
and define its subject matter. However, whereas Durkheim 
views sociology's unit of analysis as "social facts," Weber 
takes its subject matter to be "social action."
Action is "social" insofar as its subjective meaning
11 This is not to say that interactionism is directly 
indebted to Weber, but only thaf. his ideas have served as a 
major impetus to the growth of interpretive sociology and 
may be taken as representive, if not entirely constitutive 
of, the micro-view of social structure.
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takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby 
oriented in its course.18
On a general level, this view of social action is no
different from Durkheim's. In both cases social action is
viewed as a form of conformity, as action performed
according to the expectations of others. In both cases the
sociologist is led to focus on what Giddens describes as
"common adopted practices."13 There are, of course,
important differences separating Durkheim and Weber once we
look beyond this general overlapping of their positions.
These differences surface when we contrast Durkheim's rules
of sociology with Weber's methodological concepts presented
in his early essay "Some categories of interpretive
sociology."
Action specifically significant for interpretive 
sociology is, in particular, behavior that: (1) in
terms of the subjectively intended meaning of the 
actor, is related to the behavior of others. (2) is 
codetermined in its course through this relatedness, 
and thus (3) can be intellibly explained in terms of 
this (subjectively) intended meaning.14
The most striking difference between Durkheim and Weber,
brought into relief by this passage, concerns the issue of
12 Max Weber, "Basic sociological terms," in Economy 
and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York 
Bedminster Press, 1968), Volume 1, p. 4.
13 Anthony Giddens, "Sociology: Issues and problems," 
in A. R. Sadovnik, C. H. Persell, E. A. Baumann and R. G. 
Mitchell Jr., eds., Exploring Society (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1987) p. 11.
14 Max Weber, "Some categories of interpretive
sociology," 1981, p. 152.
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external constraint versus individual free will. Whereas 
Durkheim views behavioral expectations as a form of external 
constraint, Weber views these expectations as shared 
expectations, expectations that are "codetermined." Weber 
thus attributes to individuals the ability to negotiate and 
mediate the definitions of situations, and thus diverges 
fundamentally from Durkheim. Whereas Durkheim views the 
questioning of norms as pathological, Weber views such 
questioning as a responsibility.15 It follows from this 
important difference that Weber cannot accept the 
abstraction of expectations of behavior, or the common 
practices which are their result, into things or objects 
(social facts), but must insist on viewing them as part of 
individual social action.
Just as Durkheim has been criticized for overemphasizing 
the importance of the social group and social structure, 
Weber has been accused of reducing sociology’s unit of 
analysis to individuals.16 It should be emphasized, 
however, that it is incorrect and in some sense 
contradictory to describe Weberian sociology as 
individualistic, for he defines social action as a
13 Unlike Blumer, who tends to exaggerate the
interpretive leverage of the individual with regard to the 
codetermination or negotiation of situational definitions, 
Weber does not speculate on the extent to which this
codetermination is swayed by individual influences or 
influences beyond the reproach of the individual.
16 See, for example, Frank Parkin, Max Weber. (London: 
Tavistock, 1982), p. 19-27.
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relationship, as a process between two or more individuals, 
and it is in this sense never merely individual. Hence, the 
unit of analysis in Weber's formulation is not the 
individual, but social action, which is invariably a social 
relationship.
We embarked on our discussion of Durkheim and Weber in 
order to get at the nuts and bolts of the basic concepts 
underlying the macro and micro views of social structure.
In light of our discussion some interesting parallels may be 
drawn between Gadamer's hermeneutics and the classical 
sociological approaches which we have mentioned. This is 
particularly true with regard to Durkheim. An interesting 
comparison can be drawn between Durkheim and Gadamer with 
respect to their respective views regarding the structural 
importance of preconscious meanings. Consider the following 
question. Given Durkheim's claim that we are all externally 
constrained by the normative expectations of social groups, 
why is it that such behavioral constraint is so readily 
tolerated? Durkheim would have two answers to this
question. The first is obvious: we tolerate social
constraint in order to avoid any repressive sanctions which 
non-conformity might invite. His second answer, I believe, 
is less obvious, and extremely interesting: we tolerate 
external social constraint because it operates, for the most 
part, preconsciouslv.
If this power of external coercion asserts itself so
clearly in cases of resistance, it must exist also in
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the first mentioned cases (cases of non-resistance)r 
although we are unconscious of it. We are then victims 
of the illusion of having ourselves created that which 
actually forced itself from without. If the 
complacency with which we permit ourselves to be 
carried along conceals the pressure undergone, 
nevertheless it does not abolish it. Thus, air is 
no less heavy because we do not detect its weight.17
The importance of this observation is that it equates social
structure with preconscious18 phenomena similar to those
which Gadamer takes to be constitutive of interpretive
experience. The similarities between the view of our
interpretive condition as expressed by Durkheim in this
passage and that found in Gadamer's hermeneutics are
striking. Durkheim asserts that the social structuring of
consciousness is generally undetected because it is largely
preconscious, and as such, leaves us open to the illusion
that our conscious interpretations are our own creations.
This point is shared by Gadamer, who argues forcefully in
Truth and Method that we are not masters of our own reason,
as the Enlightenment would have us believe. Rather than
delude ourselves into thinking that we determine our own
conscious interpretations, we must instead admit our
historicity lest we submit to the tyranny of hidden
prejudices. In addition, while Durkheim views consciousness
17 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method. 1950, p.
5.
18 To avoid confusion, we will discuss what Durkheim 
refers to as "unconscious" as "preconsious." This is 
consistent with our earlier distinction between preconscious 
and unconscious, the former being a sociological category, 
the latter a psychological one.
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as a function of the internalization of normative 
constraint, Gadamer discusses conscious interpretation as an 
epiphenomon of preconscious understanding. Durkheim, by way 
of a brilliantly conceived analogy, stresses that the 
relative hiddenness of this preconscious structuring in no 
way diminishes its effect, merely its propensity for being 
grasped consciously. Similarly, prejudices are no less 
important for interpretation because they operate 
preconsciously. On the contrary, their concealed nature 
makes them all the more important for it demands that we 
attempt to become conscious of their constitutive effect.
Our discussion of these similarities is not intended to 
suggest any great affinity between these two thinkers, for 
despite these general overlappings of insight Durkheim and 
Gadamer differ fundamentally on a number of important 
points. Perhaps the most important difference between the 
two stems from Durkheim's belief that the preconscious 
structuring of consciousness is external to or outside of 
the individual, a view fundamentally at odds with Gadamer's 
ontological view of understanding. Durkheim describes this 
structuring (his choice of words is unfortunate) as 
something "forced" from without. Gadamer describes this 
effect as the constitutive effect of one's historical 
situation and practical relationship to the world (one's 
understanding). According to Gadamer, the preconscious 
structuring of conscious experience is part of the
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individual's experience within a linguistic tradition, and 
is therefore constitutive from within the individual: the 
preconscious constitution of experience is part of the 
experience of the individual and cannot be viewed as an 
external force.19 The point of our comparison is that in 
Durkheim, as well as in Gadamer, we find an argument against 
an overly optimistic and naive view of individual 
consciousness, such as that typical of symbolic 
interactionism.20 Symbolic interactionists tend to believe 
that individuals have the freedom of conscious choice in 
particular situations. If we are to believe this, however, 
we must qualify the meaning of "conscious" choice. In light 
of Gadamer's hermeneutics, we must not exaggerate the 
autonomy of consciousness, for consciousness is constituted 
preconsciously. This means that what might appear at the 
surface {at first glance) to be an autonomous, conscious 
decision, is actually the manifestation of a preconscious 
understanding the nature of which is historical and 
linguistic. At the same time, however, we must be careful 
not to overemphasize the determinative effect of our 
historical-linguistic tradition, for we must acknowledge the
19 Another important difference, of course, is the 
methdodological commitment of Durkheim to positivism, and 
the related notion that social facts are "things." Gadamer 
would reject such a view of human experience out of hand.
2 0 For example, Herbert Blumer has exaggerated the 
autonomous nature of individual consciousness in Symbolic 
Interactionism: Perspective and Method {Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
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mediating effect of the individual, and the importance of 
critical reflection for the modification of tradition and 
for social change. That is, we must acknowledge the 
significance of hermeneutical reflection. These 
requirements preclude the simple application of either a 
structural-functional or symbolic interactionist view of 
social reality. In light of Gadamer's hermeneutics, 
Durkheim is incorrect to view social phenomena as external 
to the individual. Durkheim is also incorrect in viewing 
social structure as determinative of individual behavior, 
for while such social phenomena structure social action, 
they do not determine it in the strict sense of the word. 
Rather than "determinative," we may follow Gadamer and view 
social phenomena as constitutive of social action. In 
Gadamer's view, social structure constitutes our 
understanding and hence our interpretive experience.
Gadamer goes beyond Durkheim in another important respect. 
Whereas Durkheim appears content with accepting the 
preconscious structuring of consciousness (a feature of 
structural-functionalism in general suggesting a 
conservative view of reality), Gadamer calls for the 
critical acknowledgment of the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation lest false prejudices continue to operate 
behind our back; a situation tantamount to being dominated 
by the influence of history. Gadamer therefore offers us a 
way out of the macro-micro problematic by enabling us to
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acknowledge 1) the constitutive nature of history and 
tradition (something micro-theorists have difficulty doing) 
while simultaneously acknowledging 2) the mediating and 
critical ability of the individual, and emphasizing the 
importance of criticizing and questioning that which 
constitutes (structures) our experience (something macro­
theorists have difficulty doing).
While Gadamer does not raise the question of social 
structure in explicit terms, we may infer from Truth and 
Method that he would take social structure to denote the the 
preconscious meanings which constitute our relation to the 
world and structure experience. Indeed, it can be suggested 
that the location of social structure within the existence 
of the individual in the form of preconsious meanings based 
on one's relation to the world suggests that any strict 
distinction between individual and structure is erroneous. 
This is because what is traditionally referred to as social 
structure, language, meaning, social and economic relations, 
norms and formal behavioral precepts, are part of the 
structure of experience itself, and are not "external" 
forces which act over and above the individual. A similar 
case for rejecting sociology's distinction between 
individual and social structure can be drawn from Heidegger. 
Interestingly, Durkheim's observation that social facts 
exist prior to our experience of them is similar to 
Heidegger's point that when we are born we are "thrown," in
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a sense, into a historical situation not of our making. 
However, as we have already seen, Durkheim views this as an 
indication that history and social facts are external to and 
distinct from us. From Heidegger's view, when we are thrown 
into a historical situation, that situation becomes part of 
us as much as we become part of it: our experience of 
history cannot be separated from history's experience of us. 
Human existence and history are mutually constitutive. 
However, Durkheim fails to give adequate consideration to 
the fact that we embody history and exist co-extensively 
with it, viewing humans instead as objects of history - 
subjected to its external effect.
Heidegger's position regarding these issues may be 
inferred from the manner by which he addresses the question 
of the meaning of being. As we discussed earlier, the 
difficulty experienced by Heidegger when he raises the 
question of the meaning of being leads him to the 
realization that the meaning which the question has for him 
is somehow already given to him preconsciously before he 
experiences it consciously. Heidegger concludes that the 
experience of his own understanding of the question is 
illustrative of the structure of understanding in general. 
That is, the structure of understanding consists of 
preconscious meanings which are the result of one's 
existence within a particular historical situation. This 
aspect of Heidegger's work may be related to the
2 8 6
individual/social structure problematic. It is important to 
note that Heidegger locates the meaning carried by the 
Western philosophical tradition within himself. This 
meaning is not merely within his mind, but part of the 
structure of his being; part of the way he relates to the 
world in general. In sociological terms, this means that 
Heidegger locates the determinative effects of social 
structure as something which is part of himself, part of his 
very being, as distinguished from 1) external social facts 
which constrain him from without, 2) or a conscious or 
deliberative process which takes place within his mind.
This, however, does not amount to a strict structuralist 
account of human agency, a view that would deny any 
mediating effect of the agent on social structure.
The work of Heidegger and Gadamer suggests that we 
should reject the traditional dichotomy between individual 
and social structure. However, this does not mean that 
sociologists should abandon the term “social structure." We 
may modify our use of the term to denote the constitutive 
effect of history and tradition, and thus retain its general 
explanatory importance while avoiding the false connotations 
it might otherwise suggest (for example, the notion that 
social structure is an external force which imposes itself 
on the individual).
In light of our discussion we may suggest a theoretical 
connection that may be used to identify and study aspects of
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social structure that have generally been overlooked by 
sociologists. This connection is the one made by Gadamer 
(and also Durkheim) between the preconscious and what we may 
describe as social structure (language, culture, social and 
economic relations- in a word the tradition we live in).
This connection suggests that we may study the prejudiced 
nature of interpretation and social action and thereby gain 
insight into the nature of social reality and the 
organization of society. In a limited sense, this is what 
Marxists do when they study aspects of economic relations of 
which we are unaware. However, contrary to a strictly 
Marxist view of reality, the analysis proposed here would 
not be exclusively economic. Following Gadamer, we may 
begin to examine social structure by way of the study of 
prejudices. By studying prejudices we will be able to 
understand the tacit dimensions of social structure which 
typically go unnoticed; the preconscious determinants of 
interpretive experience. It is important to consider that 
the study of the prejudiced nature of interpretation is at 
the same time the study of that which is tyrannical about 
social structure. This raises the possibility of examining 
the nature of power and domination by way of the 
sociological study of prejudices. Let us pursue this line 
of thinking.
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Toward a Theory of Interpretive Domination
Our discussion of the theoretical implications of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics for the question of the relationship 
between individual and social structure will be drawn on 
later in this chapter when we discuss how we might begin to 
study the constitutive role of prejudices and hermeneutical 
reflection for the social fabrication of reality. The 
discussion which we begin now suggests that Gadamer's 
hermeneutics may be used to conceptualize a theory of 
interpretive domination. Our discussion does not pretend to 
be definitive or exhaustive. It aims simply to open 
discussion on what may prove to be an important area of 
theoretical and empirical analysis within sociology.
In addition to the implications of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics for the conceptualization of social structure 
his work may be viewed as an important theoretical step 
toward establishing a critical approach to the analysis of 
the relationship between power and interpretive experience. 
Recently a number of thinkers have turned their attention to 
the study of power at the micro or interpersonal level. In 
sociology, for example, Giddens has argued for the study of 
"relations of power in interaction."21 In philosophy,
Michel Foucault has come to view power as all-pervasive, as 
part of any discourse whether it be a historical discourse
21 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. 1976, p.
1 1 0 .
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or a discourse between two subjects. He writes,
there are two meanings of the words subject, 
subject to someone else by control and dependence, and 
tied to his own identity by a conscience or self- 
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to.22
From a Gadamerian perspective, we may begin to consider what
we may term the interpretive power of individuals and
groups. How might we conceptualize "interpretive power?"
Is there an element of power in all interpretive experience?
Interpretive experience is empowering in that it enables us
consciously to grasp and express our practical relation to
the world. In one sense, interpretive experience provides
us with the power to change our environment and improve our
material existence; in another sense it enables us to
partake in the richness of a meaningful world which would
otherwise be unintelligible. Given that we have already
dealt extensively with the nature of interpretation, let us
proceed by discussing the nature of power.
According to Giddens, power refers to the
"transformative capacity" of human action, a notion which he
likens to Marx's notion of praxis. Giddens’ notion of power
thus refers to man's ability to transform nature and to the
"restlessly self-modifying character of human society."
22 Michel Foucault, as described by Paul Rabinow in his 
introduction to The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon, 
1984) p. 21. Original quote appears in Foucault's essay 
"The subject and power," in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 
Michel Foucault: Bevond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 212.
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'Power' in the sense of the transformative capacity of 
human agency is the capability of the actor to 
intervene in a series of events so as to alter their 
course .... 'power* in the narrower, relational sense 
is a property of interaction, and may be defined as the 
capability to secure outcomes where the realization of 
these outcomes depends upon the agency of others.23
Following Giddens, we may define interpretive power as the
capacity to transform our experience of the world into
meaningful interpretations and expressions. In practical
terms, interpretive power thus refers to our ability to
mediate the definitions of situations.24 Given the social
nature of meaning, and the fact that our experience is
constituted socially, we may say that the interpretive power
of one stands always in relation to that of another. Thus,
just as the capability to secure behavioral outcomes turns
on the behavior of others, the capability of interpretive
experience to define and mediate situational meanings is
invariably related to the interpretive experience of others.
This means that our interpretive power is intimately related
to that of another and to some extent dependent upon in.
According to Giddens, "the concept of power ... does not
logically imply the existence of conflict."25 Giddens thus
departs from Weber's view of power as the capacity of an
23 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. 1976, p.
111.
24 It is important to note that we are using here W. I. 
Thomas' notion of the 'definition of the situation' in order 
to establish the social-theoretical implications of 
Gadamer's analysis of interpretation.
23 Ibid., p. 112.
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individual to realize his will, even against the opposition 
of others.
It is the concept of 'interest,* rather than that of 
power as such, which relates directly to conflict and 
solidarity. If power and conflict frequently go 
together, it is not because power is linked to the 
pursuance of interests, and men's interests may fail 
to coincide. All I mean to say by this is that, while 
power is a feature of every form of interaction, 
division of interest is not.26
This view of power is very similar to that proposed by
Hannah Arendt,27 who like Giddens, rejects Weber's
definition.28 According to Arendt, if one follows Weber,
power becomes synonomous with the manipulative influence of
one over another. Hence, Arendt argues that what Weber
terms power is actually violence. But this does not mean
that it is Arendt's intention to reduce power to violence.
On the contrary, it is her aim to show that power need not
be coercive, that there is power in cooperation, power in
consensus. According to Arendt, "power corresponds to the
human ability not just to act but to act in concert."29
In light of our discussion we may define interpretive
power as the capability of mediating the meaning of a
situational definition. When the realization of this
26 Ibid., p. 112.
27 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt,
1970) .
28 For an analysis of Arendt's conception of power see 
Jurgen Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's communications concept of 
power," Social Research, Vol. 44 No. 1, 1977, pp. 3-24.
29 Arendt, On Violence, 1970, p. 41.
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capability is precluded for one reason or another, we can 
say that the realization of one's interpretive power has 
been violated. Perhaps the most obvious example of the 
violation of interpretive power would be the exclusion of 
certain parties from discourses concerning decisions which 
directly affect them. It would, of course, be utopian to 
think that we could all share equally in every discourse 
directly concerning us, particularly at the political level. 
In political discourses our interpretations and interests 
are supposedly included through the efforts of our elected 
representatives. In this sense, our political system at 
least acknowledges the right to exercise our interpretive 
power by providing a mechanism which in the very least 
provides a symbolic inclusion of our interpretive interests. 
Our political system thus avoids what would otherwise be a 
blatent denial of the public's interpretive power. However, 
in other institutions, such as the educational and corporate 
spheres, our interpretive power is often not even granted 
symbolic respect. There exists in these settings countless 
examples of interpretive domination, situations within which 
the expression of our interpretive power in the form of a 
question or assertion is denied out of hand. In some 
instances interpretive domination is blatent, such as in the 
case of a corporate executive commanding an underling to see 
things a certain way such that he or she will be able to 
perform an action according to the desire of his or her
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superior. In such cases the violators are unapologetic, the 
victims submissive and accomodating. It is unsettling to 
think that, if we follow Max Weber's reflections on complex 
organizations, bureaucracy is predicated on interpretive 
domination, for it requires of the bureaucrat in every 
instance adherence to prescribed interpretive formula, the 
deviation from which leads to reprimand and punishment. 
Considering the pervasiveness of complex organizations, all 
of which in varying degrees presuppose a certain amount of 
interpretive domination, one can only conclude that the free 
exercise of one's interpretive power is a rare occurrence in 
contemporary advanced societies, a privilege the 
distribution of which would seem to be highly stratified, 
owing to the fact that with political and economic power 
comes the authority to dictate situational definitions. It 
would be very interesting, however, to explore the extent to 
which certain occupations, occupations lacking political and 
economic power, nevertheless enjoy the free exercise of 
interpretive power, while those laying claim to political 
and economic power nevertheless are interpretively 
constrained. Adding to the interesting nature of this 
question is the fact that interpretive domination may be 
self-inflicted, and may therefore exist in instances in 
which individuals are otherwise free to exercise their 
interpretive power.
In addition to studying interpretive domination in
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hierarchical organizations we would want to study it in its 
less formal forms. For example, oftentimes acts of 
interpretive domination are actually rather subtle, such as 
in the college classroom where student's questions are 
precluded not because they are openly discouraged, but 
because of the format of the lecture itself, or because the 
students are trained for memorization and recitation in 
primary and secondary schools, and therefore lack the skills 
to exercise their interpretive ability, which has atrophied 
having been neglected for so long.30
Other subtle examples of interpretive domination 
include: the casual imposition of a situational definition, 
which might take the form of a friendly comment such as,
"you don't want to see that movie, I heard it's boring."31
30 Indeed, it may very well be the case that the very 
phenomenon to which the concept of interpretive domination 
refers may be so subtle, or taken-for-granted, that some 
might view it as insignificant and unimportant. Others may 
take the position that interpretive power should be 
stratified, owing perhaps to the belief that the opinions of 
some are more valuable than those of others. Indeed,
Gadamer acknowledges that yielding to the authority of an 
expert is not a violation of one's rights, it is simply the 
acknowledgement that the expert, an MD for example, is 
superior in judgment with regard to medical matters. Such 
an example, however, is categorically distinct from the 
countless situations people find themselves in during which 
time their interpretive power is denied out of hand.
31 We may note other examples of interpretive 
domination which are even more subtle but nevertheless meet 
our definitional criteria. For example, hearing the words 
of another without actually listening, which may be 
accompanied by such comments as "sure, sure, I see what 
you're saying ... but"; passing a negative judgment of the 
meaning of a person's expression without attempting to 
clarify whether or not your interpretation is consistent
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While such an imposition may appear trivial, it is in 
reality quite significant, not only because it is terribly 
important that individuals should be able to mediate the 
definition of a situation they will then be behaving in and 
experiencing, but because this example suggests the imposing 
nature of seemingly harmless and casual statements. When we 
become aware of this, our very self expression, in all 
situations and at all times, becomes stripped of whatever 
innocence it might otherwise claim and emerges as an 
expression of power the intent of which is to shape reality 
and others according to the way we are. A theory of 
interpretive domination would open discourse on a host of 
questions regarding the essence of power itself, which it 
reveals as nothing other than our expression of self in the 
world; an expression which manifests most primarily in 
interpretive experience and only secondarily in terms of 
economic and political decisions and actions.
In general terms we have defined interpretive domination 
as the preclusion or violation of people's ability to 
exercise their interpretive power, where interpretive power 
is taken to mean their ability to express themselves 
symbolically and therefore contribute to the mediation of 
the definition of a situation. Why, however, should we even 
consider pursuing such a theory? What is the significance
with that which was intended; failing to ask a question when 
one feels the need to and has the opportunity to do so (an 
example of self-inflicted interpretive domination).
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of the phenomenon of interpretive domination and why should 
sociologists be concerned with its specification and study? 
The answers to these questions stem from the implications of 
Gadamer's view that our experience is structured through 
interpretation. As we have already seen, Gadamer in fact 
views the nature of experience to be hermeneutical in that 
it involves (preconscious) understanding, (conscious) 
interpretation and the (practical) application of 
interpretation. The violation of one's interpretive power 
thus constitutes a violation of the structure of one’s 
experience of the world. It is therefore an ontological 
violation, a violation of the quality of one’s life. 
Interpretive domination is thus dehumanizing. This is the 
significance of interpretive domination and this is why it 
deserves to be studied sociologically.
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Semantical Analysis and Prejudices
In our discussion of the theoretical implications of 
Gadamer's work we established that his notion of the 
preconscious constitution of interpretation enables us to 
speak of the social-structuring of individual experience in
terms of preconscious linguistical concepts or prejudices.
This clears the way for the analysis of social structure by 
way of an analysis of prejudices. The aim of such research
would be to study the relationship between prejudices and
conscious interpretation and social action.
As we discussed earlier, perhaps the most important 
implication of Gadamer's notion of the preconscious or 
prejudiced structuring of experience is that our conscious 
interpretations are always at risk of being unknowingly 
falsely predicated. This in turn suggests that the social 
construction of reality should be reconceptualized in order 
to account for the fact that conscious decisions are often 
constituted through false prejudices, but otherwise appear 
sound by virtue of the fact that these prejudices escape 
conscious experience because they do not appear as objects 
of consciousness during their moment of application. Hence, 
we may begin to speak in terms of the social fabrication of 
reality. We mav therefore conclude that one practical 
implication of Gadamer's hermeneutics is that it calls out 
for the sociological study of prejudices and their 
relationship to the social fabrication of reality. How
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might sociologists study prejudices, the preconscious 
linguistical concepts which constitute interpretive 
experience?
We discussed earlier how Gadamer analyzes the 
Enlightenment's definition of the meaning of "authority" by 
focusing on the assumptions of meaning which the 
Enlightenment associated with the term. In effect, Gadamer 
calls into question the Enlightenment's interpretation of 
the meaning of authority by identifying the prejudices 
constitutive of its interpretation. This provides us with 
an example of how we might begin to indentify and study 
prejudices in a sociological and non-psychological sense. 
Following Gadamer, prejudices may be viewed as the implicit 
or preconscious linguistical concepts associated with 
particular words. By bringing into critical discourse 
aspects of linguistical concepts which are typically 
assumed, Gadamer in effect brings into discourse prejudices 
themselves. When the prejudices are experienced as false, 
the larger interpretation of which these prejudices were 
previously constitutive of is likely to be experienced 
differently. Simply stated, the explicit or conscious 
experience of prejudices may result in the negation of false 
prejudices.
In so far as this example approximates linguistical 
analysis Gadamer's hermeneutical reflection on linguistical 
concepts is clearly closer to semantical analysis than it is
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to syntactical analysis. Interestingly, a paper written by
Professor John Carroll argues for the importance of becoming
conscious of our preconscious use of language in much the
same way that Gadamer in Truth and Method calls for the
development of an effective-historical consciousness.32
What is interesting about Carroll's work is that he reaches
his conclusions without once making reference to
hermeneutics or philosophy. Concerned about the
ethnocentrism and ecological shortsightedness of American
policy makers and citizens, he deconstructs the meaning of
several words which are typically assumed to be true, but
upon further analysis, are clearly erroneous.
The parallels between Professor Carroll's approach and
that of Gadamer are striking given that the former had never
read or heard of the latter and has only a vague notion of
the meaning of hermeneutics.33 Carroll's point of departure
is the realization after
almost two decades of teaching, research writing, and 
publishing, of analyzing ecological and environmental 
issues and their causes ... that any solution to an 
environmental problem put forth in the conventional 
way, as a piece-meal, patch-it-up approach, would not
32 John E. Carroll, "Ecology and moral choice; Bias, 
prejudice and ecology." Unpublished paper, Department of 
Forest Resources, University of New Hampshire, 1988.
33 Professor Carroll provided me with a working copy of 
his paper "Ecology and moral choice: Bias, prejudice and 
ecology" in the spring of 1988 and we discussed it at length 
on at least two occasions. I would like to thank Professor 
Carroll for permitting me to cite the paper in this study. 
Professor Carroll presented a modified version of the paper 
while visiting Rhodes College on October 20, 1988.
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only not solve the problem but would bring with it a 
whole host of other problems .... It was thus that I 
came to realize that there was a much more fundamental 
problem in our assumptions, in our basic thinking, 
which was preventing us from effectively or even 
adequately dealing with our environmental problems, and 
our social problems in the broadest sense.34
What is striking about the similarity between Carroll and
Gadamer is that both conclude that the nature of
interpretive experience is prejudiced.
We are all biased, prejudiced, conditioned by our 
lives, our experiences, our inheritance, our 
proneness toward a certain world view .... that is part 
of the human condition, part of what it means to be 
human.3 3
What does Carroll consider the implication of the prejudiced 
nature of interpretation to be? He writes that, when we 
fail to realize our natural bias, we "begin to ascribe 
reality to that which is not real." When we distort reality 
in such a way, we create "gargantuan" problems, for our 
understanding of reality is false and
cannot help but result in erroneous interpretations of what
constitutes a problem and its solution.
The remedy is to know and respect our biases, our 
prejudices, our limitations to objectivity; to 
reject our intellectual arrogance which has gotten 
us into these predicaments; and to have the humility 
to much more fundamentally question our assumptions 
and, indeed, the very values we profess to believe 
in.3 6
Carroll's views are not formulated in reference to
3 4 Ibid., p. 1.
3 9 Ibid., p. 1.
3 6 Ibid., p. 2.
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philosophy, hermeneutics or sociology. They derive instead
from his practical experience and are aimed at environmental
policy reform. It is nevertheless not surprising that his
ideas should so closely approximate those of Gadamer, for
practical experience is both Gadamer's point of departure
and ultimate concern. If we compare Carroll's position on
interpretation to that arrived at by Gadamer there are no
fundamental differences. Following Carroll, understanding
is viewed ontologically, as a result of lived experience;
preconceptions are viewed as prejudices; the failure to
acknowledge this results in the confusion of reality; this
in turn impresses upon us the need to develop a new
attitude, which is in Carroll's words, one of intellectual
humility as opposed to arrogance. More striking than these
similarities, however, is the fact that Carroll comes to
view prejudices in linguistical terms, and comes to focus
his attention on the importance of semantical analysis for
revealing the "deep" meaning "underlying our usage of
certain words."
It is appropriate to start with a subject we are very 
often prone to dismiss, "semantics." Indeed, the way 
we use that very word, at least in the American version 
of the English language, is dismissive: "That's just 
semantics" .... we thus ignore, nay, dismiss, the deep 
and very real philosophical meaning underlying our 
usage of certain words.37
It is interesting to note that before Carroll can suggest
the value of semantics he must first address the prejudice
37 Ibid., p. 2.
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against semantics, just as Gadamer in his attempt to
rehabilitate the notion of prejudice must first deconstruct
the Enlightenment's prejudice against prejudice itself.38
Following Carroll's discussion of semantics he focuses on a
number of terms, one of which is "primitive." He points out
that, generally speaking, the meaning which the term
typically signifies in our society is pejorative. He points
out, however, that this is a biased and falsely prejudiced
interpretation of its meaning. According to Carroll the
term "primitive"
has become ... an excuse and an opportunity 
for people in our society to look down upon, to 
dismiss as without value those peoples who live in a 
traditional, close to the earth, close to nature 
manner, generally observing traditions that are many 
centuries old. "Primitive" peoples have much to teach 
us, but our arrogant and negative view toward them 
effectively closes off many possibilities to appreciate
38 Interestingly, Carroll is not alone in his meta- 
critical concern over prejudices and the implications of the 
constitutive role which they play in our view of the 
environment and reality in general. E. F. Schumacher, in 
his classic work Small Is Beautiful (New York: Harper Row, 
1973) pp. 82-83, asserts that although we must assume 
certain thoughts in order to think others, constitutive 
thoughts rarely become the focus of reflection itself. He 
writes, "when we think, we do not just think: we think with 
ideas .... but in modern times all too little attention has 
been paid to the study of the ideas which form the very 
instruments by which thought and observation proceed .... 
Indeed, it is often difficult to become aware 
of them, as they are the instruments and not the results of 
our thinking- just as you can see what is outside you, but 
cannot easily that with which you see, the eye itself." 
Schumacher is therefore equally concerned over the hidden 
role of prejudices. However, as this quotation indicates, 
his concern is epistemological, focusing on ideas and 




or learn from them.39
Carroll contrasts our typically falsely prejudiced
understanding of "primitive" with our equally biased use of
the term "civilized." It is worthwhile to examine Carroll's
thoughts on our usage of this term for it dramatizes the
hidden and tacit nature of linguistical contradictions.
Compared with "primitive"
our ■"usage of the word "civilized" has the opposite 
problem, a positive but no less value-laden and often 
inaccurate usage of the word. We use "civilized" to 
refer to ourselves, our Judaeo-Christian western 
industrial society, and to those who think as we do 
.... Can a society which brings the planet and humanity 
to the edge of nuclear holocaust, or ecological 
catastrophe, or one which permits milllions to starve, 
or conduct wars of aggression be considered "civilized 
as we use the term?40
Carroll makes it clear that it is not his intention to
romanticize the "noble savage." His intention is simply to
make the point that "the arrogant and prejudiced way we use
these words, the negative use of primitive and the positive
use of civilized, are ways we have of falsifying reality
and feeding our prejudice, at great cost to all and to the
planet as well."41 In terms of Gadamer's hermeneutics
Carroll is trying to help us to become conscious of the
history which operates behind our backs as a result of our
participation in a linguistic tradition. Like Gadamer,
39 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
4 0 Ibid., p. 3.
41 Ibid., p. 3.
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Carroll believes that we can learn much from the definitions 
societies live by. Both believe that it is imperative that 
we become conscious of our preconscious use of language, 
lest we continue to be deluded by that which operates behind 
our back.
We may use Carroll's example of semantical analysis to 
outline in general terms the sociological study of 
prejudices. As sociologists we would want to interview 
people and ask them to define, in their own terms. the 
meanings which they implicitly associate with certain words, 
such as "primitive," "underdeveloped," "poverty," etc. We 
would then analyze the content of the answers and study the 
extent to which certain types of answers associate with 
various demographic or biographical variables. We would 
want to study prejudices for we have established 
theoretically that prejudices constitute the social 
fabrication of reality. As Gadamer states, "reality happens 
precisely within language." It is therefore our intention 
to study social reality in part through a study of the 
constitutive role of preconscious linguistical concepts, or 
prejudices.
305
The Sociological Study of Hermeneutical Reflection
The approach to the study of prejudices which we have 
outlined may be elaborated into an experimental research 
design, a design which would enable us to study the effects 
of deliberate hermeneutical reflection on the mediation and 
ovecoming of false prejudices.42 After interviewing those 
selected (pre-test) and recording their prejudices 
(implicitly held meanings associated with certain words), we 
would adminster an experimental stimulus, such as a small 
group dialogue focusing on the implicitly held meanings 
revealed during the initial interview. The dialogue would 
be facilitated by the researcher who would encourage 
hermeneutical reflection by bringing into critical discourse 
the specific prejudices initially provided by the group's 
members. Following the discourse the participants would 
once again be interviewed and asked to expound upon their 
implicitly held meanings (post-test). We could then note 
any differences between the pre-test and post-test and draw 
conclusions from these differences in terms of other 
information obtained during the experiment. It is 
reasonable to think that such a research design would yield 
important insights into the relationship between 
hermeneutical reflection and prejudices.
Several questions arise with regard to the proposed
42 Hermeneutical reflection is defined in the final 
section of chapter four, pp. 133-136.
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design. One question would pertain to the difference 
between random and deliberate hermeneutical reflection.
Would the group discourse described above constitute an 
experience of random or deliberate hermeneutical reflection? 
Clearly the intent of the researcher is to deliberately 
facilitate hermeneutical reflection among the group's 
participants. But are the participants themselves 
deliberately reflecting hermeneutically? We must further 
specify our distinction between random and deliberate 
hermeneutical reflection before we can answer this question. 
We may say that deliberate hermeneutical reflection occurs 
only when an individual consciously acknowledges the 
prejudiced nature of interpretation, and seeks to be guided 
by this general understanding in particular moments of 
interpretation. This is what Gadamer and Carroll do in the 
work which we have discussed. We may say, then, that we 
must further specify the experiment which we have proposed 
to account for this distinction. We may posit a more 
involved experimental design which aims to specifically 
study deliberate hermeneutical reflection. This could take 
the form of inviting one (control) group of participants to 
participate in a group discussion which is not led in any 
specific direction by the facilitator but nevertheless 
focuses on the general topics from which certain words had 
been previously identified and their related prejudices 
noted. As part of the same experiment another
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(experimental) group would be interviewed but would be 
informed that the intention of the discourse is to study its 
effect on the mediation and overcoming of prejudices. These 
participants would thus be informed about Gadamer's notion 
of the prejudiced nature of interpretation and encouraged to 
deliberately reflect hermeneutically.
This research design is admittedly general and 
exploratory. As such it ignores the numerous threats to 
validity associated with an experimental design.
Nevertheless it may be taken as an important first step 
toward the sociological study of hermeneutical reflection 
and its relationship to prejudices. Aside from its 
generality, however, an important question arises with 
regard to its experimental nature. Does not the idea of 
studying hermeneutical reflection by way of a research 
design modeled after that of a classical scientific 
experiment contradict Gadamer's position regarding method? 
This is an important question, for it would be unfortunate 
if we were to find ourselves in the hapless position of 
contradicting ourselves by rejecting one part of Gadamer's 
work in order to study another. The answer to the question, 
however, is that there is nothing contradictory about what 
we have proposed. In fact, a Gadamerian would say that the 
question which we have posed is ill-conceived. What we have 
actually suggested does not so much follow the model of a 
classical scientific experiment as the structure of human
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experience itself. According to Gadamer, when an individual
experiences an unsettling feeling regarding the meaning of
something the inclination is to reflect on its meaning
hermeneutically. Such is the nature of the experience of
hermeneutical reflection. Its aim is to express consciously
through interpretation that which has been uncomfortably
experienced in understanding. Such expression has the
structure of a question. The question, once expressed,
gives rise to a meaningful discourse the experience of which
mav negate or confirm one's preiudament regarding the
meaning of that which is under consideration. The negation
or confirmation resulting from one's discursive experience . •
is part of the nature of experience itself.
The structure of an experiment is therefore essentially 
no different from the structure of experience itself. The 
initial "unsettling" feeling, the "annoyance" factor, if you 
will, which gives rise to hermeneutical reflection, is 
analogous to the research question which serves as the 
impetus for a scientific experiment; the question expressed 
through interpretation is analogous to the scientist’s 
hypothesis; the resulting meaningful discourse is analogous 
to the experimental stimulus; and the conclusion, the 
experience of the meaning of the discourse, is analogous to 
the comparison between the post-test and the pre-test. The 
importance of this comparison is not that the structure of 
common experience is comparable to that of a scientific
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experiment, for the meaning of this proposition may be 
construed in such a way as to suggest that common experience 
is almost as "good" or valid as that of a scientific 
experiment. The importance of our comparison is that it 
illustrates the fact that a scientific experiment has the 
same structure as experience itself. Doing an experiment 
involves doing what experience always does, albeit in a 
theoretically contrived situation. What Gadamer rejects 
about method, experimental or otherwise, is 1) method's 
claim to a privileged route to truth, and 2) the 
methodological requirement of attempting to detach oneself 
from one's linguistical tradition, an attempt which can 
never be fully successful. Given that many social 
scientists would admit that their methods do not constitute 
a privileged access to truth, it is Gadamer's second 
criticism which is more important. In Gadamer's view, 
method, in so far as it requires a deliberate attempt to 
carve out for oneself an objective interpretive perspective, 
is a form of self-inflicted alienation. Such an attempt 
denies the fact that all interpretation is historical, and 
mistakenly claims that there can be an interpretive moment 
outside of our historical tradition. In Gadamer’s view, 
such attempts at a controlled alienation can only distort 
the interpretation of reality.
It follows from our reiteration of Gadamer's critique of 
method that the experiment proposed in this study is not
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subject to a Gadamerian critique and is therefore not 
contradictory. The "experiment" which we have proposed 
neither makes a false claim to truth in the name of 
scienticism; nor does it posit a false separation between 
the researcher's historicity and the interpretive experience 
of the experiment. Our design is simply committed to the 
notion that the nature of interpretation is prejudiced, and 
that perhaps the best way to study the mediation of 
prejudices is by studying hermeneutical reflection. What we 
have proposed is actually little different than a Socratic 
dialogue. It intends only to 1) pose a question (for 
example, how would you define the meaning of primitive?), 
and 2) facilitate a discourse whereby people will be able 
consciously to experience the prejudice in their 
understanding by expounding on the definitions they have 
already provided, either deliberately or randomly. The only 
important difference between this approach and a quotidian 
dialogue is that the former is deliberately intended and 
that which will be observed will be noted in order to 
examine it later in reference to Gadamer's hermeneutics and 
the relevant soiological literature.43
43 Interestingly, if we wanted we could alter the 
terminology used above and describe our intended 
"experiment" in terms of a Socratic dialogue. This however, 
would taint the credibility of our proposal in the eyes of 
sociologists who lack the interpretive benefit of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. It would make sense politically, therefore, 
to play the language game of the sociologist and discuss our 
project in experimental terms in order not to alienate those 
outside of this literature.
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Given the all pervasive importance of prejudices for the 
constitution of experience and the social fabrication of 
reality it is not difficult to conclude that hermeneutical 
reflection serves a very important social function. If we 
were incapable of hermeneutical reflection we would truly be 
determined by history, for we would have no critical 
experience of it, no chance to mediate its meaning in light 
of our own experience. The ability to reflect 
hermeneutically on the meanings we inherit enables us to 
mediate these meanings and make them our own. Hermeneutical 
reflection is therefore both an example and expression of 
interpretive power, part of our natural ability to express 
ourselves and question what passes for reality.
Hermeneutical reflection appears even more important 
when we consider that reality is largely constituted through 
habit. As we have seen, both Schutz and Mead agree that our 
lives and interpretive experiences are routinized or 
habitualized. Habitual or taken-for-granted interpretation 
is the antithesis of hermeneutical reflection.
Hermeneutical reflection may therefore be discussed in terms 
of the "breaching" experiments conducted by Harold Garfinkel 
and his students. During a breaching experiment, the 
researchers (typically participant-observers) purposely 
violate the normative expectations of the person(s) with 
whom they are interacting and observe the efforts of the 
other(s) to attempt to reinstate normalcy to the situation.
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Because in such situations the normal flow of reality has
become disrupted or "breached," ethnomethodologists describe
these intentional disruptions as breaching experiments.
These experiments have demonstrated over and over again what
is now known as the conventional construction of reality.
For example, in one case Garfinkel assigns his students to
spend brief periods of time at home acting like boarders,
speaking only when spoken to, and the like. In his
description of the students' findings, Garfinkel writes
... family members were stupified. They vigorously 
sought to make the strange actions intelligible and 
to restore the situation to normal appearances.44
This is one among many studies which demonstrate the fact
that when reality is constructed in terms of conventional
meanings and expectations, and when this quasi-automatic
process is disrupted, the typical response is to act in such
a way as to recover conventionality.
The notion that reality is constructed conventionally
suggests that we have an aversion to questioning, an
aversion to hermeneutical reflection. Summarizing this
central insight of ethnomethodology Randall Collins writes,
"our strongest social principle is to leave the
interpretations alone, lest we see how flimsy they are and
reveal the unfoundedness beneath."48 From Gadamer's view,
44 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 47.
48 Randall Collins, Three Sociological Traditions.
1985, p. 210.
313
it is not so much that interpretations rest on shaky ground, 
but that they rest on prejudices.46 What is unsettling 
about questioning our prejudices is not that we would be 
faced with the "flimsiness" of reality so much as we would 
be faced with ourselves, and the way we actually are, as 
contrasted with the way we typically think of ourselves and 
our condition.
Few would disagree that the insight that reality is 
constructed conventionally is the single most important 
contribution of ethnomethology and phenomenological 
sociology. However, whereas ethnomethodology studies how 
people respond when the habitual or conventional flow of 
mundane reality is breached, Gadamer's work implies the 
importance of studying the conditions under which people 
themselves are inclined to, or denied the opportunity to, 
question the prejudiced construction or fabrication of 
reality. The study of hermeneutical reflection is thus the 
flip-side, if you will, of ethnomethodology. Where 
ethnomethodology studies the conventional construction and 
reparation of social reality, sociological hermeneutics 
studies the experience of hermeneutical reflection; it 
studies the experience of questioning the conventional and 
prejudiced fabrication of reality and the extent to which
46 Indeed, Gadamer would argue that interpretations are 
not "grounded" at all but are instead manifestations of 
understanding in particular situations and are, in this 
sense, constituted by concrete social relations.
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the possibilities for such questioning are differentiated 
across social statuses and social settings. The 
sociological study of interpretation from a Gadamerian 
perspective thus does not study that which is taken-for- 
granted, but the phenomenon of not taking reality for 
granted, for this is the nature of hermeneutical reflection.
Why should sociologists study hermeneutical reflection? 
We should study hermeneutical reflection because in both of 
its variations (random and deliberate) it represents an 
experience which mediates social structure by questioning 
the prejudiced fabrication of reality. Hermeneutical 
reflection is thus the human factor in a historical equation 
which otherwise would amount to a predetermined, meaningless 
existence. The degree of importance associated with 
studying hermeneutical reflection turns on the extent to 
which the conventional fabrication of reality may be found 
to be constituted through false prejudices. While it may 
not be feasible to attempt to establish the frequency of 
false prejudices across a society or social group it appears 
safe to say that the discovery of even a small number of 
widely assumed false prejudices would be indicative of the 
social significance of hermeneutical reflection, and of the 
sociological significance of its study. To the extent that 
hermeneutical reflection deliberately aims to bring into 
discourse the prejudices constitutive of experience its 
study becomes one with the study of social structure and the
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fabrication of social reality. By studying deliberate 
hermeneutical reflection we can learn about its ability to 
reveal false prejudices and overcome false consciousness.
The sociological study of hermeneutical reflection 
should focus on two general questions.
1) What is the effect of random and deliberate 
hermeneutical reflection on the mediation of social 
structure, defined in terms of prejudices; and what 
kind of effect does it have on the mediation and 
overcoming of false prejudices?
2) What is the social distribution of random and 
deliberate hermeneutical reflection and to what 
extent are the opportunities to experience 
hermeneutical reflection stratified across social 
groups and social settings?47
It would be worthwhile to observe dialogues within the 
rooms where policy decisions are being made, for it would be 
important to examine the extent to which hermeneutical 
reflection is either encouraged, tolerated, or precluded in 
such situations. It would also be important to study 
hermeneutical reflection across various institutions, such 
as educational institutions and centers of social research. 
In terms of the relevance of Gadamer's hermeneutics at the 
education-policy level, the experience of hermeneutical 
reflection may be encouraged and employed to help students 
identify and face consciously the prejudices which often 
block their understanding of certain ideas. In this sense
47 These minimal criteria are 1) the experience of an 
unsettling interpretive experience and 2) its expression in 
the form of a linguistic assertion which has the structure 
of a question.
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hermeneutical reflection may be used as a teaching tool, as 
an educational vehicle. This is perhaps the clearest 
example of the practical significance of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, for Gadamer's work may be used to teach 
hermeneutical reflection by example. In a very different 
sense, we may want to study the extent to which education 
hinders hermeneutical reflection by discouraging the 
questioning of prejudices. This is education at its worst 
and it would be interesting to study classroom settings in 
order to ascertain precisely how bad things really are in 
this respect.
The importance of studying hermeneutical reflection may 
be further demonstrated in terms of the fracturing or denial 
of hermeneutical reflection across social groups and 
settings. Our definition of hermeneutical reflection, be it 
random or deliberate, has two main features. The first is 
the experience of the need to question, to seek 
understanding because one is not satisfied with the meaning 
already experienced. The second important feature is the 
questioning to which the initial experience gives rise. In 
spite of our definition's lack of specificity we can at 
least say that these are the minimal criteria for 
hermeneutical reflection. If the first criterion for 
hermeneutical reflection is present {an unsettling 
interpretive experience) but the individual is denied the 
opportunity to express this unsettling experience in the
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form of question (the second criterion), then the experience 
of hermeneutical reflection has been fractured or violated. 
The denial of one's desire to raise a question in light of 
an unsettling interpretive experience constitutes an act of 
interpretive violence because the denial amounts to a 
preclusion of the realization of one's interpretive power.48 
When we consider the barriers to questioning imposed by 
differences of social status and social situation it would 
appear that the opportunities to reflect hermeneutically 
would be highly stratified in our society. In other words, 
the opportunities to express through speech questions 
regarding the meaning of something (a contract, an order, 
the meaning of another question). are not unlike economic 
opportunities, highly stratified, and vary considerably 
across groups and social settings. This suggests that the 
study of hermeneutical reflection crosses over into the 
study of interpretive power and violence. As Giddens 
writes,
the reflexive elaboration of frames of meaning is 
characteristically imbalanced in relation to the 
possession of power, whether this be a result of the 
superior linguistic or dialectical skills of one
48 Indeed, if we were to do an empirical study of the 
stratification of hermeneutical reflection we would expect 
to find a high (negative) correlation between economic 
status and interpretive violence. That is, the higher one's 
economic status the less likely would be the case that one 
would be a victim of interpretive domination. It would also 
follow that members of the economic elite, owing to their 
power regarding defining situations and specifying the 
appropriateness of certain behaviors, would be most likely 
to be the dominators rather than the domianted.
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person in conversation with another; the possession 
of relevant types of 'technical knowledge'; the 
mobilization of authority or ’force', etc. 'What 
passes for social reality' stands in immediate relation 
to the distribution of power.49
The analysis of the stratification of hermeneutical
reflection thus opens up a new dimension in the study of
power and social stratification.80
49 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. 1976, p.
113.
30 Similarly, viewing the preclusion of one's full 
realization of his/her interpretive experience as simply the 
result of the power of one over another ignores the fact 
that the person with the greater amount of power could also 
have encouraged rather than discouraged or precluded the 
other's realization of his/her interpretive power.
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Conclusion
We have discussed the practical implications of Gadamer*s 
hermeneutics in terms of the topics and research questions 
which it places before us. It is the view of this work that 
herein lies the central significance of Gadamer1s efforts 
for sociology, for it is our position that the sociological 
significance of hermeneutics turns on the social 
significance of hermeneutical or interpretive experience.
It is believed that through the study of the topics and 
questions which we have raised sociologists will be able 
more deeply to understand interpretive experience and its 
relationship to social action and the structuring of social 
relations.
Admittedly, our emphasis on the topical significance of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics, our preoccupation with the 
significance of the research topics and questions to which 
his work gives rise, has resulted in an under-emphasis on 
the specifically methodological importance of his work.
This does not mean that we view the methodological 
implications of Gadamer1s work to be unimportant. On the 
contrary, Gadamer's hermeneutics has important implications 
for methodological issues both within and outside of the 
sociology, as evidenced by the fact that the most 
comprehensive discussion of his work to date within 
sociology has focused almost exclusively on its 
methodological significance. It is simply the bias of this
320
work that the methodological implications of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, at least within sociology, are of secondary 
importance as compared with the topical implications which 
we have identified. It is indeed true that the 
methodological and topical significance of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics may both be traced back to the primary insight 
regarding the linguistically prejudiced nature of 
interpretation. However, given the fact that the effect of 
the interpretive action of sociologists on the social 
fabrication of reality is minimal compared with that of 
society at large, it appears ill-conceived for sociologists 
to place their main emphasis on interpretive problems and 
methodological disputes within sociology. More important, 
we believe, is the study of the nature of interpretation in 
terms of the relationship between hermeneutical reflection 
and prejudices.
But the contention nevertheless arises that, without 
having first examed the methodological significance of 
Gadamer's work, how is a Gadamerian-influenced sociologist 
to proceed methodologically while studying the questions 
introduced by his work? We have already discussed the fact 
that Gadamer views method as a conceptual and methodological 
derivative of quotidian understanding. The problem is that 
the derivation of method typically involves adherence to 
interpretive criteria that confound one's natural experience 
of truth in situations. Rather than to experience the truth
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in a situation as one commonly does, one is expected to 
suppress biographical biases in favor of an "objective" 
interpretation. Gadamer's main criticism of method is thus 
that it is itself an alienating experience, and as such, can 
only lead to the distortion of truth, since, after all, it 
is our understanding, our way of being in the world and our 
relation to it, which is the judge of truth. The alienation 
of experience arises when one claims on the basis of 
methodological adherence and conformity that he/she has 
attained an objective interpretive position. Such a claim, 
which is essentially Cartesian, assumes that it is possible 
to suspend the biases and prejudices resulting from one's 
historicity, thereby attaining a less clouded, objective 
perspective. It should be clear that from a Gadamerian 
perspective, this is a hopeless task. Such a claim assumes 
a false breaking of tradition, the notion that there exists 
outside of the tradition an objective interpretive moment. 
Certainly we may be able to overcome some prejudices, 
through hermeneutical reflection, but this can never be more 
than a partial overcoming, for prejudices are the condition 
of interpretive experience. Objectivity is thus a myth.
The same may be said of subjectivity, for "subjective" views 
are never merely subjective, if we take the term to mean 
that subjective views are individually constituted. Reality 
and our experience of it is inescapably intersubjective or 
social.
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Gadamer's critique of method may be construed to mean
that he rejects science. But this is not the case. To
Gadamer, science is a discipline of questioning and
research, a discipline which does not necessarily require
adherence to the fallacy of absolute historical
transcendence. In the concluding paragraph of Truth and
Method Gadamer writes
the fact that in the knowing involved in them (the 
human sciences) the knower’s own being is involved 
marks, certainly, the limitation of 'method,' but 
not that of science. Rather, what the tool of method 
does not achieve must- and effectively can- be achieved 
by a discipline of questioning and research, a 
discipline that guarantees truth.81
Gadamer thus endorses a science unencumbered by the false
claim of objectivity. Such a science, a discipline of
questioning and research, may be said to guarantee truth in
that it remains ever open to the experience of truth by
escaping the delusion of objectivity through the
acknowledgment of the prejudiced nature of interpretation.
By acknowledging the fact that interpretation is constituted
in understanding, we remain open to experience - our
questioning, our experiments, and our observations -, in a
way that is free of the false prejudice of objectivity. The
truth such a discipline "guarantees" is therefore not at all
an absolute truth, but a consciousness aware of the
constitutive effect of history within it. Such an
effective-historical consciousness is thus open to
81 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 1986, p. 447.
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experience the truth in a way those ignorant of history's 
constitutive effect cannot. From a Gadamerian standpoint, 
the only methodological concessions requested of sociology 
are 1) the admission of the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation, an admission which many sociologists have 
already expressed; and 2) the admission that the 
constitutive significance of prejudices is not something to 
be loathed. Rather than view the prejudiced nature of 
interpretation as something vicious, we should instead 
explore its significance scientifically and relate our 
findings to our historical situation.
We began this study by acknowledging the fact that 
sociology has, for many years, been living off of the 
intellectual capital of the nineteenth century. This fact 
has proved unfortunate for sociology, however, for it has 
hindered its ability to keep pace with the ever-expanding 
complexities of modern life. Classical concepts have been 
revised, but their fit remains loose; their relevance, 
questionable. Much sociological research today is little 
more than an exercise in technological application. The 
social significance and relevance of such studies are 
generally minimal. We have tried in this study to open up a 
new dimension in sociology, a dimension capable of helping 
us understand the nature of our historical predicament. Our 
conclusion is a call for the sociological analysis of the 
nature of prejudices and the experience Gadamer has defined
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as hermeneutical reflection. Studying these topics will 
provide insight into the nature of our condition; a 
condition structured by true and false prejudices which 
generally escape us. The success or failure of this opening 
will now depend on our ability to study the topics and 
questions we have identified. Perhaps in this way we may be 
able to carry on Gadamer's hope of cultivating an effective- 
historical consciousness, and thus illuminate what might 
otherwise be a dark and alienated future.
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